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PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
UNION, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, ORGANIZED ON
JANUARY 25, 1890

There is no truth more obvious than without coal there could
not have been such marvelous social and industrial progress as
marks present-day civilization.

Believing that those whose lot it Is to toil within the
earth's recesses surrounded by peculiar dangers and deprived of
sunlight and pure air, producing the commodity which makes
possible the world's progress, are entitled to protection and
an equitable share of the fruits of their labor, we have formed
the United Mine Workers of America for the purpose of establishing, by lawful means, the principles embraced in the body of
this Constitution.

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem
The economic health of the Appalachian Region is highly dependent on the coal industry.

In West Virginia, for example, the coal

mining industry in 1965 was one of only three producing sectors that
contributed more than 10 per cent to the state's total gross output.—
Presently, the principal coal producing areas in the United States
are the Appalachian portions of West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Kentucky,
2/
Virginia, Tennessee, Ohio and Alabama.—
The coal industry was a labor intensive industry which incurred
little mechanization until the late 1940s.
industry has become highly mechanized.

Since that time, the

The effects of mechanization

have had a major Impact on the economies of the important coal
producing states.
Often both non-unionized and unionized workers have been highly
3/
resistant to mechanization or labor-saving innovations.—

Workers

— Calculated from William H. Miernyk, et.al., Simulating
Regional Economic Development (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co.,
1970), Table I.
2/
— For a geographical definition of Appalachia, see Appalachian
Regional Commission State and Regional Development Plans in Appalachia 1968 (Washington, D . C : Appalachian Regional Commission,
December 1968), p. 14. West Virginia is the only state completely
included in the Appalachian Region.
3/
— Sumner H. Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial Management,
(Washington, D . C : The Brookings Institution, 1941), p. 201; and
Edwin Mansfield, The Economics of Technological Change (New York:
W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1968), p. 153.

2

in this category include the Luddites in Great Britain and those in
the various newspaper, glass and railroad unions in the United States.
In a number of instances, unions have unwillingly succumbed to
industry demands for mechanization if various guarantees were included, as was the case of the Mechanization and Modernization Agreement
signed in 1960 by the Pacific Maritime Association and the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union.—

It is unusual,

however, for a union actively to encourage mechanization, as the
United Mine Workers of America did beginning in the late 1940s.—
The position on mechanization of the United Mine Workers of America,
which represents a majority of the working miners in the coal fields,
was stated by President W. A. Boyle at Senate Hearings in 1969:
The union . . . recognized the industry was
undergoing a serious economic depression and, in fact,
its very existence was at stake. The union subscribed
to the philosophy that it was much better to have
fewer coal miners working in the industry, with mechanization, since it would provide full-time work and better .
working conditions, as contrasted to the most difficult
situations which existed in the industry prior to mechanization. It was the consensus of those, both on
management's and on labor's side, that if there were no
mechanization, there would be total elimination of coal
mining in America.6/

— For details about this agreement see Lincoln Fairley, "The
ILWU-PMA Mechanization and Modernization Agreement," Labor Law
Journal, July 1961, pp. 664-80.
— In this dissertation, actions attributed to the United Mine
Workers of America represent decisions made by national officers
that were not necessarily subject to membership referendums.
— United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, Coal Mine Health and Safety, Hearings before Subcommittee
on Labor, 91st Congress, First Session on S.355, S.467, S.1094,
S.1178, S.1300 and S. 1907, February 27, March 7, 12-14, 18, 20, 26
and May 2, 1969 (Washington, D . C : Government Printing Office, 1969),
p. 458.

3

This investigation will attempt to answer the questions:

How

have worker earnings been affected since the union's encouragement
of mechanization?

How have health, safety, and welfare for workers

in the mines been affected since the union's encouragement of mechanization?

Has the relationship between the United Mine Workers of

America and the coal operators changed since the policy of actively
encouraging mechanization was Implemented?

In other words, what

has been the impact of the union's encouragement of mechanization on
the union and on worker earnings, health, safety, and welfare in the
bituminous coal mining industry from 1946 to 1971?

Objectives and Hypotheses
The purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of the
United Mine Workers of America policy that encouraged mechanization
on the union and on worker earnings, health, safety, and welfare in
the bituminous coal mining industry from 1946 to 1971.

Specific

objectives include the examination of the following:
1.

The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements and their
impact on worker earnings.

2.

The comparison of worker earnings in the bituminous coal,
steel, and motor vehicle industries.

3.

The relationship between mechanization and health and
safety in the mines.

4.

The relationship between the United Mine Workers Welfare
and Retirement Fund and the United Mine Workers of America.

The relationship between the United Mine Workers of America
and the coal operators since 1946.

The following hypotheses will be tested:
Since the advent of mechanization in the United States
bituminous coal mines, the average annual earnings of
coal miners have increased at a slower rate than the
average annual earnings of workers in the benchmark automobile and steel industries.
The advent of mechanization was not accompanied by an
improved worker safety record in the United States
bituminous coal mines.
Since the advent of mechanization in the United States
bituminous coal mines, conditions that adversely affect
the health of working coal miners have developed.
Since the advent of mechanization in the United States
bituminous coal mines, benefits available from the United
Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund have increased
at a slower rate than benefits available to union
employees in the benchmark steel and motor vehicle
industries.
Since the advent of mechanization in the United States
coal mines, the economic interests of both the United
Mine Workers of America and the major coal operators
have become increasingly similar.

5

Procedure
Parts of the study will use the procedure of historical research
to trace developments in the policies and contracts of the United
Mine Workers of America.
be described and analyzed.

Specific union practices and policies will
In order to assure maximum objectivity

the analysis will be made from a wide representation of source
materials.

The materials will include publications of the United

Mine Workers of America, publications of dissident groups within the
United Mine Workers of America, journal articles, documented research
studies and books by economists and journalists, publications of
coal producers and coal producer associations, and government publications.

A critical evaluation of the source materials will be

accomplished by cross-checking the materials for accuracy, verifying
reported statistics and statements in the materials with the cited
sources, conducting personal interviews, and examining court documents and Congressional testimony.
Other parts of the study will utilize time-series data as
presented in government, union, and industry publications.

In

addition, data filed by the union and the management as required by
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, and data
presented

by the union and the management in court cases and

Congressional hearings will be used.

A cross-sectional analysis of

the data will be made to compare earnings, health benefits, and
welfare packages in the bituminous coal, steel, and motor vehicle
industries.

A time-series analysis of the data will be made on

fatality and injury rates in the underground bituminous coal mining

6

industry.

Also, a time-series analysis of longitudinal data will be

used to test the hypotheses that pertain to the activities of the
United Mine Workers of America and the United Mine Workers Welfare
and Retirement Fund.

Related Research
There has not been a gretit deal of research and analysis published on the coal industry since the 195C.
this section are generally out of date.

The studies cited in

None contains a comprehen-

sive examination of the major factors that contribute to the economic
well-being of the coal miner.
In a well-known study, "The Economic Effects of Collective
Bargaining in Bituminous Coal Mining," Rush V. Greenslade compared
hourly and annual earnings in the bituminous coal mines with those
in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors of the economy-.—

The

study, which was published in 1952, found average earnings in the
bituminous coal industry to be higher than those in the selected
benchmark sectors.
In the area of safety, Doris M. Drury did an excellent study
titled "A Study of Accidents in Coal Mines of the United States
8/
Compared to Other Countries.,L- The study provides a valuable analysis

Rush V. Greenslade, "The Economic Effects of Collective
Bargaining in Bituminous Coal Mining" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois, 1952).
8/
— Doris M. Drury, "A Study of Accidents in Coal Mines of the
U.S. Compared to Other Countries" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, 1965).

7

of loopholes in legislation and reasons for the poor safety records
in the coal mining industry.

The work, which analyzes data through

1959, is primarily a comparison of the United States coal industry's
safety record with that of other nations.
One of the first studies of the welfare factor was a dissertation titled, "A Study of the UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund" by
9/
George H. Scott.—

Published in 1951, the study is an interesting

source for details concerning the initial creation of the Fund and
the Fund'8 experience during its first five years.

This work was

updated in 1954 by a dissertation titled, "Development and Operation
of the Welfare and Retirement Fund in the Bituminous Coal Industry"
by Thomas E. White.—

Since that time, Robert J. Myers has publi-

shed three useful articles over a fifteen-year period in the
Industrial and Labor Relations Review that contain data released in
the annual reports of the Welfare and Retirement Fund.—

Some

9/
—'George H. Scott, "A Study of the UMWA Welfare and Retirement
Fund" (Unpublished Master's thesis, West Virginia University,
Morgantown, West Virginia, 1951).
— T h o m a s E. White, "Development and Operation of the Welfare
and Retirement Fund in the Bituminous Coal Industry" (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa., 1954).
— R o b e r t J. Myers, "Experience of the UMWA Welfare and
Retirement Fund," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Volume 10,
No.l, October 1956; "Further Experience of the UMWA Welfare and
Retirement Fund," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Volume 14,
No.4, July 1961; "The Mine Workers' Welfare and Retirement Fund:
Fifteen Years' Experience," Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
Volume 20, No. 2, January 1967.

8

additional discussion about the benefit programs of the Fund can be
found in C

L. Christenson's Economic Redevelopment in Bituminous

Coal.±2/
The first major study of the relationship between the United
Mine Workers of America and the coal industry was Baratz's The Union
13/
and the Coal Industry in 1955.—

This work is important in its

coverage through the early 1950s, but like many of the studies noted
above, it suffers from a lack of current material and analysis.

The

topic was updated to a limited extent in Christenson's work.—

12/
— C
L. Christenson, Economic Redevelopment in Bituminous Coal
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962).
13/
— M o r t o n S. Baratz, The Union and the Coal Industry (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955).
14/
— C . L. Christenson, op. cit.

CHAPTER

II

A PROFILE OF THE BITUMINOUS COAL MINING INDUSTRY

Coal: The Nature of its Demand
Bituminous coal is a primary fuel in today's industrial world.
Production over the past few years has been steadily rising to the
extent that the post-World War II record tonnage is on the verge of
being topped, and forecasters predict that the rising trend should
continue. Although coal has slipped slightly since the 1940s in its
share of total U.S. energy production, it has held its own over the
past decade (see Table 1).

Increased electricity production and

technological advances which will permit the conversion of coal into
pollution-free synthetic gas are reasons for the optimistic forecasts
of one to three billion tons of coal per year by the year 2000.—
Projections for coal production, based on estimated supplies and the
costs of competitive fuels, indicate that the rate of production will
2/
continue to increase until the turn of the century.—
The industry has changed in many ways from its "sick" image
portrayed in the 1940s.
and railroads.

The industry no longer caters to home heating

Instead, it has become tied to the electric utility

industry and continues to provide coal to basic industries such as

— TRW Systems Group, Underground Coal Mining in the U.S.
(Washington, D . C : Bureau of Mines Open File Report 10-70, June 1970),
p. 4-1.
2/
— See, for example, M. King Hubbert, "The Energy Resources of
the Earth," Scientific American, Volume 225, Number 3, September 1971,
p. 69.
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TABLE

1

SOURCES OF ENERGY IN THE U. S.**

Year
19571958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967*

Anthracite
Coal

Bituminous
Coal

Total
Coal

1.5%

30.9%
27.5
26.4
26.1
25.0
25.2
26.0
26.4
26.8
26.5
25.7

32.4%
28.9
27.7
27.2
26.0
26.2
27.0
27.3
27.6
27.1
26.3

1.4
1.3
1.1
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.3
0.8
0.6
0.6

Crude
Petroleum
36.3%
36.3
36.5
35.8
35.9
35.4
34.6
33.5
33.0
33.2
33.4

Natural
Gas

Total Oil
and Gas

Water
Power@

27.7%
30.5
31.8
33.2
33.9
34.3
34.5
35.2
35.2
35.7
36.1

64.0%
66.8
68.3
69.0
69.8
69.7
69.1
68.7
68.2
68.9
69.5

3.6%

4.3
4.0
3.8
4.1
4.1
3.9
4.0
4.2
4.0
4.2

** Water power at constant fuel equivalent: anthracite • 12,700 B.t.u. per pound; bituminous coal
* 13,100 B.t.u. per pound; crude petroleum, 5,800,000 B.t.u. per barrel; and natural gas, dry,
1,035 B.t.u. per cubic ft.
@

Includes nuclear power (one tenth of one per cent each year), beginning 1962.

*

Preliminary

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, U. S. Senate, Coal Mine Health and Safety, Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Ninety-first Congress, First Session,
on S.355, S.467, S.1094, S.1178, S.1300 and S.1907, February 27, March 7, 12-14, 18, 20, 26
and May 2, 1969 (Washington, D . C : Government Printing Office, 1969), p. A-101.
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steel and cement.

Labor relations have changed considerably.

Since

the first national wage agreement in 1950 there has not been an
authorized strike in the coal fields. Negotiations have been quiet
and secret, conducted by top union leaders and the operator associations.

Wages have risen steadily but not as rapidly by far as

productivity increases resulting from massive mine mechanization.
The industry has become more concentrated, with large oil and mineral
firms now controlling much of the production.
Competitive fuels, once considered a threat to the future of
coal, look vulnerable.

Natural gas reserves have dipped dangerously

low, as presented in Chart 1, the supply of crude oil remains highly
dependent on Third World nations, and nuclear power is still struggling with technological, cost, and environmental difficulties.

Coal

is the most abundant fuel in the U.S. with reserves approximating
3/
3,000 billion tons.— Coal has 80 per cent of the nation's known and
4/
available fuel supply.—

Shale oil is second with 8 per cent, follow-

ed by natural gas, 5 per cent;
liquids, 1 per cent;

petroleum, 3 per cent;

natural gas

and nuclear power, 3 per cent.—

The largest customer for coal in 1970 was the electric utility
industry.

The growth of the industry and its demand for coal is

shown in Table 2.

There are a number of reasons why coal is playing

a primary role in electrical generation.

First, coal is very compe-

3/
— TRW Systems Group, o£. cit., p. 4-1.
— Bituminous Coal Facts (Washington, D . C : National Coal Association, 1968), p. 45.
-'ibid.
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CHART 1
RESERVE TO PRODUCTION RATIO IN NATURAL GAS

Reserve-toproduction ratio
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SOURCE: American Gas Association as cited in Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas, Business Review.
January 1971, p. 2.

TABLE

2

THE CHANGING MARKETS FOR BITUMINOUS COAL
(Percent of Total Production)

Year
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

Electric
Utilities
12.4
12.9
13.6
15.9
18.4
17.1
19.1
22.1
24.6
29.4
30.2
30.9
31.9
37.3
40.2
41.8
44.6
45.2
45.5
45.8
47.4
49.5
49.2
54.1

Railroads

21.7
20.6
17.3
15.8
15.6
11.8
10.1
8.1
6.1
4.4
3.3
2.5
1.7
0.9
0.6
0.5
-

Steel

Cement

19.0
17.9
18.9
20.3
23.2
22.2
23.4
23.0
26.6
23.6
24.7
22.5
23.3
20.5
20.8
21.3
20.2
19.3
18.5
19.7
20.0
19.3
17.8
17.6

0.7
1.3
1.3
1.4
1.8
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
2.0
1.8
1.8
1.8
2.0
2.1
2.0
1.9
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.7
1.7
1.6
1.7

Other Manufacturing
20.7
21.1
22.7
24.4
14.4
26.1
21.3
20.6
20.4
19.5
17.6
18.9
18.6
18.3
20.2
18.3
17.7
17.9
18.8
18.9
17.4
16.6
19.3
14.5

Retail

Export

20.7
18.5
15.3
14.5
20.2
16.4
13.9
14.3
13.1
13.2
11.4

4.8
7.7

9.7
7.2
8.7
7.1
7.3
6.9
6.7
5.1
4.0
3.7
3.7
3.1
2.8

10.9
7.7
6.4
4.9

10.6
10.2
7.4
7.9

11.0
13.7
15.5
12.3
9.0
8.8
8.7
9.1

10.3
9.8
9.8
9.2
9.0
9.3

SOURCE: Computed from U.S. Bureau of Mines data as cited in Bituminous Coal Data, 1969 (Washington,
D . C : National Coal Association), p. 82.
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titive, as prices have remained relatively stable since the early
1950s.

Table 3 shows the price changes in major generating fuels.

Second, there are known ample reserves and the reserves are
located inside the United States. Hollis M. Dale, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Mineral Resources in the Nixon Administration stated, "we control securely the U.S. coal reserves, and this
is not always true of foreign supplies of natural petroleum."—

Fuel

oil is Imported from South America, mainly Venezuela, and the reserves
of natural gas are low as shown on Chart 1.

The latter was made clear

when the U.S. Supreme Court in early 1961 affirmed a Federal Power
Commission ruling that prevented New York City's Consolidated Edison
use of 50 million cubic feet of gas a day.

Said Chief Justice Earl

Warren, "the use of gas for purposes adequately served by other fuels
is undesirable not only because it injures the competing industry .
.but because it is wasteful to use a fuel in short supply in place
of an abundant fuel.—

The competitiveness of nuclear power is still

untested, since the Atomic Energy Commission still considers all
existing facilities as experimental and subsidizes their costs.
Third, coal transport costs, which often can equal the minemouth coal cost, have been reduced by a number of methods.

One

method is the fast loading-fast unloading unit train introduced by
the railroads.

This involves a long-term contract with a utility to

buy complete single cargo trainloads of coal on a regular volume

— Coal Patrol, Washington, D . C , No.3, December 1, 1970.
— Wall Street Journal, February 28, 1961, p.l.

TABLE

3

\

WHOLESALE PRICE INDEXES ANNUAL AVERAGES FOR ELECTRIC POWER FUELS
(1957-59 - 100)
Year

Coal

1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

71.4
86.1
85.8
86.1
87.9
88.2
91.4
86.2
85.0
92.0
100.8
99.7
99.4
98.8
97.7
96.8
96.9
96.9
96.5
98.6
103.3
107.1
116.2

Gas Fuels

Crude Petroleum

Total Fuel

101.7
110.9
116.6
118.6
119.2
122.8
121.3
124.1
129.3
133.7
123.9
124.5

61.7
83.1
82.0
82.0
82.4
82.4
88.4
91.0
91.1
91.6
101.0
101.2
97.8
97.2
97.5
97.7
97.3
96.9
96.8
97.5
98.6
99.4
103.7

73.6
87.0
86.5
86.1
87.7
88.3
91.4
87.3
87.1
93.3
98.6
99.8
101.6
102.5
102.3
101.8
103.0
102.5
103.3
106.4
110.5
113.0
117.6

SOURCE: Handbook of Labor Statistics (Washington, D. C : Bureau of Labor Statistics,
1970), pp. 308, 311, 318.

16

basis.

In some cases the utility even purchases the railroad coal

cars and pays only for track use. The resulting special volume
8/
rates are 25-35 per cent lower than the regular rate schedule.— Some
railroads now use what is called an "integral" train.

In these trains

cars are permanently coupled and carry up to five times the normal
load.

Coal companies are experimenting with other transport methods,

the most successful being the coal slurry pipeline.

This involves

mixing crushed coal with water and moving the resulting slurry
through a pipeline. At the destination, the water is removed and the
coal dried.

The method was considered to transport coal to the East

Coast from the coal fields of West Virginia, but the idea was temporarily shelved when the unit train rates were introduced.

However,

a 275 mile Blurry pipeline is being used to link the Black Mesa,
Arizona, coal fields with a thermal power plant on the Colorado River
in Nevada, and has the potential of becoming a very efficient trans9/
port means in certain areas.—
of barges.

Another economical method is the use

Tampa Electric Company and Peabody Coal Company jointly

own two water carrier firms which haul from western Kentucky down the
Mississippi r i v e r . — U t i l i t i e s have also started to move into the
coal fields with "mine-mouth" plants.

This is possible by the more

efficient transmission of high voltages and the use of regional power
grids.

According to the New York Times, "three major Middle Atlantic

-^New York Times, July 28, 1963, p. 9.
— Bituminous Coal Facts, op. cit., p. 33-34.
—

Wall Street Journal. February 28, 1961, p. 1.
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power systems —Consolidated Edison, Allegheny, and the PennsylvaniaNew Jersey-Maryland interconnection— announced a $350,000,000
program recently to tie in with power plants in Pennsylvania and
West Virginia at the coal mines. More than 600 miles of 500,000
volt line are planned.1'—
Fourth, one must not overlook the tremendous increase in the
demand for electricity.

According to the National Coal Association,

12/
demand doubles about every decade.—

ThiB necessitates short-run

generating capacity, and coal, being inexpensive and convenient,
obtains a significant share of the energy needed to satisfy the new
demand.

The short-run use of coal has also been aided by modern

technology that has enabled the utilities to increase significantly
their efficiency in the use of coal.

In 1945, 1.30 lbs. of coal was

required to produce 1 kilowatt hour.

By 1968, this requirement had

13/
dropped to 0.87 lbs. (see Table 4 ) . —
A future market for coal will be opened up by plants to convert
coal into synthetic gas and oil.

The U.S. Department of Interior

claims that economically feasible commercial plants of this nature
14/
are likely to be built by the late 1970s.—

According to the Wall

Street Journal:
The extraction of gas and oil from coal 'is going to
come, and when it comes, it will require tremendous

— ' N e w York Times. April 7, 1963, Section III, p. 9.
12/
—Bituminous Coal Facts, op. clt., p. 13.
13/
"~^
— Bituminous Coal Data (Washington, D . C : National Coal Association, 1969), p. 106.
14/
— Wall Street Journal. October 13, 1970.

TABLE

4

POUNDS OF COAL PER KILOWATT HOUR

1920
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

*

3.0
2.0
1.6
1.44
1.34
1.30
1.19
0.951
0.935
0.928
0.904
0.890
0.876
0.863
0.858
0.856
0.857
0.858
0.869
0.870
0.870*

Preliminary

SOURCE:

Federal Power Commission data
as cited in Bituminous Coal Data
(Washington, D.C.: National Coal
Association, 1969), p. 106.
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reserves of coal,' says John Corcoran, President of
Consolidation Coal Company, a subsidiary of Continental
Oil Company. He estimated a 'fairly modest' plant
producing 100,000 barrels of crude oil daily would
require 15 million tons of coal a year, or more than
10 times the coal needed to fire a big electric power
plant.15/
Peabody Coal Company, 1970's second largest coal producer, and
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company have announced their intention
"to construct and operate a gasification plant at a Peabody coal
mine and to use the gas produced as a supplemental supply for
Panhandle Eastern's market in the Midwest.—

The announcement also

stated that "the gasification process occurs entirely in closed
vessels, so there will be no atmospheric pollution.

The gas would

be free of sulphur and other pollutants and would be suitable in
every application where natural gas is used."—
A survey of the nature of demand must include foreign markets.
United States coal has been consistently less expensive In Europe
and Britain than European and British coal.

However, foreign import

restrictions to protect the domestic coal industry have prevented
significant increases in U.S. exports to Britain and Europe as shown
in Table 5.

The post-World War II industrial boom in Japan, on the

other hand, has created a tremendous market for U.S. coal, as Japan
must import practically its entire supply.

Some Japanese companies

are even prepared to invest capital to open more U.S. coal mines.

— W a l l Street Journal, November 11, 1970.
—'wall Street Journal. May 6, 1970.
^'ibid.
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TABLE

5

FOREIGN U. S. EXPORTS OF COAL AS A PERCENTAGE OF ANNUAL PRODUCTION

Year

1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967

European Coal and Steel
Community (Belgium
Luxemburg, France,
Italy, W. Germany, and
The Netherlands)

3.7
4.7
4.3
4.2
3.6
2.9

Canada

Japan

1.5
1.3
1.3
1.5
1.5
2.2

2.7
3.0
2.9
3.1
3.0
2.8

FOREIGN U.S. EXPORTS OF COAL AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL U.S. EXPORTS

1962

40.7

29.7

16.8

1963

45.5

29.2

12.9

1964

44.0

29.6

13.6

1965

42.5

31.2

14.9

1966

39.1

32.1

15.8

1967

32.9

30.8

24.7

SOURCE:

Calculated from U.S. Bureau of Mines data as cited in
Bituminous Coal Data (Washington, D . C : National Coal
Association, 1969), pp.79-81.
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A case in point is an agreement that calls for the Nissho-Iwai
Trading Company to lend Island Creek Coal Company (1970's third
largest producer) enough money to develop, over a four-year period,
a new mine in the Pocahontas coal field of West Virginia.

It would

commit the Japanese firm to a supply contract for two million tons
18/
of coal from the mine for fifteen years.—

Coal Fields In the United States
Important variables in the production of coal are highly dependent on the earth's geological base.

These variables include the

coal seam's location, accessibility, thickness, quality, and uniformity.

In the United States, there are three major areas of coal

mining activity, although there is coal production in over 30 of the
states.

These areas are: (a) the Appalachian field of West Virginia,

Pennsylvania, Ohio, Kentucky, Virginia, and Tennessee, (b) the
central field of Indiana and Illinois, and (c) the western field of
Colorado, Utah, Montana, and Wyoming.
Approximately 75 per cent of the nation's production is mined
in the Appalachian field, where the three largest coal producing
states of West Virginia, Kentucky and Pennsylvania are located. There,
vast underground mines produce a high grade metallurgical coking coal
that is ideal for the nearby Wheeling and Pittsburgh steel mills.
In addition, a large amount of surface and lower quality underground
coal Is being mined for the expanding utilities of the east coast
power grid.
•tai

—

New York Times. December 28, 1969, Section III, p. 10.
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There are some underground operations in the central field as
well, but over half of the production in Illinois, and practically
all of the production in Indiana, comes from surface mines.

The

main reason is that the coal seams do not remain equidistant from
the surface.

Thus, the same seam that might be far underground in

one area might be closer to the surface in another. As CL.Christenson points out: "The stripping areas in Indiana tend to be near the
eastern edge.

.

. while the deep mines are almost at the western

border of the state .

.

. this is because the geological formation

has placed the coal seams at an angle, rising toward the east .
hence strippable tonnage of one area may present coal from the same
19/
seam that requires deep mining elsewhere.—

The geological situa-

tion in the central field places good quality seams very close to the
surface, and the area accounts for approximately 20 per cent of the
nation's production.
Most of the remaining 5 per cent of the nation's, production
comes from the Western field.

Although the seams there are very

thick, often two or three times as thick as average seams in West
Virginia and Pennsylvania, they are deep and difficult to mine by
conventional mining operations.

Extensive research to develop new

techniques of roof support and machinery that can efficiently handle
thick seams will be necessary before the vast Western reserves are
utilized.

—w
C L. Christenson, Economic Redevelopment in Bituminous Coal
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 34.
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There are three basic classifications of coal mines:
ground, strip, and auger.

under-

About two-thirds of the nation's coal in

1968 was mined underground.

Basically, an underground operation 1s

serviced by shafts, through which men, equipment, and air are put
in and mined coal taken out.

A", underground mine presents unique

problems, such as gas emission from the coal seam, roof support,
ventilation, coal dust, and water drainage.
Underground operations have three types of access to the coal
seam: drift, slope, and shaft.

As shown in Figure 1, a drift mine

has an opening directly on the seam, thus allowing a straight
horizontal entrance.

Many small mines are of this type. A slope

operation has an entrance to the seam, but the haulage way is usually
short and has a slope of less than 30°. The deeper mines utilize
elevator shafts, which often service a number of parallel coal seams
at various levels.
A strip mine is simpler, since the coal is merely excavated
from the surface after removal of an overburden.

Necessary equip-

ment Includes huge shovels (which range up to five stories high),
bulldozers, trucks, and other heavy construction-type equipment.
The equipment is versatile and highly mobile.

Although stripped

coal is usually of poorer quality than underground coal, the nature
of its excavation allows higher productivity per man-hour and a
total exhaustion of the seam.

Considerable surface upheaval

usually accompanies the process.
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FIGURE 1

THE THREE TYPES OF ACCESS FOR UNDERGROUND COAL MINES

^n

DRIFT

SLOPE

SHAFT

SOURCE: TRW Systems Group, Underground Coal Mining in the U. S.
(Washington, D. C : Bureau of Mines Open File Report 10-70,
June 1970), p.5-4.
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Auger mining is the third major type of mining.

This might be

described as a boring process, during which whirling bits are drilled
into the seam.

This usually takes place from an exposed hillside or

during the stipping operation.

The bit is capable of boring 200

feet or more, leaving behind immense cylindrical cavities.
All three mining processes utilize tipples and/or cleaning
plants.

Tipples screen the coal by various sizes, while cleaning

plants wash and crush the coal according to buyer specifications.

Underground Fragmentation Techniques

Coal fragmentation techniques have changed considerably since
1940, although they are still controlled by seam characteristics,
such as thickness and uniformity, and capital investment.
In 1945, over 90 per cent of the nation's coal was mined by
20/
what is called the "conventional" method.—
cutting holes into the working face.
the holes.

This entails under-

Explosives are then placed in

Upon ignition, the entire working face crumbles, leaving

chunks of coal of various sizes. A loader then scoops the coal into
a car, which is moved to the surface by a locomotive.

Roof bolts

or timbers are then advanced and the process is repeated.

The

percentage of coal mined in this manner has been steadily decreasing.
By 1969, only 45 per cent of the underground U.S. coal was mined
21/
by the "conventional" method.—

20/
— Bituminous Coal Data, op. clt., p. 51.
21/
—'TRW Systems Group, op.cit., p. 5-5.
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The continuous mining machine was introduced in the larger
mines during the early 1950s.

In 1950, the continuous mining

machine accounted for only 1.2 per cent of underground coal produc22/
tion in the U. S . —
This share had increased to over 50 per cent
23/
by 1969.
Basically, the continuous miner is a one-man machine
that automatically rips out the coal with clawing arms, scoops up
the pieces, and conveys these pieces to a waiting transport car
behind it.

The machines are capable of producing more than 600 tons

per hour, use electric motors of up to 600 horsepower, weight 100,000
24/
pounds, and cost up to $200,000 each.—

These machines do not

always operate at full capacity, since delays due to roof bolting
and the lack of shuttle transport cars are frequently encountered.
This mining method is also being introduced in smaller mines, as
used machines have become available.

Overall, the diffusion in the

industry of the continuous mining technique has been very rapid.
According to Edwin Mansfield, "fifteen years elapsed before half of
the major pig-iron producers had used the by-product coke oven, but
only three years elapsed before half of the major coal producers had
25/
used the continuous mining machine."—
The longwall mining method has been used extensively in Europe
for years, but only recently has it been used in the United States.
This mining process is somewhat similar to slicing meat, as a block

—'Bituminous Coal Data, op. cit., p. 51.
•=^'TRW Systems Group, op. cit., p. 5-14.
^'ibid., p. 5-14.
•=£'Edwin Mansfield, The Economics of Technological Change
(New York: W. W. Norton and Company Inc., 1968), p. 115.
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of the coal seam is continually sheared by the machine which moves
forward by a series of self-advancing roof jacks. The seam blocks
that are sliced "range from 300 to 600 feet wide and are sometimes
26/
1% miles long."—

The first year that longwall mining was used in

the United States was 1966, when it accounted for 0.7 per cent of
27/
total underground U. S. production.
slowly but steadily increasing.

This percentage has been

By 1968, its share was 1.4 per cent

and the method is expected to make faster inroads in the future.
The longwall mining machine is particularly efficient in long three
to five foot high seams.
Table 6 presents a comparison of the three mining methods
described above.

The Nature of the Price and Cost Structure

Coal is not a homogeneous product.

There are different kinds

of coal for different purposes, and each market has its own demand,
supply, and selling price.
First, there are the three basic types of coals: anthracite,
bituminous, and lignite.

Anthracite is hard coal, difficult to

mine and limited in supply.

It contains over 90 per cent carbon

and only a small amount of volatile elements.

The production of

anthracite coal has been decreasing and presently accounts for only
about0,5 per cent of the total energy used in the United States.

26/
— TRW Systems Group, op. cit., pp. 5-14.
27/Bituminous Coal Data, op. cit.. p. 51.

TABLE

6

COMPARISON OF CONVENTIONAL, CONTINUOUS, AND LONGWALL MINING

Longwall

Advantages

Disadvantages

. Increases prdduction
. Eliminates some permanent roof support cost
. Cuts cost of ventilation, storage, and rock
dusting by 45%.
. Provides better ventilation, roof support.
. Requires less supervision.
. Safer-superior method
where roof conditions
are poor.

Requires large, level,
straight blocks of coal
free from obstructions
with seam height minimum of 39".
Requires high capital
investment for equipment.

Continuous Room
and Pillar

Conventional
Room and Pillar

Involves fewer work cycles,
less equipment, and
normally produces more per
man than conventional
mining.
Permits more concentrated
mining with fewer supervisory and ventilation
problems.

Effective in coalbeds
with high hardness
*
ratings, large partings
and varying dimensions.
Produces less fine coal.
Efficient where roof
and floor planes
undulate.

Not effective where hardness ratings are high,
partings* large, floor and
ceiling planes undulate,
and roof conditions are
poor.
Not effective where seam
heights vary greatly.

Requires numerous work
cycles.
Involves larger crew
and more equipment with
attendant supervisory
and maintenance problems.
Produces less per man.
(Continued)
to

oo

TABLE

Longwall

Involves costly equipment moves (30-150 manshifts to move 300 tons
of equipment).
Crew Sizes

Varies - 12-24 employees

6

(Continued)

Conventional
Room and Pillar

Continuous Room
and Pillar

Cannot be used where coal
size is critical.
Provides inefficient face
haulage.

Provides inefficient
face haulage.
Not efficient where
roof conditions are poor.

1 - Continuous Miner Operator
1 - Continuous Miner Operator
Helper
2 - Shuttle Car Operators
1 - Roof Bolting Machine
Operator
1 - Section Mechanic
1 - Section Foreman
T " - Total
Plus:
1 - Loading Machine
Operator
1 - Conveyor Belt
Attendant - Boom
Operator
1 - Timberman - Cleanup
Man
(Average crew size is 8)

2
1
1
1

Cutting Machine
Operator
Drill Operator
Shot Fireman
Loading Machine
Operator
Loading Machine
Operator Helper
Shuttle Car Operators
Roof Bolting Machine
Operator
Section Mechanic
Section Foreman

10 - Total
Plus:
1 - Conveyor Belt
Attendant Boom
Operator
1 - Timberman-Cleanup
Man
(Average crew size is 11)
(Continued)
ro

TABLE

Longwall

6

(Continued)

Continuous Room
and Pillar

Conventional
Room and Pillar

Equipment

Continuous Longwall Mining
System, including:
. Longwall Machine
. Face Conveyor
. Self-Advancing Supports

Continuous Miner
Shuttle Care or Bridge
Conveyor
Roof Drill

Cutting Machine
Coal Drill
Loading Machine
Shuttle or Bridge
Conveyors
Roof Drill

Average
Productivity

500 to 1,000 tons/shift
60 tons/face-man

400 tons/shift
50 tons/face-man

300 tons/shift
25 tons/face-man

Average Seam
Thickness

36" to 84"

24" to 120"

24" to 184"

Width Mined

300' to 600'

12' to 30'

12' to 30'

*

Partings are impure bands in coalbeds.

SOURCE: TRW Systems Group, underground Coal Mining in the U. S. (Washington, D. C : Bureau of Mines
Open File Report 10-70, June 1970), pp. 5-11, 5-12.
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Lignite is the youngest geological form of coal, being one stage
advanced over peat.

Lignite contains considerable moisture and

large amounts of volatile elements.
anthracite and lignite.

Bituminous coal falls between

It is the most widely mined and used coal

in the United States and thus is the focus of this study.

Unless

noted otherwise, all references to coal in this study pertain only
to bituminous coal.
There are also specialized markets for various classes of
bituminous coal determined partly by BTU ratings which vary considerably from clasB to class.

The metallurgical market, for example,

requires high quality coal that is free from as many impurities as
possible.
producers.

Tolerable specificationsare determined by the steel
On the other hand, steam coal for utilities can be of

varying quality.

Utilities are mainly interested in the price per

million BTUs. The price of coal in the steam market is less than in
the metallurgical market.
or screening facilities.

Some mines do not have cleaning, crushing,
The market for their lump coal would be

different than coal from a mine which offered a carefully washed and
crushed product.
The average price of coal per ton at the mine mouth has remained
relatively stable or decreased from 1950 to 1968. The price was
$4.84 in 1950.

It reached a peak of $5.08 In 1957, dropped as low

as $4.39 in 1963, and has risen slowly since then.

These data are

presented in Table 7.
Another Important consideration is the price of coal compared
with other competitive fuels. Table 3 compared wholesale price

TABLE 7
AVERAGE F.O.B. MINE-MOUTH PRICE OF BITUMINOUS
COAL PER TON, 1945-1968

Year
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

Current Dollars
3.06
3.44
4.16
4.99
4.88
4.84
4.92
4.90
4.92
4.52
4.50
4.82
5.08
4.86
4.77
4.69
4.58
4.48
4.39
4.45
4.44
4.54
4.62
4.67

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Mines data as cited
in Bituminous Coal Data (Washington,
D.C: National Coal Association, 1969),
p. 8.
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indices computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and showed that
coal prices have consistently maintained a competitive relationship
with the other fuels.

In the late 1960s coal prices began to rise

dramatically, due to an increase in demand by the electric utility
industry, the Increased costs of labor and capital, and higher costs
due to stricter health and safety regulations.

However, this does

not necessarily mean that the relative cost of coal as compared to
competitive fuels is changing since other fuel costs are also rising.
For example, "the international oil companies are already planning
to pass on their higher overseas taxes to consumers — a n d according
to the president of one major utility, this alone should increase
28/
the average fuel bill this year by about 20 per cent.1'—
To a considerable extent, the average price for a ton of coal
has been kept low due to the increase of low-price, low-quality strip
and auger mined coal.

Combined, strip and auger mined coal accounted

for only 19 per cent of the total production in 1945, but by 1968
this figure was 36.9 per cent (see Table 8).

Table 9 compares the

average price per ton at the mine mouth for strip, auger, and underground coal.

Strip and auger mines, which are highly mechanized and

have relatively lower costs, have price levels consistently below
the average.

Mine mechanization in all types of mines since 1950

has been the major reason why increased costs, mainly labor costs,
could be absorbed by coal operators.

However, an additional factor

has been the increase in demand by electric utilities, causing an
increase in the market share for lower quality and cheaper coal.

—'Newsweek. May 3, 1971, p. 82.

TABLE

8

PERCENT OF TOTAL PRODUCTION BY STRIP, AUGER, AND UNDERGROUND METHODS
IN THE BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY

Year

Strip

1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

19.0
21.1
22.1
23.3
24.2
23.9
22.0
23.3
23.1
25.1
24.8
25.4
25.2
28.3
29.4
29.5
30.3
30.9
31.4
31.2
32.3
33.7
33.9
34.1

Auger

0.3
0.5
1.1
1.3
1.6
1.6
1.8
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.5
2.7
2.7
2.8
2.9
2.9
2.8

Underground

81.0
78.8
77.9
76.7
75.8
76.1
78.0
76.4
76.4
73.8
73.9
73.0
73.2
69.9
68.8
68.6
67.7
66.6
65.9
66.1
64.9
63.4
63.2
63.1

United States Bureau of Mines data as cited in
SOURCE: Bituminous Coal Data (Washington, D. C.: National Coal
Association, 1969), p. 9.
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TABLE

9

AVERAGE VALUE OF BITUMINOUS COAL PER TON F.O.B. MINE-MOUTH
(Current Dollars)

Year

Strip

1945
1950
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

2.65
2.87
3.48
3.74
3.89
3.80
3.76
3.74
3.67
3.64
3.57
3.55
3.57
3.64
3.68
3.75

Auger

3.60
4.17
4.12
3.60
3.83
3.37
3.24
3.33
3.25
3.35
3.36
3.58
3.59
3.53

Underground

3.16
5.15
4.86
5.20
5.52
5.33
5.23
5.14
5.02
4.91
4.82
4.92
4.93
5.05
5.18
5.22

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Mines and U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics data as cited in Bituminous Coal Data
(Washington, D . C : National Coal Association,
1969), p. 73.

Total
All Mines

3.06
4.84
4.50
4.82
5.08
4.86
4.77
4.69
4.58
4.48
4.39
4.45
4.44
4.54
4.62
4.67
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There is another reason why the price level has remained stable.
As the industry became more concentrated, the major producers such as
Consolidated Coal Company and Peabody Coal Company (1970's largest
and second largest producers respectively) were able to commit themselves to long-term contracts, especially with electric utilities.
Many of these contracts run twenty years or more.

The long-term

contract does have an escape clause in case taxes, negotiated wage
agreements, or other expenses alter significantly the cost situation.
In addition, it enabled the producer to enlarge his operations and
take advantage of long-run planning and large scale efficiencies.
One of the major elements of cost in the mine-mouth price of
bituminous coal has always been labor.

Since 1939, however, increased

mechanization has lowered the wage cost from 71 per cent to 39 per
cent of the value added in the industry.
Table 10.

These data are presented in

Simultaneously, as shown in Tables 11 and 12, the share of

capital costs appears to have risen, since capital investment per
dollar of wages and per ton have increased significantly.

There does

not appear to be any published time-series data on bituminous coal
industry capital costs.

However, it was estimated in 1952 that the

development of a modern mine with a daily capacity of 10,000 tons
29/
would cost $12 million.—'
Another major cost variable is related to the nature of the coal
scam.

A wide thick coal seam that is not deep can be mined more

efficiently by conventional mechanized operations than a thin coal
seam, which requires special low machinery and yields less coal
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TABLE

10

WAGE AND SALARY SHARES OF VALUE ADDED IN BITUMINOUS
COAL MINING : 1939-1967

Year

Wage Share

1939
1954
1958
1963
1967

Salary Share

70.5%
53.9
47.2
40.5
38.7

TABLE

7.1%
7.8
9.5
6.9
7.4

11

CAPITAL INVESTED ANNUALLY PER TON IN THE BITUMINOUS
COAL INDUSTRY : 1954-1967
(1958 Dollars)

Year

Strip-Auger-Other

Underground

1954
1958
1963
1967

0.37
0.39
0.52
0.37

0.29
0.41
0.33
0.54

TABLE

12

THE CAPITAL INVESTMENT-WAGE PAYMENT RATIO IN THE
BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY : 1954-1967

Year

Ratio

1954
1958
1963
1967

.1578
.2473
.3353
.4304

SOURCE: Calculated from the 1954, 1958, 1963 and 1967 Census of Mineral
Industries, U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
p. 12A-6, Table 1. Table 12 - Wages for workers engaged in
productions development, and exploration only.
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tonnage per foot traveled forward in the mine.

A high quality coal

seam can also be cleaned and processed more quickly.
quality of the seam can affect unit production costs.

Thus, the
Other major

cost variables include the extent and age of the utilized machinery,
a union or non-union labor force, the type of mining undertaken,
productivity of the labor force, efficiency of the management, taxes,
and mine size.

Production, Employment and Productivity

The bituminous coal industry was considered by many as a sick
and dying industry, as production declined after the 1947 peak year
of over 630 million tons.

During World War II and the post-war

production boom, coal was in great demand.

However, as new innova-

tions were introduced, such as the Diesel locomotive and gas pipelines, this demand withered.

As presented in Table 13 only 391.7

million tons of coal were mined in 1954.

Despite a few improved

years in 1956 and 1957, production hovered at this level until the
middle 1960s.
While production dropped after 1947, mechanization and a more
skilled working force were increasing the productivity of the miner.
As shown in Table 13 the average miner produced 6.26 tons a day in
1948, and this figure has increased every year since.
average miner was producing over 20 tons a day.

In 1970, the

As might be expected,

strip and auger mines have a higher tonnage per man-day than underground mines.

But it is not correct to conclude that the increasing

share of strip and auger mining was the only reason for the increase
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TABLE

13

PRODUCTION, EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE BITUMINOUS
COAL MINING INDUSTRY

Year

Production
(net tons)

Men
Employed

Net Tons per Man
per Day per Year

1945
1946
1947
1948
1949

577,617,327
533,922,068
630,623,722
599,518,229
437,868,036

383,100
396,434
419,182
441,631
433,698

5.78
6.30
6.42
6.26
6.43

1,508
1,347
1,504
1,358
1,010

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954

516,311,053
533,664,732
466,840,782
457,290,449
391,706,300

415,582
372,897
335,217
293,106
227,397

6.77
7.04
7.47
8.17
9.47

1,239
1,429
1,389
1,560
1,724

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959

464,633,408
500,874,077
492,703,916
410,445,547
412,027,502

225,093
228,163
228,635
197,402
179,636

9.84
10.28
10.59
11.33
12.22

2,064
2,195
2,155
2,079
2,294

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

415,512,347
402,976,802
422,149,325
458,928,175
486,997,952

169,400
150,474
143,822
141,646
128,698

12.83
13.87
14.72
15.83
16.84

2,453
2,678
2,935
3,204
3,784

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

512,088,263
533,881,210
552,626,000
545,245,000
560,503,000

133,732
131,752
131,523
127,894
124,532

17.52
18.52
19.17

3,829
4,052
4,198
4,263
4,501

NA
NA

United States Bureau of Mines data as cited in
SOURCE: Bituminous Coal Data. 1969 (Washington, D. C : National Coal
Association), p. 8. Data updated by Mrs. Betsy Kraft of
the National Coal Association.
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in productivity.

In fact, from 1952 to 1965, tons per man-day

increased by 119.8 per cent in underground mines, 90.7 per cent in
strip mines, and 128.4 per cent in auger mines. The main reason that
productivity in underground mining was able to increase so rapidly
was the introduction of the totally different continuous and longwall
mining methods.
The employment data presented in Table 13 indicates that employment has been significantly affected both by the 1947 to 1954 production decline and by the increase in mechanization.

By 1954, with

production down 37.8 per cent and tons per man per day up 47.5 per
cent from 1947, employment was down 45.7 per cent.

But even as

production levels stabilized in the middle 1950s, and began to turn
up in the middle 1960s, the mechanization drive increased.

Thus in

1970, with production at approximately that of the peak year of 1947,
employment was down over 68 per cent from 1947.
While the industry was making a successful comeback, those once
employed by the industry were not.

Some of the displaced miners

remained in the coal fields, hoping for better days. But for these
displaced, better days never came, as mining companies began to
recruit younger and more skilled workers for the highly mechanized
operations.

No retraining or adjustment programs to alleviate the

effects of the mechanization revolution were Implemented by the
Federal Government, State Government, industry, or the union prior
30/
to 1959.—'

In 1959, a small state-assisted pilot retraining program

__
—Interview with Dr. Harold Glbbard, Professor of Sociology,
West Virginia University, March 1971.
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31/
was established in McDowell County, West Virginia.—

In the

following year, the state program was expanded to most West Virginia
counties.

The Federal government did not participate in any retrain-

ing program until after passage of the Area Redevelopment Act in
1961.—'

The Structure of the Bituminous Coal Industry

The bituminous coal industry consists of a large number of
mines.

In 1948, there were 9,079 mines producing at least 1,000

tons of coal annually.

Even in 1968, after mechanization and other

factors encouraged larger and fewer mines, there were 5,327 mines
in operation.
Although the larger mines producing more than 500,000 tons
annually accounted for 38 per cent of the production in 1948, the
largest firm, which operated over 40 mines, controlled only 4.6
33/
per cent of the market.—

It took 128 firms to account for 60

34/
per cent of the total tonnage.—
Thus it can be said that at the end of World War II the

317
— H a r o l d A. Glbbard and Gerald G. Somers, "Government Retraining of the Unemployed in West Virginia," Retraining the Unemployed,
Gerald G. Somers, editor (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1968), p. 17.

22/iMd.
33/
— Calculated from Coal Production in the U.S., 1949, Pamphlet
compiled by Keystone Coal Buyers Manual (New York: McGraw-Hill
Publishing Co., 1950), Bituminous Coal Annual (Washington, D . C :
National Coal Association, 1968).
34/
— M o r t o n S. Baratz, The Union and the Coal Industry (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 1.
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bituminous coal industry, relative to other basic industries and
relative to itself today, possessed a competitive structure.

The

competitive nature of the industry is further demonstrated by the
lack of cooperation and industry unity in bargaining with the powerful United Mine Workers of America.

Speaking at the United Mine

Workers' 1948 convention, John L. Lewis stated:
We have not yet been able to work out with the
Bituminous Operators any kind of a nationally stabilized
arrangement, simply because there is no national leadership in the bituminous industry. They have sectional
group leaders, each one thoroughly lacking confidence in
the other, and it is impossible for the Mine Workers to
find any stable agency on the side of the bituminous
operators with whom we can discuss a national program,
however conducive it would be to the welfare of the
industry, both on the investment side and on the side
of the mine workers.35/

Strikes and labor unrest prevailed throughout the industry before
and during World War II, to the extent that a number of times the
Federal Government was forced to take over the mines and negotiate
agreements.

This occurred from May, 1943 to October 1943;

1943 to June, 1944; April, 1945 to June, 1945;
36/'
June, 1947.

November,

and May, 1946 to

The main reason for the large number of mines was easy entry
into the industry.

Of the 9,079 coal mining establishments in 1948,

47.1 per cent were extremely small operations that produced between
1,000 and 10,000 tons annually.

This is the lowest production

category tabulated by the Bureau of Mines and thus if statistics

—'Mine Workers of America, United, Proceedings of the Fortieth
Consecutive Convention, 1948, p. 297.
36/ Ne w York Times, March 4, 1950, p. 2.
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for mineB producing fewer than 1,000 tons annually were available,
the percentage of coal mines producing fewer than 10,000 tons annually
would certainly exceed 50 per cent.
The reasons that made easy entry feasible were many.

One reason

was that coal mining in 1948 was still a highly labor-intensive
industry.

Table 10 shows approximate wage shares as a per cent of

value added in mining from 1939 to 1967.

In 1948, wages were a major

portion of mining costs, and thus it was a significant competitive
advantage if the mine were not unionized.
traditionally been non-union.

The smaller mines have

Table 14 provides an indication of

underground mine mechanization.

It shows that in 1948, the continu-

ous mining machine was used to a negligible extent and that about 36
per cent of all underground coal was still being hand loaded.

The

result was that a small family-owned dog-hole mine, with a basically
non-mechanized non-unionized operation, was able to competitively
co-exist with the larger mines that were also highly non-mechanized
but unionized.
Another factor that contributed to easy entry was the low
capital investment needed to open many types of mines. With possession of mineral rights, explosives, and a few thousand dollars a small
dog-hole mine could be opened.

Table 11 shows the capital invested

per ton in 1954 for underground mines. Although this statistic is
approximate and does not include the initial investment cost, it does
suggest that the nation's mines in 1948 were, on the average, annually
investing relatively little capital per mine.
were also inexpensive to open.

Strip and auger mines

According to Baratz:
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TABLE

14

MECHANIZATION IN UNDERGROUND BITUMINOUS COAL MINES : 1945-1968

Year

1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

Per cent Mined by
Continuous Mining
Machines

0.1
0.8
1.2
1.5
2.3
3.4
5.7
8.0
10.9
14.9
19.7
23.2
27.4
30.9
32.1
34.5
38.7
42.7
45.8
47.4
47.6

Per cent of coal
Mechanically loaded

56.1
58.4
60.7
64.3
67.0
69.4
73.1
75.6
79.6
84.0
84.6
84.0
84.8
84.9
86.0
86.3
86.3
85.7
85.8
87.4
89.2
91.7
94.5
95.7

United States Bureau of Mines data as cited in
SOURCE: Bituminous Coal Data (Washington, D. C : National Coal
Association, 1969), p. 9.
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Outcroppings of coal can be worked with power shovels
of the size employed in highway construction. In fact many
small strippers were originally road builders who were
delighted to employ otherwise idle machinery for coal mining.
Other strip operators can rent such machinery at relatively
little expense. Strip mining can be undertaken on very
short notice for as little as $10,0001*37/
A third major factor that pressured entry and exit was the nature
of demand.

Bituminous coal, in 1948, was the major source of fuel for

the railroads and many basic industries, in addition to being an
important ingredient in steel production.

Thus, coal was in demand

mainly in industries that were extremely sensitive to basic economic
conditions in the nation.

These markets, in addition, did not require

elaborate washing, screening, and crushing that only the larger mines
could provide.

According to Baratz, "the sensitivity of coal demand

to adjustments elsewhere in the economy was clearly demonstrated
during the recession of 1948-49, when gross national product declined
by less than 5 per cent while consumption of bituminous coal fell by
27 per cent."—'
During World War II and the post-war recovery, United States
coal was in great demand both in the United States and Europe.

One

result of this increase in demand was the dramatic mine-mouth price
rise during the late 1940s and early 1950s (as shown in Table 7, p.
32), which did not reoccur until the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The price increase was to some extent caused by the Krug-Lewis
Agreement between the United Mine Workers of America and the United
States Government in 1947, and the National Bituminous Coal Wage
37/
— M o r t o n S. Baratz, op. cit., p. 2,
—'ibid., p. 18.
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Agreement of 1950 between the United Mine Workers of America and
unionized producers.

These agreements will be analyzed later.

It

is clear, however, that the agreement costs as well as the great
demand for coal did make the market attractive for small low-capital
non-unionized 'dog-holes' that could enter into the market and exit
from the market relatively quickly.

Table 15 shows that the share

of production by the smallest mines grew steadily until 1959, when
over 60 per cent of the nation's mines produced less than 10,000
tons annually.
A final major factor that made easy entry possible was the
lack of mining regulations and the poor enforcement of the regulations already in existence.

The first Federal Coal Mine Safety

Bill was passed in 1941, but it included no powers of enforcement.
The 1952 Federal Coal Mine Safety Act also had serious deficiencies.

According to Ben Franklin of the New York Times, the

Act contained a "grandfather clause" which permitted dangerous
machinery if in use or on order when the Act went into effect.
39/
Machinery could thus be rebuilt to avoid the law.—

The Act

specifically exempted mines with less than fifteen employees.
Larger mines could thus be separated into smaller units to evade
the law.

Small mines were not included in the Act until 1966.

Finally, the 1952 Act gave Federal mine inspectors jurisdiction
only in major disasters and contained no provisions on health
hazards.

Said President Truman, before he signed the bill, "I

— ' N e w York Times. March 30, 1969, Section VI, p. 125.
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TABLE

15

PER CENT OF BITUMINOUS COAL MINES AND PRODUCTION BY SIZE OF MINE

Year

ANNUAL TONNAGE
500,000 + tons
200,000-500,000 tons
Per cent Per cent Number
Per cent Per cent
Number
of Mines of Prod, of Mines of Mines of Prod, of Mines

1948

2.9

38.0

265

5.4

25.6

490

1949

1.9

29.3

164

4.5

27.3

383

1951

3.3

42.3

264

5.4

25.4

434

1952

3.2

40.5

231

5.3

26.2

386

1953

3.4

44.4

226

6.0

26.4

398

1954

3.1

44.0

190

4.9

25.3

300

1955

2.9

47.4

227

4.1

22.5

320

1956

2.9

48.6

246

3.8

20.8

323

1957

2.9

48.4

245

3.5

21.3

303

1958

2.4

45.8

200

3.2

21.1

265

1959

2.7

49.9

212

3.2

19.2

248

1960

2.6

49.3

202

3.3

19.5

258

1961

2.5

50.4

195

2.9

18.1

225

1962

2.6

50.6

204

3.1

18.1

240

1963

2.8

52.9

224

3.0

16.9

242

1964

3.1

54.9

238

2.9

15.2

220

1965

3.6

57.2

259

3.1

14.0

224

1966

4.1

57.9

274

3.3

13.1

221

1968

5.2

58.5

275

4.9

15.4

260

(Continued)
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TABLE

Year

15 (Continued)

ANNUAL TONNAGE
100,00-200,000 tons
50,000-100,000 tons
Per cent Per cent Number
Per cent Per cent Number
of Mines of Prod, of Mines of Mines of Prod, of Mines

1948

6.4

13.8

580

8.5

9.1

768

1949

5.8

16.1

497

7.8

10.9

666

1951

5.8

12.2

464

7.5

8.0

604

1952

5.8

12.9

425

7.3

8.1

532

1953

5.4

10.9

358

7.3

7.2

484

1954

4.7

10.5

290

6.7

7.5

410

1955

4.2

10.1

331

6.0

7.2

471

1956

4.3

10.2

365

5.7

6.8

488

1957

3.6

9.0

311

5.5

6.7

466

1958

3.6

10.1

295

4.9

6.9

408

1959

3.4

9.0

261

5.0

6.6

383

1960

3.3

9.0

262

5.0

6.7

396

1961

3.2

8.4

242

5.5

7.5

420

1962

3.3

8.5

255

5.3

6.8

414

1963

3.3

7.8

262

6.3

7.4

499

1964

3.5

7.7

270

7.2

7.8

553

1965

3.9

7.7

279

7.7

7.5

555

1966

4.8

8.5

327

8.7

7.7

589

1968

6.6

9.0

349

10.0

6.9

533

(Continued)
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Year

15 (Continued)

ANNUAL TONNAGE
10,000-50,000 tons
1,000-10,000 tons
Per cent Per cent
Number
Per cent Per cent
Number
of Mines of Prod, of Mines of Mines of Prod, of Mines

1948

29.7

10.2

2,697

47.1

3.3

4,279

1949

25.1

11.4

2,148

54.9

5.1

4,701

1951

25.5

8.8

2,046

52.4

3.2

4,197

1952

25.0

9.0

1,820

53.3

3.3

3,881

1953

24.4

8.0

1,629

53.6

3.1

3,576

1954

26.3

9.1

1,612

54.3

3.5

3,328

1955

24.3

8.7

1,908

58.5

4.1

4,599

1956

24.8

9.3

2,112

58.5

4.3

4,986

1957

28.0

10.5

2,393

56.5

4.0

4,821

1958

26.2

11.4

2,169

59.6

4.7

4,927

1959

25.2

10.4

1,948

60.5

4.9

4,667

1960

26.7

10.6

2,102

59.1

4.9

4,645

1961

28.5

11.3

2,183

57.3

4.3

4,383

1962

28.4

11.5

2,201

57.2

4.4

4,426

1963

28.3

10.9

2,250

56.2

4.2

4,463

1964

30.1

10.8

2,299

53.1

3.6

4,050

1965

32.7

10.6

2,367

49.0

3.0

3,544

1966

35.4

10.3

2,386

43.7

2.4

2,952

1968

36.6

8.5

1,951

36.8

1.6

1,959

SOURCE:Calculated from the Mineral Yearbook. Department of Interior,
Bureau of Mines.
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consider it my duty to point out its defects so that the public will
not be misled into believing that this is a broad-gauge accidentprevention measure.

.

. I am advised that loopholes in the law were

40/
provided to avoid any economic impact on the coal mining industry."—
To understand what has happened in the bituminous coal industry
since 1948, it is important to differentiate between "mine" and "firm."
Today, there is an increasing tendency for single firms to own many
mines.
The Bureau of Mines top category for individual mine size is an
annual production of 500,000 tons or more. As Table 15 shows, the
number of mines in this category increased from 1948 to 1968. In
all other production categories, the absolute number of mines declined.
As might be expected, the larger mines obtained a larger share of
total production during the time period.

In 1948, the larger mines

were 2.9 per cent of the total and accounted for 38 per cent of the
output.

In 1968, the larger mines were 5.2 per cent of the total

and accounted for 58.5 per cent of the output.

In no other category

did both the percentage of mines and the percentage of production
increase.

It must, therefore, be concluded that there is a trend

toward a greater number of larger mines.

The main reasons, undoubted-

ly, are efficiencies and economies of scale of highly mechanized
operations.
It is a more difficult task to examine the question of market
share by a firm.

Fortunately, the Keystone Coal Buyers Guide has

published regularly a pamphlet that combines production by group or
40/ibid.
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company, instead of by mine.

Computations from the data, presented

in Table 16, show that the largest firm — a n honor that oscillates
between Consolidation Coal Company and Peabody Coal Company— has
increased its share of the market from 4.6 per cent in 1948 to 10.9
per cent in 1970.
past decade.

The share has been steadily rising during the

The top 15 companies increased their share from one

quarter of the market to over half.
If the coal industry is considered part of the energy industry,
the significance of this concentration is even more apparent.
Consolidation Coal Company, with 10.9 per cent of the market in 1970,
is now owned by Continental Oil Company and Island Creek Coal
Company, with 5.1 per cent of the market, is now owned by Occidental
41/
Petroleum Corporation.*3*Thus, the oil industry controls two of
the nation's top three coal companies which together account for
over 15 per cent of the nation's annual coal production.
is continuing.

This trend

Other major oil companies that plan or have purchased

coal producers since 1968 include Standard Oil of Ohio, AtlanticRichfield, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Shell, and the Sun Oil
Company.

— ' I t should be noted that production from the steel companies'
"captive" mines usually never reaches the open market. Thus, the
share of the open market obtained by the firms not owned by steel
companies is greater than the percentage indicated.
^'Barron's. "Fuel of the Future", July 8, 1968.
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TABLE

16

CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION IN THE
BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY: 1948-1970

Year

1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

Market Share of
Top Firm

4.6
4.9
4.8
5.3
NA
NA
NA
NA
6.3
8.1
6.8
7.5
7.0
7.3
8.1
8.7
9.6
9.6
10.1
10.7
11.0
10.9
10.9

Market Share of
Top 15 Firms

25.2
26.2
26.5
29.5

NA
NA
NA
NA
35.0
37.8
37.0
39.1
39.5
39.5
40.7
41.9
45.1
45.1
47.2
49.8
52.2
52.3
52.0

SOURCE: Calculated from Coal Production in the U. S.. pamphlet
compiled by Keystone Coal Buyers Manual, McGraw-Hill,
New York, 1946, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1957, 1959,
1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968,
1969, 1970; Keystone News Bulletin. McGraw-Hill, New
York, February 1971, pp. 19-24; Bituminous Coal Data
1969, National Coal Association, Washington, D. C.;
Survey of Current Business. U. S. Department of Commerce.
Data excludes production from small mines that have an
output of less than 1,000 tons a year.

CHAPTER

III

LABOR STRATEGIES IN THE BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY

The Strategy of the United Mine Workers of America
The main goals of the United Mine Workers of America, according
to Feder, were to improve the economic standards of miners, create
"prosperity in the coal mining industry through stabilization of
competitive relationships within the industry and the protection of
the industry against outside competition," and to establish and
maintain the United Mine Workers of America.—
To achieve these goals, John L. Lewis realized, during the
early years of the United Mine Workers of America, that he had to
have help from outside sources, such as the Federal Government.

He

was not under the illusion that a highly competitive and chaotically
disorganized coal industry could alone bring security for the miners.
Stated Lewis:
To one informed of the underlying causes for the 'disorderly conduct' of bituminous coal, it is utterly
absurd even to entertain the thought that the time will
ever come when the bituminous coal industry can establish
sane business relations through corrective measures
brought about of its own free application.2/
During the 1920s and 1930s, the United Mine Workers of America
was a very vulnerable union that constantly was fighting for its

— Bernard Feder, "The Collective Bargaining and the Legislative
Policies of the UMWA, 1933-1947" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
New York University, New York, 1957), p. 491.
2/
— United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate
Commerce, Bituminous Coal Commission, Hearings on S. 4490, 70th
Congress, Second Session, Part I, December 14, 17, 1928 (Washington,
D . C : Government Printing Office, 1929), p. 24.
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existence.

The unionized mines of the central Illinois and Indiana

fields were having difficulty competing with non-union operations in
West Virginia and Kentucky.

Labor costs, which were mainly piece-

rate before 1950, contributed over 60 per cent of the mine-mouth
cost of coal, and thus non-union operations were able to force union
mines out of business by wage and price cuts during periods of
declining demand, especially during the post-depression years.
1930s

The

found the industry in total disarray, with both excess mines

and miners.

The industry, according to economist Alexander Sachs of

the National Recovery Administration, "has been not only an overdeveloped, but .

.

.an underorganized and underplanned industry in

relation to the problems that have confronted it in the post-war
3/
(World War I) period and are confronting it today."- Evidence of the
problems is shown by the fact that the industry underwent nineteen
hearings before Congress and Federal commissions between 1913 and
1935.*7
It was at this time that the union, unable to muster enough
strength to effectively use the power of collective bargaining,
looked to the New Deal Administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt for
assistance.

Under the NRA code for bituminous coal that gave protec-

tion to unionization, United Mine Workers of America President John
L. Lewis sent hundreds of organizers into the coal fields claiming
"the President of the United States wants you to join the union."

—'National Recovery Administration, Release No. 237 (Washington,
D. C : Government Printing Office, August 12, 1933)
^'simon N. Whitney, Antitrust Policies (New York: Twentieth
Century Fund, Inc., 1958), p. 392.
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Within a short time, most of the coal miners joined the union.
moved quickly to consolidate his gain.

Lewis

In 1939, Lewis negotiated

contracts in which all short-run economic demands were traded for the
union shop.
Simultaneously, while the United Mine Workers of America
strengthened its bargaining position, the New Deal Administration
passed a number of bituminous coal price control acts.

The first was

the Guffey-Snyder Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, which
incorporated for bituminous coal many principles from the general
National Industrial Recovery Act that was declared unconstitutional
on March 27, 1935. The primary purpose of the Guffey-Snyder Act was
to stabilize the bituminous coal mining industry and
promote its interstate commerce; to provide for
cooperative marketing of bituminous coal; to levy a
tax on bituminous coal and provide for a drawback
under certain conditions; to declare the production,
distribution, and use of bituminous coal to be affected
with a national public interest; to conserve the
bituminous coal resources of the United States; to
5«
provide for the general welfare, and for other purposes.—
The Guffey-Snyder Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 was
declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court on
May 18, 1936.
John L. Lewis asked that the Guffey-Snyder bill be reintroduced
In Congress.

Speaking at the union's 1936 convention, he called on

President Roosevelt to set up "a system of proper federal regulations
which will encompass a synchronized system of price-fixing and alloca_
— Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office), C 824, 49 Stat. 991.
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tion of tonnage on a basis equitably fair to mine workers and operators alike."—

In its next session, Congress passed the Guffey-

Vinson Coal Act of 1937, which included primarily only the pricefixing section of the previous Act.

The constitutionality of the

new Act was upheld, but delays and jurisdictional transfer to the
Department of Interior prevented the establishment of minimum prices
until October 1, 1940.

It was allowed to expire in 1943, when the

Office of Price Administration began to use the minimum price schedules as price ceilings during World War II.

The shortlived price-

fixing regulations, which created 400,000 rigid minimum prices for
various coals from various mines by various conveyances, were found
to be ineffective, cumbersome, and, as the 1940 war boom began,
suddenly unnecessary.
Another union-encouraged scheme was the establishment of sales
agencies to control the deadly competition in the industry.

The

best known of these agencies was Appalachian Coals, which began in
1932 with 137 members in southern Appalachia.

The purpose of an

agency was to set minimum prices for sales by its members and to
allocate orders among its members.

Initially, sales agencies were

prevented from becoming operational by court injunctions, which were
based on the "restraint of trade" provision of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.

The injunctions were lifted by the United States Supreme Court

in 1933,—

and this decision was reaffirmed when the constitutionality

— T. N. Bethell, Conspiracy in Coal (Nashville, Tennessee:
Southern Student Organizing Committee), p. 7.
-'Appalachian Coals.Inc. v. U.S., 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
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of the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 was upheld.

The Act specified

that activities under the jurisdiction of the National Bituminous
8/
Coal Commission were exempt from the antitrust laws.—
John L. Lewis's United Mine Workers thus emerged from the 1930s
with two important accomplishments:

"the suspension of the antitrust

laws to permit coal operators to set fair and profitable prices and
9/
the right of labor to organize and bargain collectively."—

The new

strength obtained by the United Mine Workers of America allowed Lewis
to prevent wage rates from being forced downward during competitive
price wars in the industry.

Thus, in essence, Lewis used the method

of wage rate rigidity to encourage stable prices in the industry.
Prior to 1930, the union was unable to hold onto its wage gains,
as its policy of "no backward step" became ruinous in the face of the
competition from non-union mining operations.

"The story of the ills

of bituminous coal," said Lewis, in reference to the numerous price
wars in the industry, is "directly interwoven with discriminatory
differentials in wages."—

Now, however, with the coal fields

highly unionized, Lewis was able to test his stabilization theory
that minimum union wage rates in all the mines would prevent wage
rates from being forced downward and would "force a reorganization
of the basic industry upon scientific and efficient lines."—

8/
—'Simon N. Whitney, op. cit., p. 400.
9/
— Bernard Feder, "The Collective Bargaining and the Legislative
Policies of the UMWA, 1933-1947" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
New York University, New York, 1957), p. 145.
—'united Mine Workers Journal, May 15, 1934, p. 5.
— J o h n L. Lewis, The Miners' Fight for American Standards
(Indianapolis, Indiana: Bell Publishing Co., 1925), p. 31.

58

For the first time, Lewis was able to negotiate a regional master
agreement that would not face the danger of cracking.

The pacesetter

of the regional master agreements was called the Appalachian Wage
Agreement of 1933, and it was renegotiated at approximately two year
intervals until World War II. Lewis slowly brought the regional
agreements closer together and by 1941 the power of the United Mine
Workers of America had eliminated the traditional wage differentials
between the northern and southern fields.

In obtaining uniform wage

earnings and organizing most of the mines, the United Mine Workers of
America halted the practice of "cut-throat" competition by the reduction of wages. An Induced inelastic labor supply had been achieved.
Lewis was obviously moving towards a national agreement.

But

before that could happen, he had to consolidate his power in the
United Mine Workers.

Under the regional master agreements, such as

the Appalachian Wage Agreement, districts and subdistricts had the
power to tack on special provisions for the immediate area.

Lewis,

to obtain industry-wide bargaining, had to reduce the power and independence of the union's districts.

This was done by steadily stripp-

ing districts of their autonomy and appointing local district replacement officers who would allow Lewis effectively to control the
district.

This policy caused perpetual dissension, and the issue of

district autonomy has been a topic at almost all of the International
Conventions since 1936. Lewis, who felt that the centralization of
power at the international level was a crucial tool in effectively
coordinating efforts to stabilize the industry, would explain his
position by asking, "Do you want an efficient organization or do you
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12/
want merely a political instrumentality?''—
In consolidating the power of the United Mine Workers of America
at the international level and eliminating regional differences in
master agreements Lewis was set to negotiate an industry-wide agreement
and set in motion the final stage of his plan to stabilize the industry.
Lewis negotiated with the operators at the national level for the first
time in 1945.

But, due to the war, the Federal Government took over

the mines as soon as labor unrest in the coal fields was apparent.
Thus, Lewis found himself negotiating with the Government instead of
the operators.
The Government seized the mines from the operators and negotiated
contracts four times during the 1940s: May 1943 to October 1943;
November 1943 to June 1944; April 1945 to October 1945;

and May 1946

to June 1947. While negotiating with the Government, Lewis was
hampered by the wage controls imposed by the War Labor Board.

Thus,

Lewis had to postpone his major mechanization effort and opted instead
for a program that dealt with welfare and retirement for the coal miners.
In 1946, Lewis negotiated a highly controversial welfare and
retirement fund with J. A. Krug, Chief Administrator for the Federal
Government Coal Mines Administration.

A key reason for agreement was

that "welfare plans voluntarily arrived at between the employer and
the union would not be considered a wage increase if the cost of the
13/
plan did not exceed 5 per cent of the payroll."—

Thus, Lewis was

12/
— M i n e Workers of America, United, Proceedings of the 34th
Constitutional Convention, 1936, Vol. I, p. 122.
—'wage Stabilization Board, Case No. 52-11, 138, May 1946, cited
by George H. Scott, "A Study of the UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund"
(unpublished Master's thesis, West Virginia University, Morgantown,
West Virginia, 1951), p. 2.
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able to win a major breakthrough without any opposition from the
Government regulatory agencies. Operators, who had no say in negotiating the agreement, were consoled by the fact that contributions to
qualified funds were exempt from Federal income taxes in the Revenue
Act of 1942.—'
As initially set up, the Krug-Lewis welfare package contained
two funds:

the Welfare and Retirement Fund and the Medical and

Hospital Fund.

The former was managed by three trustees representing

the Coal Mines Administration, the United Mine Workers of America, and
a neutral member appointed by the other two.

The latter was managed

by three trustees appointed by the United Mine Workers of America.
Both were financed by the 5c per ton royalty.
begin the operation of the welfare package.

It took over a year to

The first roadblock was

the reluctance of the Coal Mines Administration to appoint a trustee,
mainly because the Government preferred to have the operators select
the trustee after the mines were returned to private control.

The

second roadblock was the Taft-Hartley Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947, which specified that employee benefit funds had to be administered both by the industry and by the union.

Although the Welfare and

Retirement Fund met this criterion, the Medical and Hospital Fund did
not.

Thus, the union and operators agreed, effective July 1, 1947, to

merge the two funds into the Welfare and Retirement Fund of 1947,
financed by a 100 per ton royalty.

The royalty was raised to 20c per

ton in 1948. The 1947 Fund distributed pensions and benefits until

—'George H. Scott, "A Study of the UMWA Welfare and Retirement
Fund," (unpublished Master's thesis, West Virginia University,
Morgantown, West Virginia, 1951), p. 3.
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September 17, 1948, when all payments were halted due to the lack of
royalty collections.

This resulted from the inability of the United

Mine Workers and the operators to negotiate a new contract after the
1948 agreement expired.

On March 6, 1950 the welfare package was

renegotiated as the Welfare and Retirement Fund of 1950, financed by
a 30<: per ton royalty.

The royalty was again increased in the 1952

contract (to 40$ per ton) and it remained at this rate until 1971.
The Welfare and Retirement Fund was a pay-as-you-go plan financed
by a royalty based on tonnage.

Thus, the United Mine Workers of

America joined the operators in being vitally interested in a high
volume of uninterrupted production.

If production were to be interrup-

ted because of a strike, royalties would obviously stop and fund
programs would be jeopardized.

This would lead to discontent among

many union members, since by the 1960s retired miners, who maintained
the right to vote in union elections, approximately equalled active
miners in number.

The Fund, even though it was intended primarily to

provide a social service, was a step toward shifting basic union concern from the active miner to production and stabilization in the
industry.

The hookup with the industry, which made the success of the

fund dependent on technological advance that increased production,
was of crucial significance.—
The high demand for coal during the early and middle 1940s postponed the need for minimum wage rates in the industry.

By the late

1940s, however, the coal industry again demonstrated its inability to
regulate itself, as over-production threatened to disrupt the price
— C . L. Christenson, Economic Redevelopment in Bituminous Coal
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 211-12.

and wage structures.

John L. Lewis felt the union was now powerful

enough to handle the situation alone, and vowed in 1948 that "if the
operators of this country can't give any leadership on the commercial
side of the industry the United Mine Workers can and will .

.

."—

Less than a year later, Lewis imposed the temporary three-day
work week as an attempt to regulate production.

The regulation of

the coal supply was the most dramatic and visible effort by the United
Mine Workers of America to create order in the industry.

However, at

this time the United Mine Workers of America also began to work seriously on long-run efforts to increase the demand for coal. Two of these
efforts, which will be mentioned only briefly, were Lewis's competitive
fuels policy and his attempts to alter coal transportation costs.
It has been already stated that at this time basic changes were
occurring in coal consumption patterns.

Oil and natural gas were

making significant market inroads, particularly in home heating and
on the railroads.

To meet this challenge, the union decided that

coal costs had.to decrease or competitive fuel prices had to increase.
Lewis attempted to obtain the latter goal by sponsoring organizing
drives, through the United Mine Workers of America "catch-all"
District 50, among workers in the oil and gas fields. The drives were
never highly successful, mainly because the oil and gas industries
were not labor intensive and a strike in the fields would not necessarily cause a production stoppage.

The union also advocated the

elimination of depletion allowance tax subsidies for oil and gas (or,
as an alternative, the extension of depletion allowances to the
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coal industry), higher tariffs on imported crude oil, and similar
pressures at the legislative level to, in the opinion of Lewis, allow
coal to compete equally with other fuels.
The effort to lower the cost of coal was more effective.

Lewis

attempted to pressure the Interstate Commerce Commission to lower
freight rates, which were often nearly equal to the price of coal at
the mine-mouth.

The rate structure, based on the Federal price-

fixing regulations during World War II, was very complicated and
obsolete, setting lower rates, for example, for companies that were
located farthest from the market.

Lewis failed to obtain rate changes

for a number of years, but finally succeeded when the Interstate
Commerce Commission approved the unit-train differential and also
allowed the railroads some flexibility to adjust to competing
transportation methods.
Mechanization had been increasing in the mines since the 1920s,
but it was in the late 1940s that the United Mine Workers of America
decided to actively encourage mechanization as a way to reorganize
the industry.

The decision had many ramifications.

Mechaniza-

tion would increase productivity and lower costs, thus forcing the
high cost marginal mines to close and employment to drop.

Mechaniza-

tion would strengthen the larger companies and the larger mines,
since they had the resources to invest in machinery, and the capacity
and reserves to utilize the machinery efficiently.

The smaller coal

17/
operators, said Lewis, "are just a drag on the industry."— Feder
states flatly: "In reviewing the union's struggle to stabilize the
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bituminous coal industry, it became clear that the union's remedy for
the ills of bituminous coal mining was monopoly."—'

To the union,

mechanization and concentration were highly related.
The strategy of encouraging mechanization was simple. "When the
labor of men can be bought for a few cents a day," stated John L.
Lewis, "there is little reason to invest $10,000 in devices that
will enable one man to do the work of five.

But when men cost from

$5 to $10 per day, the capital outlay is more easily justified."
Part of the strategy, thus, was to increase wage rates.

19/

But in

addition the union was determined to participate in any benefits of
mechanization.

Said Lewis:

The UMWA . . .(takes) the position that the only way
in which the standard of living could be increased .
would be by increasing the productivity and lowering the
unit costs and utilizing the genius of science and the
automatic machine . . . and the usage of power to do the
work of human hands, and the UMW educated its membership
through the years to an acceptance of that policy .
As the result of that policy, the UMW . . . declared
that the miners had a right to participate, through increased
wages and shorter hours and improved safety and better
conditions, in the increased productive efficiency of the
industry, holding that there were three parties to the profit
by increased proficiency and greater production: a) the
investor who was given a larger return and a more secure
investment; b) the mine worker who would get higher wages
and shorter hours, improved safety conditions; and c) the
consumer of the product who could buy this product at a
lower unit cost . . . — '
Thus, the encouragement of mechanization was a dynamic process, since

.18/ Bernard Feder, op_. cit.. p. 504.
19/ John L. Lewis, op. cit., p. 109.
20/ United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee
on Education and Labor, Welfare of Miners, Hearings, 80th Congress,
1st Session, April 3, 1947 (Washington, D. C : Government Printing
Office, 1947), p. 41.
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higher wages would force mechanization which would cause still higher
wages and therefore even more mechanization.

The limits are the

financial capacity of firms to mechanize, the extent of efficient
equipment available from the research and technology of the day, and
21/
the level and elasticity of the demand for coal.—
The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 (see Appendix A) is often called the "Mechanization Agreement."

Of course, the

mechanization trend had been in the mines for some time.

But it was

in the late 1940s that a number of events occurred simultaneously to
seriously push mechanization, namely the decision of Lewis that the
union alone would once and for all use its economic power to
reorganize the industry, and the declining market for coal due to
competitive fuels.
The 1950 Agreement was not won easily.

President Truman had to

start procedures once again to seize the mines before Harry Moses,
representing the captive mines owned by the steel companies;

George

Love, representing northern operators; and Joseph Moody, representing
southern operators, signed.

Within months, however, the operators

formed the Bituminous Coal Operators Association and joined Lewis in
implementing his strategy.

At this point, Lewis remarked that "the

country is now freed from any thought of a so-called coal crisis for
an

22/
indefinite period of time."—
The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, aside from

21/
— M o r t o n S. Baratz, The Union and the Coal Industry (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 72.
— ' T . N. Bethel, op_. cit., p. 6.
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being the first national contract between the union and coal producers
was partially in writing and partially a "gentleman's understanding."
The 1950 contract stated, for the first time ever, that "it is the
intent and purpose of the parties hereto that this agreement will
promote and improve industrial and economic relationships in the
bituminous coal Industry .

.

23/
. " — After signing the agreement of

March 5, 1950, Lewis said:
Negotiation of this Contract is a constructive
accomplishment in the industry with reasonable assurance
that for a substantial period of time the industry can
abate its labor warfare and apply itself —both management and labor— to the constructive problems of producing
coal in quantity for the benefit of the American economy
at the lowest possible cost permitted by modern techniques.
The Mine Workers stand for the investors in the industry
and for a return on their capital. They stand for the
public to have coal at the lowest possible price consistent
with the Mine Workers having a decent life with the same
opportunities under the law as other citizens .£*.'
The "gentleman's understanding," as interpreted by after events, was
that the union would not resist but would actively encourage massive
mechanization.

Joseph Ardige, Secretary of the Operators Associa-

tion of the Williamson Field, stated, "it may be said that in the
installment of mechanical equipment that there has been a community
of interests between the UMWA and the operators .

.

'25/
."—

23/
—"Mine Workers of America, United, National Bituminous Coal
Wage Agreement of 1950, p. 1.
24/
— M i n e Workers of America, United, Proceedings of the FortyFirst Consecutive Constitutional Convention, 1952, p. 126.
25/
— S t a n l e y Miller, "The United Mine Workers: A Study of How Trade
Union Policy Related to Technological Change," (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, 1957),
p. 147.
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In the past, this had been accomplished by abolishing the
machine-hand pick differential and switching the wage rate from
piece work to straight time.

Now, the union was concerned about

efficient low cost production.

According to McAteer, Love and Moses

felt that "if the agreement could be worked out so that the terms
would be binding on the entire industry, regardless of the conditions
under which a particular mine must work, and if through the increased
profits of automation, extra benefits in the form of higher wages,
etc., were granted to the union, the results might satisfy Lewis and
26/
at the same time drive the small operator out of competition."—~

The Effect of the Union Wage Pattern Since 1946

Prior to 1946, the United Mine Workers of America had negotiated
in the Appalachian Wage Agreements an elaborate system of wage scales
based on tonnage, piece work, and straight time.

Since 1946, however,

the union steadily moved in the direction of the straight time
hourly wages and periodic "across the board" flat rate increases.
The wage provision of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 states simply: "All mine workers, whether employed by
the month, day, or tonnage, yardage, deadwork or footage rate, shall
receive four dollars and seventy-five cents ($4.75) per day in
addition to that provided for in the contract which expired March 31,
1946."

Since then, a series of amendments to the 1950 Agreement have

i^/j. Davitt McAteer, editor, Coal Mining Health and Safety in
West Virginia (Morgantown, West Virginia, July 1950), p. 350.
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increased the flat rate addition to the 1946 base.

In the completely

rewritten but similar National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of
1968, the wage provision continues the flat rate tradition by stating:
"All mine workers .

.

.shall receive (i) effective October 1, 1968

twenty dollars and twenty-five cents per day in addition to that
provided for in the contract which expired March 31, 1946;

(ii)

effective October 1, 1969 twenty-two dollars and twenty-five cents
per day in addition to that provided for in the contract which expired
March 31, 1946;

(ill) effective October 1, 1970 twenty-four dollars

and twenty-five cents per day in addition to that provided for in the
contract which expired March 31, 1946."

The flat rate increases from

1950 to 1970 are shown in Table 17.
The effect of this policy has been analyzed by Christenson.
Basically, the consistent flat rate additions to the basic wage
structure have reduced the per cent differentials between various
work classifications in the mine.

Thus, an incentive is provided for

the company to mechanize, since labor costs are not tied to output.
A man operating an obsolete machine is receiving basically the same
wage as the operator of a sophisticated continuous miner.

As flat

rate boosts continue, the company is indirectly pressured to update
its operations.

Thus, according to Christenson, "the effect of the

uniform increase in daily wage payments has been to emphasize the
importance of any technological improvements that make possible
27/
reduction in unit payroll costs."—
The powerful effect of the flat rate strategy is even more
27/
— C. L. Christenson, op. cit., pp. 206-209.
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TABLE

17

CHANGES IN SCALE SPECIFICATIONS OF UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA
NATIONAL BITUMINOUS COAL AGREEMENTS SINCE 1950

Date of Change

Change in
Daily Wages
since 1946

Change in Day's
pay per man

Number of
Months effective duration

March 5, 1950

4.75

0.70

February 1, 1951

6.35

1.60

10
21

October 29, 1952

8.25

1.90

34

September 1, 1955

9.45

1.20

7

April 1, 1956

10.25

0.80

6

October 1, 1956

11.25

1.00

6

April 1, 1957

12.25

1.00

21

January 1, 1959

13.45

1.20

3

April 1, 1959

14.25

0.80

60

April 2, 1964

15.25

1.00

8

January 1, 1965

16.25

1.00

16

April 1, 1966

17.25

1.00*

October 1, 1968

20.25

3.00

30
12

October 1, 1969

22.25

2.00

12

October 1, 1970

24.25

2.00

12

* $1.32 for electricians, mechanics and continuous miner operators

SOURCE: Calculated from C L. Christenson, Economic Redevelopment in
Bituminous Coal (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1962), p. 207; United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 1558, Wage Chronology: Bituminous Coal Mines,
1933-68 (Washington, D. C : Government Printing Office,
July 1967), pp. 7-12; Mine Workers of America, United,
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968.
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impressive when one realizes that productivity varies widely,
depending on such variables as the type of mining operation and the
thickness of the seam.

By making labor equally costly, preference

was given to the larger mines, mines that could efficiently utilize
mechanized operations, as well as thick seam mines where there was
a high output per man-hour.

The result was that many marginal

mines were forced to leave the industry or at least to go nonunion,
and the firms with which the union dealt became larger, stronger,
and fewer.
From 1950 to 1970, there has not been a single authorized
strike in the coal fields, and all contracts have been negotiated in
secrecy at the national level.

This has had the dual purpose of

pleasing industry and utility customers by assuring an uninterrupted
source of fuel and contributing a constant flow of funds into the
Welfare and Retirement Fund. A significant and revealing result of the
wage strategy was provided by the United Mine Workers Journal when it
stated "every wage increase received by UMWA members since 1948 has
been absorbed by Increased productivity within six months of the
28
date on which the contract containing the wage increase was signed."—
However, it is a fact that Lewis stated publicly and emphatically
that the miners had the right to participate in the benefits obtained
from the necessary mechanization.

Said Lewis: "Mine workers do not

believe God put an idea in the mind of an inventor for the sole profit

IS/united Mine Workers Journal. December 15, 1958, p. 4.
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of the coal operator.

We propose to bargain in the market for our

share. "-^'
It became apparent that two sets of goals had emerged.

Lewis

and the operators had one set of goals, which included ways to
establish minimum wage rates, reorganize the industry, compete with
other fuels, and maintain the union.

The other set of goals, which

Lewis claimed adherence to publicly, was to significantly improve
the standard of living for the skilled miners who were employed by
the mechanized operations in the industry.

Lewis stated:

We decided that question long years ago. We decided
it's better to have a half million men working in the
industry at good wages, high standards of living, than
it is to have a million men working in the industry in
poverty and degradation.
In return for encouraging modernization, the
utilization of machinery and power in the mines and
modern techniques, the Union . . . insists on a clear
participation in the advantage of the machine and the
improved techniques .3?./

—'ibid., May 1, 1956, p. 4.
—'ibid., August 15, 1957, p. 14.

CHAPTER

IV

WORKER EARNINGS IN THE BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY
SINCE THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF MECHANIZATION BY THE
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA

Introduction
John L. Lewis stated in 1947 that the United Mine Workers of
America intended to obtain a share from the encouragement of mechanization.—

This policy has been implemented by placing primary

emphasis on wages and earnings and secondary emphasis on fringe
benefits and working conditions.

The United Mine Workers of America

remained one of the few unions that, until 1971, had not gained any
of such common fringe benefits as holiday pay, supplemental unemployment benefits, severance-dismissal pay, paid sick leave, and savings
2/
and thrift plans.— Paid jury leave and a Christmas bonus plan were
recently negotiated benefits included in the National Bituminous Coal
3/
Wage Agreement of 1968.—

The union does have an exceptionally

outstanding fringe benefit to its credit, namely the Welfare and

— United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee
on Education and Labor, Welfare of Miners, Hearings, 80th Congress,
First Session, April 3 and 22, 1947 (Washington, D . C : Government
Printing Office, 1947), p. 41.
2/
— U. S. Department of Labor, Employer Expenditures for Selected
Supplementary Remuneration Practices for Production Workers in
Mining Industries, 1960. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 1332
(Washington, D . C : Government Printing Office, March 1963), p. 41.
3/
— Mine Workers of America, United, National Bituminous Coal
Wage Agreement of 1968 (Washington, D.C. : United Mine Workers of
America, 1968).
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4/
Retirement Fund.—

However, it was Initially negotiated in lieu of a

wage increase in 1946 and the last renegotiation lasted from 1952 to
1971.

Thus, progress in the area of wages and earnings remains as the

main test of whether the union succeeded in gaining any benefits from
the encouragement of mechanization.
Wages and earnings will be analyzed in two ways over a period of
approximately twenty years.

The first will be relative to two other

major industries: motor vehicles and steel.

The second will be with

respect to productivity changes, i.e. output per man-hour.
There are a number of reasons why the steel and automobile
industries were selected for a benchmark comparison with bituminous
coal.

All three industries play a basic role in the United States

economy and, to a great extent, are economically dependent on each
other.

Each employs a sizeable working force, and each industry is

highly organized by a large, strong industrial trade union.
There is an interesting historical relationship among the
three unions.

John L. Lewis, President of the United Mine Workers of

America, helped found the Congress of Industrial Organization in the
1930s which, with considerable financing by the United Mine Workers
of America, sponsored the successful organizing drives in both the
steel and automobile industries.

Each union has since remained

particularly sensitive to contract demands and gains of the others.
The United Mine Workers of America keeps a close watch on the United
Steel Workers of America, as the mine workers represent the employees
__
— The Welfare and Retirement Fund will be discussed in detail in
Chapter VI.
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of the steel company's captive and non-captive mines.

The automobile

industry, at one time, also operated captive mines in the coal fields.—'
Another reason for comparing the industries is because all have
experienced considerable capital investment since the 1950s.

In the

steel industry, companies have recently begun to replace old outmoded
facilities with the more efficient basic oxygen process and automated
plants.

The automobile industry has undergone considerable capital

investment in plant and equipment since the 1950s, perhaps to a
greater extent than any other major industry.—'

The bituminous coal

industry has experienced heavy capital investment since the late
1940s as presented in Table 18.
The final reason for selecting these three industries is because
each has a location that,

to a great extent, is regionally oriented.

As a result, the wages and benefits negotiated by the three unions
have a significant regional economic impact.

A benchmark comparison

might be able to give an Interesting insight into any economic
differences among workers in a key industry in Appalachia (coal
mining), on the fringe of Appalachia (steel production), and outside
Appalachia (automobile manufacture).

Comments on Weekly and Annual Earnings

While average wages and earnings compiled by the Bureau of Labor

— Tom Bethell, "South-East Coal Co. in a Battle for Life,"
Appalachian Lookout, Vol. 1, No.l, December 1968, p. 3.
— U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly
Labor Review. "Productivity Increases in the Auto Industry,"
(Washington, D . C : Government Printing Office, March 1969), p. 39.

TABLE

18

INDEX OF PLANT AND EQUIPMENT PER PRODUCTION WORKER IN BITUMINOUS COAL
(1929 - 100)

Year

1929

Index Value

Average Annual Per Cent Change

100

1939

69.8

-

3.5

1948

83.1

+

2.0

1953

145.8

+ 11.9

1958

214.8

+

8.1

SOURCE: Robert T. Adams, "Technology and Productivity in Bituminous
Coal, 1949-59," Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (Washington, D . C :
Government Printing Office, October 1961), Vol. 84, p. 1083.

Statistics and other agencies for the steel and automobile industries
probably reflect fairly accurately the typical wage payment of their
employees, this is not the case in the bituminous coal industry.
The bituminous coal industry contains sectors that vary considerably
in wages and earnings.

These sectors are distinguished principally

by union or non-union representation of the miners and the type of
mining operation utilized.
Unlike the automobile and steel industries, the bituminous coal
industry is not yet completely organized.

In 1967, "slightly more

than three-fourths of miners working in mines having 10-49 employees
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were nonunion while not more than a twentieth of miners in mines
employing at least 50 were nonunion."-

Table 19 shows that

presently less than 75 per cent of the bituminous coal miners are
organized.

According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the

unorganized sector paid an average of 47 per cent less compensation
8/
per hour in 1969 than the organized sector." Data comparing compensation in union and nonunion operations are presented in Table 20.
From inspection, it is obvious that the wage and earning situation
in the unorganized sector is significantly different from that in
the organized sector.
The type of mining operation also creates wages and earning
differentials in bituminous coal.

Surface or strip mining employees

obtain different earnings than underground miners. Although surface
9/
miners receive a slightly lower average hourly wage-, their average
annual earnings are generally greater due to the average of 20 to 30
more days a year that surface miners work as compared to underground

12/

miners.

Particularly misleading statistics in the bituminous coal
industry are the hourly and weekly wages. As it turns out, very few

—/ U. S. Department of Labor, Compensation of Bituminous Coal
Miners Rose to $5.70 an Hour in Latest BLS Survey. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, News Release 71-201 (Washington, D. C.: Government
Printing Office, April 16, 1971), p. 4.
- ' Ibid., p. 7.
—/ The average hourly wage from 1965-69 of a surface miner was
20$ less than an underground miner, according to the Handbook of
Labor Statistics. 1970, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department
of Labor, p. 260.
IP-'Bitumlnous Coal Data. 1969 (Washington, D. C.: National Coal
Association), pp. 39-40.

TABLE 19
ANNUAL TOTAL PRODUCTION, ROYALTIES, UNION COAL PRODUCTION, AND SIZE OF THE ORGANIZED SECTOR
IN BITUMINOUS COAL
I
Year

Tonnage Royalties
(Dollars)

Royalty/Ton
(cents)

1950 - 1951
1951 - 1952
7/1952-9/1952 )

129,873,885.61
125,734,818.68

30
30
30

)

129,690,366.43

10/1952-6/1953)

Union Production
(tons)
432,912,952
419,116,062

Total Production
(tons)
544,046,000
511,378,000
107,305,000

345,840,977
40

79.57
81.96
)
)

342,755,000

Per Cent
Organized

76.84

)

1953 - 1954
1954 - 1955

132,368,801.61
127,920,180.20

40
40

330,922,004
319,800,450

416,014,000
423,253,000

79.55
75.56

1955
1956
1957
1958

-

1956
1957
1958
1959

152,886,125.45
155,318,828.09
138,297,694.21
130,981,039.04

40
40
40
40

382,215,313
388,297,070
345,744,235
327,452,597

502,893,000
499,099,000
440,128,000
424,003,000

76.00
77.80
78.56
77.23

1959
1960
1961
1962

-

1960
1961
1962
1963

127,581,536.87
116,692,784.86
123,604,999.81
123,211,279.51

40
40
40
40

318,953,842
291,731,962
309,012,500
308,028,200

415,041,000
389,216,000
428,912,000
431,450,000

76.85
74.95
72.05
71.39
(Continued)

TABLE

Year1

Tonnage Royalties
(Dollars)

Royalty/Ton
(cents)

1963 - 1964

133,486,784.68

1964 - 1965

142,624,963.16

1965 - 1966

146,493,759.62

1966 - 1967

159,848,815.78

1967 - 1968

163,089,691.21

1968 - 1969

157,480,708.95

40
40
40
40
40
40

1969 - 1970

166,654,729.00

40

19 (Continued)

Union Production
(tons)

Total Production
(tons)

Per Cent
Organized

333,716,962

470,780,000

70.89

356,562,407

497,519,000

71.67

366,234,400

519,434,000

70.51

399,622,040

557,769,000

71.65

407,724,227

550,358,000

74.08

393,701,772

540,438,000

72.85

416,636,822

572,864,000

72.73

To correspond with the annual reports of the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement
Fund, yearly data were calculated from July 1 of the first year to June 30 of the second year, except
where indicated.
SOURCE:

Tonnage royalties compiled from the annual reports of the United Mine Workers of America
Welfare and Retirement Fund; royalty per ton compiled from union contracts; union production
compiled by dividing royalty per ton into tonnage royalties; total production compiled from
monthly data in the Survey of Current Business and Business Statistics. U. S. Department of
Commerce; percent of the industry represented by the United Mine Workers of America collective
bargaining agreement computed by dividing union coal production by total coal production.
Data from the Southern Labor Union are not included.
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TABLE

20

COMPENSATION OF UNION AND NONUNION BITUMINOUS COAL MINERS, 1969

Compensation Practice

Total compensation

Pay for working time
Straight-time pay
Premium pay
. . . . . . . . .
Overtime, weekend, and holiday work .
Shift differentials
Pay for leave time (except sick leave) .
Vacations
Holidays
Civic and personal leave
Employer payments to vacation and
holiday funds
Employer expenditures for retirement programs.
Social security
Private pension plans
.

Majority of miners
covered by collective
bargaining agreements
Dollars
Per cent
per hour
of compenof work
sation

Majority of miners not
covered by collective
bargaining agreements
Per cent of
Dollars per
compensation
hour of
work

100.0

$6.13

100.0

$3.27

71.7
66.0

4.39
4.05

86.9
83.0

2.84
2.71

5.6
4.9
0.7

.34
.30
.04

3.9
3.9

.13
.13

-

-

6.0
3.7
2.2
0.1

.37
.23
.14
1/

1.1
0.8
0.2
1/

.03
.03
.01

12.2

.75
.19
.55

4.3
4.1
0.2

.14
.13
.01

3.2
9.0

1/

(Continued)

SO

TABLE

Majority of miners
Majority of miners not
covered by collective
covered by collective
bargaining agreements
bargaining agreements
Per cent of Dollars per
Per cent of
Dollars per
compensation hour of work compensation
hour of work

Compensation Practice

Employer expenditures for health and
insurance programs*
Life, accident and health insurance
Sick leave
Workmen's compensation
. . . .
Employer expenditures for unemployment
benefit programs
Unemployment insurance
. . . .
Severance pay
Severance pay funds and supplemental
unemployment benefit funds
Nonproduction bonuses
Savings and thrift plans

20 (Continued)

9.0
5.7

.55
.35

6.6
0.9

.22
.03

1/
3.2

1/
.20

1/
5.7

1/
.19

0.5
0.5
1/

.03
.03
1/

1.0
1.0

.03
.03

-

-

0.6

.04

0.1

1/

78.3
21.6

4.80
1.32

88.0
11.9

. . . .

Wages and salaries (gross payroll)
Supplements to wages and salaries

.

2.88
.39

* Includes other health benefit programs, principally State temporary disability insurance.
** Wages and salaries include all direct payments to workers.
*** Supplements to wages and salaries include all employer expenditures for compensation other than
for wages and salaries.
1/ Less than 0.05 per cent or $0,005.
SOURCE: U. S. Department of Labor, Compensation of Bituminous Coal Miners Rose to $5*70 an Hour in
Latest BLS Survey. Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release 71-201 (Washington, D. C : Government Printing Office, April 16, 1971), p. 7.
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miners can take advantage for the entire year of the relatively
attractive hourly and daily wage rates.

The average coal miner works

fewer hours a week than other industrial workers due to such reasons
as a shortage of railroad cars, inspection shut-downs, power failures,
work stoppages, machine failures, and market conditions.—' The individual miner, in addition, is employed in an extremely hazardous industry
and as a result he is more likely to miss work due to injuries and
12/
health problems than other industrial workers.—

According to a study

conducted by Helen Lewis in Virginia, only 42 per cent of the miners in
13/
her sample were reported as working during an entire year.—

Thus,

if one were to compare, for example, the ability of workers in the three
industries to support a family, a more informative measure would be
earnings over an extended time period, such as annual earnings.

Weekly and Annual Earnings in Bituminous Coal, Steel and Motor
Vehicles
Average weekly earnings for the three industries from 1947 to
1969 are shown in Table 21 and graphically represented in Chart 2.
The chart shows that weekly earnings in bituminous coal have generally
kept pace with the other two industries, although there was a noticeable lag during the early 1960s.

It is interesting to note that

bituminous coal, after leading the three in 1947 and 1948, trailed the
group for 15 of the remaining 21 years depicted.

—'ibid., p. 44.
12/
— T h i s will be discussed and supported in Chapter V.
13/
— H e l e n M. Lewis, The Sociological Impact of Mechanization on
Coal Miners and Their Families, Annual Council of Economic Proceedings
Volume, American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum
Engineers, 1969, p. 12.

82

TABLE

21

AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGES FOR PRODUCTION WORKERS IN THE BITUMINOUS COAL,
STEEL, AND MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRIES

Year

Bituminous Coal

Steel

1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

63.75
69.18
60.63
67.46
74.65
75.04
81.84
77.52
92.13
102.00
106.00
97.57
111.34
112.41
112.01
114.46
121.43
128.91
140.26
149.74
153.00
153.16
165.79

56.51
62.84
63.34
67.95
77.71
80.00
88.29
83.92
96.80
102.87
105.57
108.00
122.71
116.13
122.92
127.40
133.06
138.43
140.90
144.73
143.51
151.51
165.29

Motor Vehicles

58.63
63.15
67.33
74.85
77.16
84.87
89.88
91.30
99.84
96.82
100.61
101.24
111.38
115.21
114.69
127.67
132.68
138.03
147.63
147.23
144.84
167.66
170.61

United States Bureau of Labor Statistics as cited in
SOURCE: Bituminous Coal Data (Washington, D. C.: National Coal
Association, 1969), and Employment and Earnings, U. S.
Department of Labor (Washington, D. C : Government
Printing Office).
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CHART

2

AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS FOR PRODUCTION WORKERS IN THE BITUMINOUS
COAL, STEEL, AND MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRIES
(Current Dollars)

H H M H M I - ' M f H H M M I - ' M I - ' l - ' H - ' M H t - ' l - ' l - ' l - - '
t0 tO VO tO SO VO tO to s o t O t O t O t O t O t O t O t O
so so SO to to to
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>
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United States Bureau of Labor Statistics as cited in
SOURCE: Bituminous Coal Data (Washington, D. C.: National Coal
Association, 1969), p. 46.
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Annual earnings for the three industries are shown in Table 22
and graphically represented in Chart 3.

It should be noted that

since the middle 1950s the difference in annual earnings between
workers in bituminous coal and workers in the other two industries
has been increasing.
The annual earnings figures do present some difficulties.

The

most unfortunate is that the latest figures in the series are for
1965.

An attempt to update the data by means of a survey conducted

by the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association was unsuccessful.

There

is no reason to believe, however, that contracts negotiated in the
three industries since 1965 have greatly altered the depicted trend.
The second difficulty is that the annual earning series includes
salaries as well as production worker wages.

Thus, the reported

figures might be slightly high if one wanted to accurately detect the
annual earnings of production workers in the steel and automobile
industries.

In bituminous coal the inclusion of salaried employees

is balanced to some extent by the lower average annual earnings in
the nonunion mining sector.

The result is thus a reasonable estimate

of the annual earnings for an average coal miner.

The figures were

supported by the Lewis study, which found the annual earnings of a
14/
union miner to range between $5,280 and $7,200 in 1967.—
The final difficulty with the series is one of classification
for the bituminous coal industry.

—

Prior to 1960, the average earning

Helen M. Lewis, op_. cit., p. 12.
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TABLE

22

AVERAGE ANNUAL EARNINGS FOR SALARY AND PRODUCTION WORKERS IN
THE BITUMINOUS COAL, STEEL AND MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRIES
(Current Dollars)

Year

1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965

Bituminous Coal

3,212
3,383
2,930
3,268
3,831
3,760
4,194
4,044
4,550
4,944
5,162
4,831
5,322
5,376
5,289
5,434
5,669
6,062
6,444

Steel

NA
3,431
3,435
3,728
4,164
4,403
4,712
4,626
5,156
5,448
5,683
5,854
6,332
6,341
6,551
6,824
7,008
7,317
7,556

Motor Vehicles

3,143
3,881
3,608
4,010
4,221
4,614
4,952
5,070
5,445
5,450
5,703
6,092
6,359
6,558
6,638
7,144
7,528
7,866
8,152

SOURCE: Paul Blederman, editor, Economic Almanac (New York:
National Industrial Conference Board, 1962 and 1967
editions).
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figures were for "bituminous coal and other soft coal mining."
Since 1960, the figures were for "coal mining," undoubtedly including
both anthracite and bituminous coal production.

Anthracite mining,

however, has been declining over the past decade.

In 1969 anthracite

coal production was only 1.8 per cent of bituminous coal production.—'
Thus, the addition of anthracite miners, most of whom are members of
the United Mine Workers of America, should not significantly affect
the comparability of the series before and after 1960.
Needless to say, annual earnings are only part of total compensation.

If, for example, miners received significantly greater

supplementary benefits than workers in the other two industries, the
depicted gap in Chart 3 would be narrowed, closed, or reversed.
Table 23 compares the compensation allocation between the
bituminous coal and basic steel industries for various categories.
It shows that the bituminous coal and basic

steel industries allocate

a similar per cent of compensation for straight-time pay (67.5 per
cent and 70.9 per cent respectively). The overall pay percentage for
premium time is somewhat higher in bituminous coal, due to the
recent increased demand for coal and the resulting overtime work.
The per cent of compensation allocated for wage supplements appears
to be much higher in bituminous coal (20.8 per cent) than in basic
steel (14.9 per cent).

However, most of the difference is due to the

significantly higher percentage allocated to the coal industry's

—'Coal Production in the U. S.,1969. Pamphlet compiled by
Keystone Coal Buyers Manual (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing
Company, 1970).
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TABLE 23
EXPENDITURES FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION, BITUMINOUS COAL MINING,
AND BASIC STEEL, 1969
Coal Miners
Compensation Practice
Per cent of
compensation
Total compensation

. . . .

Pay for working time
. . . .
Straight-time pay
. . . .
Premium pay
. . . .
Overtime, weekend, and holiday
work
. . . .
Shift differentials
...
Pay for leave time (except sick
leave)
. . . .
Vacations
. . . .
Holidays
. . . .
Civic and personal leave
. .
Employer payments to vacation
and holiday funds
. . . .
Employer payments to savings
and vacation funds*
Employer expenditures for retirement programs
. . . .
Social security
. . . .
Private pension plans
...
Employer expenditures for health
and insurance programs^ . . .
Life, accident and health
insurance
. . . .
Sick leave
. . . .
Workmen's compensation . . .
Employer expenditures for unemployment benefit programs
...
Unemployment insurance . . .
Severance pay
...
Severance pay funds and supplemental unemployment benefit
fund
...

Production Workers,
Basic Steel
Per cent of compensation

100.0

100.0

72.9
67.5
5.5

76.0
70.9
5.1

4.8
0.6

4.2
0.9

5.6
3.5
2.0
0.1

9.0
6.7
2.0
0.1
1/
0.3

11.5
3.2
8.3

7.4
3.4
4.0

8.8

5.9

5.3
1/
3.4

5.3
1/
0.6

0.5
0.5
1/

1.3
0.5
1/
0.8
(Continued)
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TABLE

23 (Continued)

Coal Miners
Compensation Practice
Per cent of
compensation
Nonproduction bonuses . . .
Savings and thrift plans . .
Wages and salaries (gross
payroll) 4
. . .
Supplements to wages and
salaries5
. . .

0.6

Production Workers,
Basic Steel
Per cent of
compenstation
0.2
1/

79.1

85.1

20.8

14.9

1

Less than 0.05 per cent of $0,005.

1

Funded savings and vacation expenditures are made by basic steel
establishments as part of their total outlay for savings and
vacation plans. The other expenditures aider these plans are
included in the vacation pay category.

3

Includes other health benefit programs, principally State temporary
disability insurance, not presented separately.

*

Wages and salaries include all direct payments to workers. They
consist of pay for working time; pay for vacations, holidays,
sick leave and civic and personal leave; severance pay; and
nonproduction bonuses.

*

Supplements to wages and salaries include all employer expenditures for compensation other than for wages and salaries. They
consist of expenditures for retirement programs (including direct
pay to pensioners under pay-as-you-go private pension plans);
expenditures for health benefit programs (except sick leave);
expenditures for unemployment benefit programs (except severance
pay); payments to vacation and holiday funds, and payments to
savings and thrift plans.

Note:

Because of rounding, sums of individual items may not equal
totals.

SOURCE: U. S. Department of Labor, Compensation of Bituminous Coal
Miners Rose to $5.70 an Hour in Latest BLS Survey, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, News Release 71-201 (Washington, D. C :
Government Printing Office, April 16, 1971), p. 8; and U.S.
Department of Labor, Results of Latest BLS Survey of Employee
Compensation in Basic Steel, Bureau of Labor Statistics News
Release 71-269 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
May 13, 1971), p. 7.
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workmen's compensation insurance, undoubtedly a result of a poorer
safety record.

Since workmen's compensation payments do not vary

from industry to industry, the increased allocation in bituminous
coal does not result in greater benefits to the miners.

If the

allocation for workmen's compensation insurance were the same in
both industries, the compensation for wage supplements in bituminous
coal and basic steel would differ by only 3.1 per cent.

This would

narrow the gap depicted in Chart 3, but only slightly since, for
example, the earnings differential between bituminous coal and
basic steel, as presented in Table 22, is $1,255, or over 20 per
cent, for the year 1964.
An important observation from Chart 3 is that bituminous coal
annual earnings have been consistently below the other two industries since 1948.

In fact, the difference between annual earnings

in bituminous coal and the other two industries has been greatly
increasing during the entire time period.

This lower position of

bituminous coal was also true before 1947, but there were many
reasons causing the situation during that time.
early 1940s

The 1930s

and

involved strikes and labor unrest, and a greater amount

of nonunion employment.

During World War II, the government used

wage controls to effectively lock worker earnings into relatively
stable positions.
While strikes and unorganized employment may explain the relatively low annual earnings record for workers in bituminous coal
before the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, they do
not explain the reason since then.

There have been no authorized

9r
strikes in the coal fields from 1950 to 1971, and the average number
of days worked in a year has increased, as shown in Table 24.

TABLE

24

THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS WORKED ANNUALLY

1950 - 1954

189

1955 - 1959

200

1960 - 1964

203

1965 - 1967

219

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Mines data as cited in
Bituminous Coal Data (Washington, D.C.:
National Coal Association, 1969), p. 8.

Productivity in the Bituminous Coal. Steel, and Motor Vehicle
Industries
Another factor in the analysis dealing with the impact of
mechanization on worker earnings is productivity per man-hour.

As

mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, all three industries can
be classified as capital intensive.

Chart 4 portrays the indexes

of output per man-hour for production workers in the three industries
during the time period.

The chart shows that output per man-hour

in the bituminous coal industry has risen at a faster rate than in
the steel or motor vehicle industries.

From 1957 to 1966, average

annual productivity per man-hour increases were 6.3 per cent in
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CHART 4
PRODUCTIVITY INDEXES OF OUTPUT PER MAN-HOUR FOR PRODUCTION WORKERS
IN THE BITUMINOUS COAL, STEEL, AND MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRIES
(1957-59 - 100)
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SOURCE: U. S. Department of Labor, Handbook of Labor Statistics. Bureau
of Labor Statistics (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1970), pp. 161-166.
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bituminous coal,—

2.7 per cent in steel, and 4.5 per cent in motor

vehicles.—'

Productivity and Earnings

According to the Council of Economic Advisers, "The only valid
and noninflationary standard for wage advance is the productivity
principle .

.

18/
."—

The policy suggested was that annual wage

adjustments should not exceed the annual rate of productivity increase
per man-hour in the nation, which was estimated to be between 3 and
4 per cent during the 1950s and early 1960s depending upon producti19/
vity measurement and the time interval considered.—
Table 25 presents a comparison of average annual productivity
per man-hour increases for production workers in the bituminous coal,
steel, and motor vehicle industries in selected years.

During all

of the time spans indicated, the average annual productivity per manhour increases in bituminous coal were significantly higher than the
corresponding rates in the steel and motor vehicle industries.

It

is interesting to note that the average annual productivity per manhour increases for production workers in the steel and motor vehicle

— I t is interesting to note that the TRW study for the Bureau
of Mines estimated that productivity increases in bituminous coal
from 1900 to 1950 averaged 1.6 per cent per year. TRW Systems Group,
Underground Coal Mining in the U.S., U.S. Bureau of Mines Open File
Report 10-70 (Washington, D . C , June 1970), p. A-4.
— U . S . Department of Labor, Handbook of Labor Statistics, Bureau
of Labor Statistics (Washington, D . C : Government Printing Office,
1967, 1968 and 1969 editions).
—'Economic Report of the President, February 1968 (Washington,
D.C:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 126.
19/
-—'Sanford Cohen, Labor in the United States, Third edition
(Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1970), p. 428.
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TABLE

25

AVERAGE ANNUAL PRODUCTIVITY PER MAN-HOUR INCREASES FOR PRODUCTION
WORKERS IN THE BITUMINOUS COAL, STEEL,AND MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRIES
IN SELECTED YEARS

Years

Bituminous Coal
(annual rate)

Steel
(annual rate)

Motor Vehicles
(annual rate)

2.2
2.2
2.6
2.7

NA
NA
4.3
4.5

6.2
6.4
5.8
6.3

1947-68
1947-66
1957-68
1957-66

TABLE

26

RATES OF INCREASE IN AVERAGE PRODUCTIVITY PER MAN-HOUR PER PRODUCTION WORKER, AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGES, AND AVERAGE ANNUAL EARNINGS IN
THE BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY

Year

1947-68
1947-66
1957-68
1957-66
*

Average Annual Rate
of Productivity per
Man-hour, per Production Worker

6.2
6.4
5.8
6.3

1947-65 average

Average Annual
Average Annual
Rate of Increase Rate of Increase
in Weekly Wages in Annual Earnings

2.9
3.2
2.0
2.5
@

NA
2.3*

NA
1.4@

1957-65 average

SOURCE: (for both tables) U.S. Department of Labor, Handbook of
Labor Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics (Washington,
D . C : Government Printing Office, 1967, 1968, 1969 and
1970 editions). In Table 26, weekly wage rates calculated
from Table 21; annual earnings rates calculated from
Table 22.
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industries were extremely close to the estimated national averages
cited above.
Table 26 presents a comparison of rates of increase in average
productivity per man-hour per production worker, average weekly
20/
wages, and average annual earnings in the bituminous coal industry.—
Since average productivity per man-hour per production worker in
bituminous coal was greater than the national average rate, coal
miners could have received annual wage adjustments of at least three
to four per cent without exceeding the recommendation of the Council
of Economic Advisers.

The data, however, indicate that the average

annual rates of increase in annual earnings, particularly during the
period from 1957 to 1966, were below the rate that would have been
permitted by non-inflationary wage adjustment policy and the average
21/
annual rate of productivity per man-hour.—

The situation was

different in the benchmark industries. As shown in Table 27, the

20/
— A l l data in Table 26 are not directly comparable. It would
have been preferable to use average productivity per man-week and
average productivity per man-year if such U.S. Department of Labor
data were available.
21/
— F r i n g e benefits were to be included in the wage adjustment
rate recommended by the Council of Economic Advisers. Most of the
fringe benefits in the bituminous coal industry are financed by a
tonnage royalty paid into the United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund. Since the royalty remained unchanged during the period
from 1952 to 1971, it can be assumed that fringe benefits would add
very little, if any, extra each year in the calculation of the total
annual wage adjustment. This situation might not have been true for
the benchmark industries, as major fringe benefits were being added
during the periond since 1952, as discussed in Chapter VI. The
result would be that the total annual wage adjustments in the benchmark industries could be greater than those listed.
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TABLE

27

COMPARISON OF RATES OF INCREASE IN AVERAGE PRODUCTIVITY PER MANHOUR PER PRODUCTION WORKER, AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGES, AND AVERAGE
ANNUAL EARNINGS IN THE BITUMINOUS COAL, STEEL, AND MOTOR VEHICLE
INDUSTRIES, 1957-66

Year

Average Annual
Rate of Productivity Per ManHour Per Production Worker

Average Annual
Rate of Increase
in Weekly Wages

Average Annual
Rate of Increase
in Annual Earnings

Bituminous Coal
1957-66

6.3

2.5

1.4

2.7

2.1

2.3

4.5

3.0

3.4

Steel
1957-66

Motor Vehicles
1957-66

All data are not directly comparable.
* 1957-65 average.

See footnote 20.

SOURCE: U. S. Department of Labor, Handbook of Labor Statistics.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, (Washington, D. C : Government
Printing Office, 1967, 1968, 1969, and 1970 editions).
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average annual rates of increase in annual earnings from 1957 to 1966
in the steel and motor vehicle industries were very close to their
respective average annual rates of productivity per man-hour and the
non-inflationary annual wage adjustment guidelines suggested by the
Council of Economic Advisers.
The findings seem to indicate that average annual earnings in
bituminous coal have not kept pace with those in the benchmark industries.

In addition, average annual earnings in bituminous coal have

increased at a lower rate than productivity gains and the recommendation of the Council of Economic Advisers would justify.

A possible

explanation for the findings can be found by examining wholesale
prices in bituminous coal during the 1950s and 1960s. According to
Dunlop, "the levels of prices and wage rates could vary over time
under the impetus of increasing productivity in accordance with at
least three logically possible patterns: (1) constant prices and
rising wages, (2) falling prices and constant wages, and (3) rising
22/
prices with wages rising at an even faster pace."—

It has already

been shown in Table 3 (p. 15) that prices in the industry fell during
the period from the middle 1950s to the middle 1960s.

This was due

in part to an increase in the production of less expensive strip mine
coal and due in part to increased competition from substitute fuels.
The resulting deflationary prices that affected the entire industry
undoubtedly contributed to a wage adjustment rate similar to what
was suggested in Dunlop'8 second pattern.
22/
— J o h n T. Dunlop, "Productivity and the Wage Structure," Income,
Employment and Public Policy —Essays in Honor of Alvin H. Hansen,
Lloyd A. Metzler, et. al., ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company,
1948), p. 341.

CHAPTER

V

THE IMPACT OF MECHANIZATION ON WORKER HEALTH AND SAFETY
IN THE BITUMINOUS COAL MINING INDUSTRY

Injuries and Fatalities

The U. S. Bureau of Mines, Legislation and Codes.
of Mines was established in 1910 ".

.

The Bureau

.to make diligent investi-

gation of the methods of mining, especially in relation to the
safety of miners and the appliances best adapted to prevent accidents,
the possible improvement of conditions under which mining operations
are carried on .

.

. and from time to time to make such public

reports of the work, investigations, and information obtained as
the Secretary of said department may direct, with the recommendation
of such bureau1.—
For the first four decades of its existence, the Bureau of
Mines was mainly engaged in the operation of its experimental mines
and in the testing of new techniques and equipment.

According to

Feder, "the question of the the improvement of safety standards in
2/
the industry did not become a serious issue until 1939."- At that
time, due to the continuing number of major mine disasters, Congress
began hearings on the Coal Mine Inspection and Investigation Act,

—/Bituminous Coal Miners' Safety Course. U. S. Bureau of Mines
Instruction Manual (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office,
1954), p. iii.
^/Bernard Feder, The Collective Bargaining and the Legislative
Policies of the United Mine Workers of America. 1933-1947 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York: New York University, 1957), p. 50.
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which finally became law in 1941. As previously pointed out in
Chapter II, this act gave the Bureau of Mines no enforcement powers.
The Bureau of Mines, after inspecting a mine, could merely make
recommendations.
The Bureau of Mines finally obtained enforcement powers in
1952, upon the passage of Public Law 552 called the Federal Coal
Mine Safety Act.

There remained many serious deficiencies in the

1952 Federal Coal Mine Safety Act, such as enforcement power only
for those mines regularly employing fifteen or more men underground.
These mines were designated Title II mines, while the smaller mines
were labeled Title I mines.

Other deficiencies of the 1952 Act were

mentioned in Chapter II. President Truman, upon signing the Federal
Coal Mine Safety Act of 1952, recognized the deficiencies in the
bill.

Truman stated':

I consider it my duty to point out these defects
so that the public will not be misled into believing
that this legislation is a broad gauge accident prevention measure. We will do our very best to prevent
mining disasters with the authority granted in this
bill but the Congress eventually will have to meet its
responsibility for enacting legislation which provides
tools fully adequate to prevent the great loss of life
and the thousands of crippling injuries due to mine
accidents.3/
Small Title I mines continued to remain exempt from the enforcement powers of the Bureau of Mines for sixteen years.

In 1964, an

attempt was made to amend the Act so as to include the small mines,

^VS. S. Congress, Coal Mine Health and Safety, Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, United States Senate, Ninety-first Congress, First Session,
on S.355, S.467, S.1094, S.1178, S.1300 and S.1907, February 27,
March 7, 12-14, 18, 20, 26 and May 2, 1969 (Washington, D. C.:Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 518.

but the effort failed.

Finally, on March 26, 1966, Congress passed

an amendment that brought the small mines within the scope and
jurisdiction of the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act of 1952.
On November 20, 1968, the death of 78 mines at Consolidation
Coal Company's No. 9 mine near Farmington, West Virginia, prompted a
new look at the deficient 1952 Act and led directly to the passage
of the significantly tougher Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.
This Act focused on safety and health by banning underground smoking
and open-flame lighting and requiring spark-free electrical equipment
and other technical improvements.

Standards were established for

ventilation and coal dust levels.
It is not the purpose of this study to discuss in detail any
of the legislation mentioned above.

The only point advanced is that

the era of mechanization was not accompanied by tough federal health
and safety requirements until 1969. And even beyond that date, it
was the contention by some that the 1969 Act was not enforced as
4/
strictly as it could.- Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey,
concerned about enforcement of the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act, requested in August 1970 that the Federal General Accounting Office investigate the Bureau of Mines.

The GAO report, released

in June, 1971, charged that the Bureau:
-- had made only about 31 per cent of its required safety
inspections, and 1 per cent of its required health
inspections, through December 31;

—'See, for example, "Enforcing of New Law Bogs Down, Stirring
Uproar in Coal Fields," Wall Street Journal. June 25, 1970, p. 1.
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--failed to use its power to close mines where inspectors
found repeated safety violations, and has been "at times
extremely lenient, confusing, uncertain and inequitable"
about enforcing safety regulations written into the
1969 law;
--failed to force operators to begin dust-sampling programs
as required by law, and allowed them to submit "erroneous
data" that may have made their dust-control programs look
better than they really are;
--"had done little to induce operators to comply" with
requirements that they submit plans for roof control,
ventilation, and emergency action when a fan fails,
and had failed to provide district offices with instructions on methods of approving such plans, with the result
that no uniform criteria are in use;
--ignored the 6 criteria of the 1969 law for determining
the size of fines to be Imposed for safety violations;
—allowed operators too much tine to acquire equipment that
may not have been in short supply, as claimed; and, in
one instance, may have contributed to an equipment shortage
by buying more dust-sampling equipment for the Bureau's
own use than was actually needed;
--compromises its investigations of mine accidents, because
the investigating teams include inspectors and district
officials who have been involved in prior inspections of
the mine and "in effect are required to evaluate their
own previous performances;"
--gave insufficient guidance to field inspectors in interpreting the new law. The GAO investigators discovered,
to their obvious amazement, that although the Bureau had
supposedly given "top priority" in October, 1969, to
preparing a new manual for inspectors, as of May, 1971,
it still had not been completed. The report quotes an
April, 1970, statement by Interior officials that the
manual was "almost complete" and would be distributed
"within 90 days;" the GAO was told more than a year later
that revisions were "about 85 per cent" complete. Meanwhile, GAO concluded, "the lack of uniform administration
of inspection activities" has left the inspectors essentially without guidance from above (the manual currently
in use was written in 1952, for use with a law that has
since been repealed).
V
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There were three other "groups" that had jurisdiction over
health and safety in the coal mines:

the states, the industry, and

the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA).
State legislation and enforcement varies widely.

With the

passage of the 1952 Federal Coal Safety Bill, President Truman
remarked that "the broad phase of accident prevention in general
remains the responsibility of the States in which coal is mined,
despite the record to date indicating either the inability or
unwillingness of the states to meet this responsibility.'*-' An
example of the result is Table 28, which presents the relative
standing of states according to fatal and non-fatal injury rates per
million man-hours of exposure in 1966.

The table shows that Pennsyl-

vania and West Virginia, two adjacent major coal producing states,
have a non-fatal injury rate differential of 152 per cent.
Industry has done very little to handle the problems of health
and safety in the mines. According to the House Committee on
Education and Labor, "the coal mining industry is still in the horseand-buggy era in regard to health and safety."!' From 1952 to 1968,
declared Secretary of the Interior Hickel, the coal industry has
spent $195 million on commercial research and development;

however,

8/
less than $15 million was spent on health and safety research.Instead, Industry appears to rely on worker inducements to encourage
safety.

For example, the Christopher Coal Company, a large division

§./ U.S. Congress, op. cit., p. 518.
2.1 U. S. Congress, Legislative History, Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act, Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives (Washington, D.C:Government Printing Office, March 1970), p.12.

y

Ibid., p. 41.

TABLE

28

RELATIVE STANDING OF STATES ACCORDING TO FATAL AND NON-FATAL INJURY
RATES PER MILLION MAN-HOURS OF EXPOSURE IN BITUMINOUS COAL MINING,
1966

State

Fatality Rate

State

Non-Fatality Rate

Illinois

.48

Alabama

13.91

Indiana

.49

Iowa

16.84

Alabama

.57

Pennsylvania

23.03

Pennsylvania

.64

Ohio

26.08

Ohio

.84

Indiana

33.06

U.S. Average

.99

Tennessee

37.25

West Virginia

1.08

Illinois

39.21

Kentucky

1.17

Missouri

39.59

Missouri

1.28

Utah

40.84

Virginia

1.57

U. S. Average

41.80

Colorado

1.90

Kentucky

44.11

New Mexico

1.93

Colorado

46.43

Tennessee

1.94

Montana

47.00

Utah

2.17

Virginia

48.23

Iowa

2.41

New Mexico

52.21

Montana

6.71

West Virginia

58.07

SOURCE: Forrest T. Moyer and Mary B. McNair, Injury Experiences in
Coal Mining. 1966. Bureau of Mines, U. S. Department of
Interior, Information Circular 8419 (Washington, D . C :
Government Printing Office, July 1969), p. 72.
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of Consolidation Coal Company, presents each miner 400 S & H green
stamps a month if their joint "monthly accident rate isn't too
high."2.'

Table 29 presents a summary of industry research and

development expenditures from 1952 to 1968.
Industry has also been reluctant to listen to the Bureau of
Mines.

The Bureau of Mines, in addition to its enforceable recommen-

dations, makes advisory suggestions in accordance with the Coal Mine
Safety Code, which is described in more detail below.

From 1960 to

1968, of 1.3 million advisory suggestions by Federal inspectors,
10/
only 231,000 were heeded.
Table 30 compares the average number
of violations of the Coal Mine Safety Code.

It shows a gradual

increase, even though industry was increasingly aware of the provisions in the Code.

Table 31 compares inspection data on Title II

mines under the Federal Coal Safety Act of 1952.

It shows that

under the same legislation, assuming reasonably consistent standards
by the inspectors, industry has not made headway in reducing the
hazards of coal mine health and safety.
The union was the natural body to take on the role of championing health and safety for its members.

During the early 1940s,

union pressed for a national safety code in the industry.

the

This was

obtained as part of the 1946 Krug-Lewis Agreement, after the Federal

2-'V. S. Congress, Coal Mine Health and Safety, Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
U. S. Senate, Ninety-first Congress, First Session, on S. 355, S.467,
S.1094, S.1178, S.1300 and S.1907, February 27, March 7, 12-14, 18,
20, 26 and May 2, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1969), p. 813.
— ' u . S. Congress, Legislative History. Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act. Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.:Government Printing Office, March 1970), p.6.
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TABLE

29

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES, IN THE BITUMINOUS COAL
INDUSTRY, 1952-68
(millions of dollars)

Health and
Research

Education and
Training

Coal Industry

1
NA

NA2

Equipment Manufacturer

m}

NA2

Department of
Interior

20*

22

Other Research
and Development
1953

168

No systematic survey has been conducted, but it is estimated
that the combined expenditures by the coal industry and the
equipment manufacturers were less than $15,000,000.
No systematic survey has been conducted, but it is estimated
that the combined expenditures by the coal industry and the
equipment manufacturers were less than $5,000,000.
Figure for coal industry and equipment manufacturers. Based
on extrapolation of a systematic survey by Bituminous Coal
Research in 1955 and by the Bureau of Mines in 1963.
Includes approximately $5,000,000 for testing permissable
equipment.

SOURCE:

U. S. Congress, Coal Mine Health and Safety. Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, U. S. Senate, Ninety-first Congress, First
Session, on S.355, S. 467, S.1094, S.1178, S.1300 and S.1907,
(Washington, D. C ; Government Printing Office, 1969)p. 526.

TABLE 30
AVERAGE VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL COAL MINE SAFETY
CODE

Year

Average violations per
Title I mine

1953
1955
1958
1961
1962

19
20
20
22.7
22.8

Average violations per
Title II mine
14
19
19
22.8
23.1

SOURCE: U. S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Information
Circulars 7685, 7765, 7902, 8133 and 8188.

TABLE 31
VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL COAL SAFETY ACT OF 1952, TITLE II MINES

Year
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962

Total Inspections
7,286
6,621
5,844
5,003
4,964
4,236
3,634
3,298
3,322
3,147

Average Violations per Mine
1.09
1.21
1.49
1.89
1.67
1.74
1.93
2.31
2.32
2.52

SOURCE: Calculated from James Westfield, et. al., Administration of
the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act, 1952-1962, U. S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Information Circular 8188.

Government took over the nation's coal mines.

The Code covered

300 safety standards, including protective clothing, timbering,
blasting, explosives, ventilation, coal dust, and electrical
apparatus.

In later years the Code underwent slight revisions.

Each time, however, it continued to remain an integral part of
every National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement.

For example, the

National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968 reads:
The Federal Mine Safety Codes for Bituminous Coal
and Lignite Mines of the United States, Part I —underground mines and Part II —strip mines, promulgated and
approved October 8, 1953, by the Secretary of the Interior
are hereby adopted and incorporated by reference in this
contract as a code for health and safety in bituminous
and lignite mines of the parties of the first part.—/
Technically, the Federal Mine Safety Code is not law.

However,

by inclusion in the United Mine Workers of America contracts, the
union obtained promised compliance by the operators.

Thus, the

union has the right to close down any union mine at any time if an
inspector finds a violation of the advisory Code.
In addition, the union negotiated in the Krug-Lewis Agreement
the existence of a mine safety committee for each union mine. At
Hearings before a House of Representatives Subcommittee, Chief
Administrator for the Federal Government Coal Mines Administration, J.A.
Krug, testified:
Mr. Lewis made what I still consider to be a strong
case for the local mine safety committee. I do not recall
the exact wording, but I remember very well the general
argument. It is unsound, the union insisted, to suppose

—'Mine Workers of America, United, National Bituminous Coal
Wage Agreement of 1968 (Washington, D. C , 1968).
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that one or two hundred Federal coal-mine inspectors,
who are able to visit a particular mine only once or
twice a year, can ever achieve reasonable mine safety
through their unsupported efforts. Safety depends
upon day-to-day operations, and is not a static condition. Without the active participation and cooperation
of the miners, reasonable mine safety cannot be achieved.
Without the minue-by-minute vigilance of these men, each
one a safety expert in his own right, the mine is bound
to revert to unsafe conditions or practices. With an
active union mine committee in every mine there would be
a constant police force to insure against needless
violations of the code. In every mine there would be a
group of experts, qualified by experience and alerted by
the most rudimentary instincts of self-preservation,
with power to close the mine the minute that it became
dangerous JL?/

The actual provision for the mine safety committee in the
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements reads as follows:

.in those special instances where the Committee
believes an immediate danger exists and the Committee
recommends that the management remove all mine workers
from the unsafe area, the Operator is required to follow
the recommendation of the Committee .ii/

Without doubt, therefore, the union has the right and certainly
the power to close down any unsafe union mine.

Yet of the 1.3 million

violations of the Code from 1960 to 1968, more than half were repeat
14/
violations.—

— / U. S. Congress, Welfare of Miners. Hearings before the SubCommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 80th Congress, First Session (Washington, D. C : Government
Printing Office, Vol. 1, April 3 and 22, 1947), p. 108.
12/Mine Workers of America, United, op. cit.
J^/McAteer, J. Davitt, editor, Coal Mining Health and Safety in
West Virginia (Morgantown, West Virginia, July 1970), p. 286.
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Aside from the reluctance of union officials to close a mine,—
the mine safety committee is under additional pressures to keep the
mine open.

One reason, according to United Mine Workers of America

President W. A. Boyle, is that those on the mine safety committee
are sometimes discharged by the company.—

Although the union may

successfully protest the discharge, it would not if according to the
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 and later amendments
"the Safety Committee in closing down an unsafe area acts arbitrarily
or capriciously."—
Another reason that the mine safety committee might hesitate to
act is the potential loss of earnings.

Obviously, a closed mine

results in no employment for the entire shift.

In addition, the mine

safety committee does not obtain compensation from the company for
its inspection time.

Time is compensated by the local union.

Thus,

the attitude of local officers and the financial condition of the
local treasury influence
committee.

the diligence and thoroughness of the

These factors also lead to considerable differences in

the effectiveness of safety committee among various mines.

15/
— I n a 1956 resolution, the United Mine Workers of America
International Executive Board stated "each district representative
shall know the Federal Mine Safety Code and be made fully responsible for compliance with its various provisions by the various miners
within his assigned jurisdiction . . .", Ibid.
— U . S. Congress, Coal Mine Health and Safety, Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, U. S. Senate, Ninety-first Congress, First Session, on S.355,
S.467, S. 1094, S.1178, S.1300 and S. 1907, February 27, March 7,
12-14, 18, 20, 26 and May 2, 1969 (Washington, D . C : Government
Printing Office, 1969), p. 467.
— M i n e Workers of America, United, National Bituminous Coal
Wage Agreement of 1950 (Washington, D . C , 1950).
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Causes of Injuries and Fatalities

Roof Falls, Haulage, and Explosions.

The main general causes

of bituminous coal industry Injuries and fatalities are roof falls,
haulage mishaps, and explosions.

These, in turn, lead to specific

miner injuries which will be discussed later.
Roof falls result from improperly securing the roof with timbers
and/or roof bolts. According to an interviewed miner, roof bolts
18/
should not be spaced further than a man's reach.— However, this
conservative precaution is often ignored if the roof "looks or feels"
19/
sound.*—

Such an evaluation is extremely risky, since the din of

the machinery no longer permits the audible warning signals of a
loose roof.
Jit the present time, practically all roof securings are done
with the bolting method.

A hole Is drilled into the roof and a long

expansion bolt is forced Into and through the overlying rock layers.
This method removes many of the pillars and timbers that prevented
easy accessibility of machinery to the coal seam.

In addition,

however, it switched the weight of the roof from supports to the
overlying layers.

If the overlying layers are cracked or cannot

bear the weight of the underlying roof layers, the roof will fall.
The continuous miner, an automatic ripping, scooping, and
conveying machine that can continually move forward into the coal
seam, accounted for a negligible amount of the total coal production

M/lnterview with William Fin ley, Westland, Pa., May 15, 1971.
2 2 / A roof is sounded by a tapping procedure. An experienced
miner can often detect the quality of the roof by the resulting
reverberations.
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in the late 1940s. At the present time, however, close to 50 per cent
20/
of the underground coal production is mined by this method.— As the
operator drives the machine forward, a roof bolter is securing the
roof from the rear of the machine.

Due to the length of the machine

and the position of the roof bolter, a continuous miner is constantly
ripping out coal under a considerable distance of unsecured roof.
This undoubtedly accounts for the fact that 50 per cent of all fatalities are from coal and rock falls, of which 80 per cent are within
21/
25 feet of the working face.—

This shown in Chart 5.

Haulage accidents can occur as a result of machinery malfunctions, roof falls along the main haulage ways, derailments, and a
variety of other reasons.

It is estimated that about 20 per cent of

22/
the annual fatalities are a result of haulage accidents.—
Another major cause of injuries and fatalities is the explosion.
Explosions are a danger because of the coal dust and methane in the
air.

The coal dust is a result of the continuous miner or any other

cutting procedure.

Coal dust also causes a health problem, which

will be discussed in another section of this chapter. Methane is
released from the coal seam upon exposure to the air and the amount
of methane in the coal varies from seam to seam.
The explosions are ignited by a variety of causes. During the
past ten years, electrical equipment in the mines has switched from
20/
— Bituminous Coal Data, (Washington, D . C : National Coal Association, 1969), p. 51.
21/
— ' T R W Systems Group, Underground Coal Mining in the U.S., U.S.
Bureau of Mines Open File Report 10-70 (Washington, D . C , June 1970),
pp. 2-3.
—'ibid., pp. 4-12.

CHART

5

PERCENT OCCURRENCE OF FATALITIES DUE TO FALLS OF ROOF, FACE, OR RIB v. DISTANCE FROM WORKING FACE
IN U. S. UNDERGROUND COAL MINES
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SOURCE: TRW Systems Group, Underground Coal Mining in the U. S.. U. S. Bureau of Mines Open File
Report 10-70 (Washington, D. C , June 1970), pp. 4-11.
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DC to AC current.

Continuous miners use 2,300 volt AC motors, and

23/
transmission lines of up to 13,800 volts are not uncommon.**"
Obviously, a single spark from an electric motor could and often
does set off the explosion.

Sparks can also be generated by the

drill bits hitting rock impurities in the coal seam.
If the mining technique is the conventional cutting/blasting
method, the danger is that too much powder will be used for the
necessary task or that primer cord will be used to link together a
number of areas to be blasted simultaneously.

The latter is extreme-

ly dangerous when ventilation is poor, thus leaving high concentrations of methane near the face, and a strict rock-dusting procedure
to settle the coal dust is not followed.
Table 32 presents the distribution of causes of fatalities in
U. S. underground coal nines in 1930-35 and 1965.

It is interesting

to note that the distribution has remained relatively constant over
the time span.
TABLE

32

DISTRIBUTION OF CAUSES OF FATALITIES IN U.S. UNDERGROUND COAL
MINES

Cause
Fall of Roof, face, and Rib
Haulage
Explosions

1930-35

1961

59%
16-21%
11%

62%
16%
11%

SOURCE: TRW Systems Group, Underground Coal Mining in the U. S..
U. S. Bureau of Mines Open File Report 10-70 (Washington,
D . C , June 1970), pp. 4-12.
23/lbid.. pp. 5-37.
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Lighting.

The lack of lighting in the mines has been suggested

as a major cause of mine accidents.

The actual effect is difficult

to determine since the lack of lighting is often camouflaged by the
result of some other more immediate cause. Accident histories in
other Industries, however, "show a direct relationship between
24/
accidents and lighting conditions."—^'
The main source of light in the mines is the electric cap lamp,
which first appeared in 1915. After a number of improvements, it
25/
was universally adopted in the mines by the early 1930's."- Since
that time, "the visual environment in coal mines has not Improved
significantly. «2£/
According to Carter, "the electric cap lamp was designed to
furnish illumination for the individual miner when he was working by
himself in a single place."—'
situation.

Obviously, this is no longer the

Miners work in teams with fast-moving heavy equipment

that often requires them to be at a dozen places in the mine during
a single shift.

This calls • for the increased awareness of the

activities of other mine-sand their machinery.
Type of Mining Technique.

The three main types of underground

mining havealready been discussed in Chapter II. Briefly, they are
the conventional type, which relies on cutting and blasting;

the

continuous mining type, which relies on an automatic ripping, scooping, and conveying machine;

and the longwall type, a process

.24/lbld.. pp. 5-37.
21'S. P. Carter, "Better Underground Lighting," Coal Age.
September 1956, p. 75.
26/TRW Systems Group, op. cit., pp. 5-37.
27/s.P. Carter, op. cit.. p. 75.

introduced from Europe that slices coal along the wall under the
support of self-advancing roof jacks. Table 33 presents the rate of
acceptance of the different methods.

It should be noted that the

longwall method was only recently introduced and should win increasing favor.

The continuous miner technique was introduced in the

late 1940's and was the most modern technique used during most of
the time span under consideration.
Table 34 presents a comparison of the three techniques with
respect to health, safety, external environment, and productivity.
It shows that the best method in three of the four categories is the
longwall method.

In the fourth category, external environment, the

longwall method is equal to the others. On the other hand, the table
shows that the continuous mining method, the method that was introduced at the beginning of the time period under consideration and
became increasingly popular in the Industry, sacrificed health and
safety for production when compared to the conventional method it
was replacing.

Injury Rates in Bituminous Coal Mining

Severity Rates Within the Industry: 1965. The severity.rate
calculation is used by the Bureau of Mines to determine the relative
dangers of specific jobs in the Industry.

The Bureau of Mines

defines the severity rate (SR) a s : — '

28/Forrest T. Moyer and Mary B. McNair, Injury Experiences in
Coal Mining. 1966. Bureau of Mines, U. S. Department of Interior,
Information Circular 8419 (Washington, D . C : Government Printing
Office, July 1969), p. 21.
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TABLE

33

MINING METHODS IN UNDERGROUND BITUMINOUS COAL MINES

Per cent of Total Production
Continuous Miner
Longwall
Other

Year

Conventional

1945

90.8

0

0

9.2

1950

91.4

1.2

0

7.4

1955

88.1

8.0

0

3.9

1956

84.6

10.9

0

4.5

1957

80.9

14.9

0

4.2

1958

75.2

19.7

0

5.1

1959

72.1

23.2

0

4.7

1960

67.8

27.4

0

4.8

1961

64.7

30.9

0

4.4

1962

63.3

32.0

0

4.7

1963

61.0

34.5

0

4.5

1964

57.4

38.8

0

3.8

1965

53.9

42.7

0

3.4

1966

51.0

45.1

0.7

3.2

1967

49.1

47.4

1.0

2.5

1968

48.4

47.6

1.4

2.6

SOURCE: Bituminous Coal Data (Washington, D. C i National Coal
Association, 1969), p. 51.

TABLE 34
SUMMATION AND NORMALIZATION OF RATINGS FOR COMPARISON OF THREE MINING FRAGMENTATION TECHNIQUES
(CONVENTIONAL, CONTINUOUS, LONGWALL)

H

Mining Function

Conventional
S
E
P
+ 4

- 5

-23

-10
0

+18

- 1

5

0

- 1

+ 2

- 6

0

Coal Fragmentation

- 3

- 9

Materials Handling

-12

Ground Control
Environmental Control
Support Systems
Totals
Normalized Totals*
Code: H • Health,
Note:

H

0
-13

Continuous
S
E

-10

+21

H

Longwall
S
E

P
+12
+46

-10
0

+ 6

- 5

- 3

-12

-10
-23

+20

- 8

-11

-10
0

- 1

- 5

0

- 1

0

+ 8

0

- 6

0

+ 4

- 4

0

0

0

0
-43

P

-15

-44

-10

+25

-9

0
-10

-10

+58

-1.00 -1.00 -1.00 +1.00 -1.12 -1.02 -1.00 +1.19 -0.69 -.23 -1.00 +2.76
S • Safety, E • External Environment,

P • Productivity

Continuous and Longwall Techniques are normalized to Conventional for H, S, E, and P
respectively.

SOURCE: TRW Systems Group, Underground Coal Mining in the U. S.. U. S. Bureau of Mines Open File
Report 10-70 (Washington, D. C., June 1970), p. E-26.
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SR

•

Humber of man-days lost per year x 10
(Total) man-hours per year

All fatalities and permanent total disabilities have a standard time
loss charge of 6,000 days.
Appendix B

lists the severity rates for specific causes in the

industry in 1965. As expected, the main causes discussed in the
preceding section have significantly higher severity rates than
others.

For example, falls of roof, face or ribs have a total severity
29/
rate of 3839.""" Such falls happened either during setting and
pulling timbers or props (SR • 578); testing or taking down the roof
(SR - 157); installing roof bolts (SR - 110);
868);

30/
or during a variety of other tasks."—*

loading coal (SR Conventional mining

has an overall severity rate of 437 while continuous mining has a
31/
severity rate of 575.
Again, it is demonstrated that the modern
continuous mining technique is more hazardous than the method It
replaces.
The severity rates indicate that the most dangerous jobs in the
mine are those of a loading machine operator helper, supervisor, roof
bolter, and a continuous mine operator.

This conclusion

is supported

by Table 35, which presents annual roof-fall fatalities by major
occupations.
Severity and Frequency Rates Compared with Other Industries:
1969.

The severity rate calculation can also be used to compare

various industries with each other.

The National Safety Council,

J2/TRW Systems Group, op. cit.. pp. 6-94.

32'lbid.
31/lbid.

TABLE

35

OCCUPATIONAL INFORMATION RELATING TO ROCK- AND COAL-FALL FATALITIES, 1960-69

Fatalities that occurred
inby the last support

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964
1965
(Per cent)

1966

1967

1968

1969

25.2

36.6

32.4

37.4

49.1

38.9

40.0

40.4

41.8

54.5

23.8

34.8

34.3

18.7

19.3

18.2

16.4

8.5

11.2

3.9

14.7
15.4
11.9

17.8

11.4

19.5

11.9
11.1

14.2

15.4
12.2

15.1
18.2

13.8
10.6
20.3
16.0

14.3

8.1

14.6
10.0
14.6
12.7

23.5

7.6

12.3
11.4
13.2
15.8

19.0

5.2

2.4

1.8

2.4

4.5

Fatalities by Major
Occupations
Miner, loader or laborer
Loading machine operator
or helper
Cutter or scraper
Roof bolter or timberman
Supervisor
Utility man - jack setter
Preparation man or shotfirer
Haulageman
Continuous miner operator
or helper
Car loader (boom chute)
Dr11ler-electrician-mechanic
Pumper

9.1
7.0

3.2

4.1

2.6

16.3
17.4

28.6
16.9

1.1

1.0

2.6

4.4

8.6
1.0

9.1
3.5

4.5
4.4

9.5
4.8

4.9
3.3

5.3
2.6

1.6
4.0

2.7
5.4

7.4
7.4

5.1
4.1

6.5
6.5

4.1
1.4

5.2
0.7

8.6
0.0

12.2

16.6

13.5

15.5

11.7

12.2

<r»

-

0.0
1.7

0.0
4.8

0.0
3.6

0.0
3.2

4.1
1.0

11.7
-

-

0.0
3.3

5.2
1.3

SOURCE: U. S. Department of Interior, Falls of Roof , Rib and Face: The No . 1 Killer in Bituminous Coa!
Mines in 1969. Mineral Industry Survey, Bureau of Mines (Washington, D . C , March 1970), p. 13.
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utilizing data reported by member companies only, compares various
major industries by this method.

Chart 6 shows that underground

bituminous coal mining has the highest severity rate of all the
industries listed, and this rate is seven times as great as the steel
industry and nineteen times as great as the automobile industry.
The National Safety Council also compares the frequency rate,
which is defined as the rate of disabling injuries per million man32/
hours.—'

Again, the underground bituminous coal mining industry is

highest with a frequency rate of 31.86. This is over nine times that
of the steel industry and nineteen times that of the automobile
industry.

These statistics tend to confirm the statement made by the

Department of Interior at Senate Hearings on the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969 that "while the coal mining industry
has made giant strides in its ability to extract the natural resource
coal from the depths of the earth, it has lagged behind other Indus33/
tries in protecting Its most valuable resource — t h e miner."-~

•ir/According to the U. S. Department of Labor,
A disabling work injury is any injury. . .which results
in death, permanent impairment, or temporary-total disability.
Injuries which require only first aid or medical treatment are
not included in the computation of injury rates. Absence from
work for a part of a day for treatment is not considered
'disabling'. To be counted as 'disabling,' an injury must
have either caused some permanent impairment or made the person
unable to work at a regularly established job for at least one
full day after the day of injury.
U.S. Department of Labor, Handbook of Labor Statistics. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (Washington, D. C : Government Printing Office, 1970), p.14.
2£/\J. S. Congress, Legislative History. Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act, Committee on Education and Labor, U. S. House of
Representatives (Washington, D. C : Government Printing Office, March
1970), p. 1.
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CHART

6

1969 injury rites, reporters to National Safety Council
FRKiUINCY RATI

MVNUTY RATE

SOURCE: National Safety Council, Accident Facts (Chicago,
Illinois, 1970), p. 26.

Severity and Frequency Rates in Bituminous Coal, Steel, and
Motor Vehicle Industries. 1958-1968. Severity and frequency rate
statistics have been gathered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for
a number of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industries.
Table 36 compares these rates in bituminous coal mining with the
basic steel and motor vehicle industries. Charts 7 and 8 show that
each of the three industries has not improved its frequency and
severity rates over time.

In fact, the recent severity rate movement

in bituminous coal appears to be moving upward, opposite to the trend
depicted for the other two industries.

There is no indication that

the gap between bituminous coal and the other two industries, with
respect to either the frequency rate or the severity rate, is narrowing to any great extent over time.
Non-fatality Rate per Million Man-Hours in Bituminous Coal:
1930-1970.

Table 37 presents the non-fatality rates in bituminous

coal from 1930 to 1968. These data were calculated by the Bureau of
Mines at the Department of Interior and differ slightly from the
frequency rate and severity rate data gathered by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics at the Department of Labor, although the Bureau of Labor
Statistics data are supposedly based on data from the Bureau of Mines.
The purpose of presenting theseaddltlonal data Is not to compare or
analyze the different techniques and interpretations that were used
in compiling the two sets of data, but to examine related data that
are available for the bituminous coal industry over a much longer
time span.
At first glance, it appears that tremendous strides have been
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TABLE 36
WORK INJURY RATES BY INDUSTRY, 1958-68

Year

Bituminous Coal
F
S

Steel

F

S

Motor Vehicles
F
S

1958

NA

NA

4.5

847

5.5

348

1959

40.1

7981

4.7

969

6.2

378

1960

41.1

9072

4.4

815

5.2

398

1961

42.8

9568

4.0

833

4.7

313

1962

43.1

9504

4.2

916

4.9

277

1963

42.6

8658

4.4

704

4.7

266

1964

40.0

8149

4.6

962

4.7

280

1965

43.3

9043

5.3

962

4.7

229

1966

41.9

7730

6.3

804

4.9

330

1967

41.5

7655

5.4

821

5.4

301

1968

40.6

10,146

6.8

710

5.8

294

F : Frequency rate. Disabling injuries per million man-hours
worked.
S : Severity rate. Number of days of disability resulting from
disabling work injuries for each million employee-hours worked.

SOURCE: U. S. Department of Labor, Handbook of Labor Statistics.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (Washington, D. C : Government
Printing Office, 1970), pp. 370, 373 and 375.

CHART

7

COMPARISON OF WORK INJURY FREQUENCY RATES IN THE
BITUMINOUS COAL, STEEL, AND MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRIES, 1958-1968

Motor Vehicles

1958 1959

Steel

1960 1961 1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

Years
SOURCE: U. S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics
Printing Office), pp. 370,
on data presented in Table

Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1970
(Washington, D. C.:Government
373, 375. This chart Is based
37.

CHART
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8

COMPARISON OF WORK INJURY SEVERITY RATES IN THE BITUMINOUS COAL,
STEEL, AND MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRIES, 1958-68
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TABLE 37
BITUMINOUS COAL MINES NON-FATALITIES PER MILLION MAN-HOURS

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950

SOURCE:

83.75
79.98
72.58
68.87
69.39
71.47
65.62
68.05
63.47
60.52
61.28
58.93
60.21
57.79
56.02
56.52
58.81
57.32
56.28
51.67
47.73

1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

47.56
47.64
45.26
43.66
42.76
42.99
43.74
41.97
39.15
40.85
42.52
42.86
42.38
41.92
41.30
41.80
41.44
40.09

U. S. Congress, Legislative History. Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act, Committee on Education and Labor,
U. S. House of Representatives (Washington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, March 1970), p. 351.

made in the bituminous coal Industry in reducing the number of nonfatalities per million man-hours.
more than halved.

From 1930 to 1968, the rate has

However, it must be recalled that serious mechani-

zation in the industry did not begin until the late 1940's and early
1950's.

From the middle 1950's to the present, as the industry became

increasingly more mechanised with sophisticated equipment, the nonfatality rate has remained relatively stable.

This is clearly

demonstrated in Chart 9.
Fatality Rates in Bituminous Coal Mining.

There are a number

of alternate ways to look at the fatality rate in the bituminous coal
industry and one must be cautioned to look carefully at the data
presented.

A favorite technique of industry is to present data on
35/
total annual fatalities or fatalities per million tons mined."""

Chart 10 presents the annual fatalities per year from 1956 to 1969
and Chart 11 presents the annual fatality rate per million tons mined.
Both show significant reductions over the time span.
Unfortunately, Charts 10 and 11 do not accurately represent the
effect of mechanization on miners.

Fatality rates per million tons

are misleading since the statistics are Influenced by Increased
productivity and do not necessarily reflect the safety conditions in
the mines.

Chart 12 presents the annual fatalities per one thousand

men working in underground mines and Chart 13, based on Table 38,
presents the fatality rate per million man-hours, as calculated by
the U.S. Bureau of Mines.

21'The
rate.

Chart 12 shows that the fatality rate per

same technique could be utilized for a non-fatality

CHART

9

NON-FATALITIES PER MILLION MAN-HOURS IN BITUMINOUS COAL MINES, 1930-1970
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SOURCE: Data 1930-1968 from U.S. Congress, Legislative History, Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act. Committee on Education and Labor, U. S. House of Representatives (Washington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, March 1970), p. 351. The 1930-68 part of the chart is based on
data presented in Table 38. Data,1969-1970, from Coal Patrol. No. 15, July 1, 1971, p. 2.
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ANNUAL FATALITIES IN U. S. UNDERGROUND COAL MINES
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SOURCE: TRW Systems Group, Underground Coal Mining In the U.S.,
U. S. Bureau of Mines Open File Report 10-70 (Washington, D. C., June 1970), p. 4-10.

CHART 11
ANNUAL FATALITY RATE PER MILLION TONS MINED IN U.S. UNDERGROUND
COAL MINES
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CHART

12

ANNUAL FATALITIES PER ONE THOUSAND MEN WORKING
IN UNITED STATES UNDERGROUND BITUMINOUS COAL
MINES
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CHART

13

FATALITY RATE PER MILLION MAN-HOURS IN THE BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY: 1930-68
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SOURCE: U. S. Congress, Legislative History. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act.
Committee on Education and Labor, U. S. House of Representatives (Washington, D . C :
Government Printing Office, March 1970), p. 351. 1966-8 data from TRW Systems Group,
Underground Coal Mining in the U. S., U. S. Bureau of Mines Open File Report 10-70
(Washington, D. C., June 1970), p. 4-7. This chart is based on data presented in
Table 39.
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TABLE 38
FATALITY RATES IN THE BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY
1930-1968

Year

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949

Fatality Rate
Per Million
Man-Hours
1.90
1.60
1.77
1.31
1.41
1.46
1.43
1.54
1.52
1.36
1.68
1.35
1.41
1.39
1.23
1.13
1.09
1.23
1.15
0.93

Year

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

Fatality Rate
Per Million
Man-Hours
0.92
1.16
0.90
0.89
0.99
0.96
1.02
1.17
1.14
0.92
1.13
1.18
1.15
1.09
0.94
1.08
1.14
1.01
1.37

SOURCE: U. S. Congress, Legislative History. Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act, Committee on Education and Labor,
U. S. House of Representative (Washington, D. C : Government Printing Office, March 1970), p. 351. 1966-8 data
from.TRW Systems Group, Underground Coal Mining in the
U. S.. U. S. Bureau of Mines Open File Report 10-70
(Washington, D. C., June 1970), pp. 4-7.
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miners working in the industry is, in fact, not decreasing, and
Chart 13 shows that the fatality rate per million man-hours worked
has not changed significantly for over thirty years.

In Chart 13,

the fatality rate in 1933 was lower than in 1968 and the lowest rates
were obtained in the early 1950's when massive mechanization of the
mines was only beginning.
There is no discrepancy among Charts 10, 11, 12 and 13.
Although the first two charts show a down-trend in annual fatalities,
it can be concluded that this results from a reduction in the work
force and an increase in productivity, not from a reduction in hazards.
From 1930 to 1965, according to the TRW report: "a reduction in work
force of about 70 per cent was accompanied by a reduction in yearly
fatalities of about 80 per cent. In the same period, yearly produc36/
tion increased about 15 per cent."—

Charts 12 and 13, which take

into consideration the death-rate per 1,000 workers and million manhours regardless of production, offer a more reliable indication of
safety conditions in the industry.
Roof Fall Fatalities: 1958-1968. As mentioned earlier In this
chapter, roof falls have traditionally accounted for over 50 per cent
of the fatalities in the mines. Although this has been known for
decades, the problem has not been successfully dealt with.

As the

TRW study pointed out in its report:
Not only are the causes of fatalities very much the
same over this period of time, but some of the answers

TRW Systems Group, o£. cit.. pp. 4-5.
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suggested in the 1930's are still valid today. For
example, modernized and movable supports were, and
are still a primary answer to roof falls since most
accidents due to this cause result from insufficient
propping near the face .22/

Chart 14 presents the roof fatalities per million man-hours
worked underground.

It shows that there has been only a slight

reduction in the rate over the decade and that, compared in Chart 15
with the overall fatality rate, roof falls continue to be a major
cause of deaths underground.

It is interesting to note the wide

difference between the roof fatality rate per million man-hours in
Title I and Title II mines.

In the small mines, Title I, the roof

fatality rate in 1968 was 1.07 while in the large mines, Title II,
38/
the rate was only 0.57"—'
Fatality Rates in the United States as Compared to Other
Nations.

Chart 16 presents the death rates per 100,000 manshifts in

the coal mines of a number of countries.

It shows that the United

States has over the time span tolerated considerably more hazardous
mining conditions than in Europe.
bituminous coal mines in the

For example, in 1965 underground

United States had a 2.8 times greater

fatality rate than mines in Belgium;
rate than mines in France;
mines in Great Britain;

a 3.4 times greater fatality

a 4.9 times greater fatality rate than

a 6.4 times greater fatality rate than mines

in The Netherlands; and a 2.7 times greater fatality rate than mines

JZ/ Ibid., pp. 4-12.
i§/ U.S. Congress, Legislative History. Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act. Committee on Education and Labor, U. S. House of
Representatives (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, March
1970), p. 22.
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CHART

ROOF FALLS PER MILLION MAN-HOURS WORKED
UNDERGROUND IN THE BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY

15

ROOF FALLS AS A PERCENTAGE OF UNDERGROUND
FATALITIES IN THE BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY
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CHART

16

FATAL ACCIDENTS UNDERGROUND 1930-1966

1930 1935 1940
.....

1945

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

U.S.A. Anthracite
U.S.A. Bituminous

.

Belgium

•—

France

——*

Great Britain

..—_

Netherlands

—--

West Germany

SOURCE:

U. S. Congress. Coal Mine Health and Safety,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor of the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United
States Senate, Ninety-first Congress, First
Session, on S.355, S.467, S.1094, S.1178, S.1300
and S.1907, February 27, March 7, 12-14, 18, 20
26 and May 2, 1969 (Washington, D. C.: Government
Printing Office, 1969), p. 1071.
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in the Federal Republic of Germany.*-—

On the other hand, in the same

year, United States underground bituminous mines had a 7.7 times
greater output per man-day than mines in Belgium;

a 6.3 times greater

output per man-day than mines In France;

a 5 times greater output

per man-day than mines in Great Britain;

a 5.8 times greater output

per man-day than mines in The Netherlands;

and a 4.7 times greater

40/
output per man-day than mines in the Federal Republic of Germany.—
Table 39 presents the death rates per 100,000 manshifts worked
underground in anthracite coal mines in selected countries.

Calcula-

tions show that average annual death rates between the first five
year period and the last five year period decreased 1.7 per cent in
Belgium, 30 per cent in France;

35.5 per cent in Britain, 45.3 per

cent in Holland, and 17.2 per cent in West Germany.

However, the

average annual death rates increased 63.2 per cent in U. S. anthracite
mines and 13.4 per cent In U. S. bituminous mines for the same time
period.

Health Problems in the Bituminous Coal Mining Industry

Introduction. There are a wide variety of health problems

12/u. S. Congress, Coal Mine Health and Safety. Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
United States Senate, Ninety-first Congress, First Session, on S.355,
S.467, S.1094, S.1178, S.1300 and S.1907, February 27, March 7, 12-14,
18, 20, 26 and May 2, 1969 (Washington, D. C : Government Printing
Office, 1969), p. 1616.
it0-/ Calculated from Bituminous Coal Data (Washington, D. C.:
National Coal Association, 1969), p. 28.
— ' U. S. Congress, o£. cit.

TABLE

I

39

DEATH RATES PER 100,000 MANSHIFTS WORKED UNDERGROUND AT ANTHRACITE COAL MINES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES,
1946-1965

Period

Belgium

France

Average Annual Rate During Period
Britain
Holland
United States
A*
B**

W.Germany

1946-50

45.6

43.2

35.4

32.2

93.6

102.8

71.5*

1951-55

49.0

38.6

27.6

19.6

114.0

93.4

64.2

1956-60

57.4

39.0

25.6

17.2

156.8

109.0

51.0

1961-65

44.8

30.2

22.8

17.6

152.8

116.6

59.2

a

*

- 1947-1950 annual average
Anthracite
** Bituminous

SOURCE:

U. S. Congress, Coal Mine Health and Safety. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor of
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, Ninety-first Congress,
First Session on S.355, S.467, S.1094, S.1178, S.1300 and S.1907, February 27, March 7,
12-14, 18, 20, 26 and May 2, 1969 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969),
p. 1616.
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associated with the coal mining Industry.

These include tuberculosis,

rheumatism, degenerative heart disease, cancer of the respiratory
42/
system and stomach, and chronic bronchitis and emphysema.""" Many
health problems stem, undoubtedly, from the typical damp condition
of coal mines, many of which are only a few feet high.

In addition,

hygienic facilities in the mines were not used until relatively
recently, when new health regulations were prescribed by Federal
legislation.
Since most of the health problems mentioned above are latent,
often occuring after retirement, injury and fatality statistics are
not reliable indicators of the overall effects of the occupation.
While the discussion of occupational health might be a minor issue in
some industries, it is of primary importance in the coal mining
industry.

Dr. Philip Enterllne, in a pioneering study, compared the

death rate of coal miners with that of all workers, after removing
deaths from accidents and other violence which would not be usually
affected by health.

Table 40 presents the data and clearly shows

that coal miners "became increasingly unhealthy relative to other
43/
workers as they grow older."—~
Dr. Enterllne also observed the causes of death (other than
accidents and violence) and compared the frequency with Standardized
Mortality Ratios.

He discovered that death rates among the coal

miners were greater than expected for every observed cause of death
except diabetes.

Dr. Enterllne concluded his analysis by stating

M / T R W Systems Group, <j£. cit.. p.4-3.
43/Philip E. Enterllne, "Mortality Rates Among Coal Miners,"
American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 54, No. 5, May 1964, p. 761.

TABLE

40

DEATH RATES PER 100,000 FOR ALL CAUSES EXCLUDING ACCIDENTS AND
VIOLENCE AMONG COAL MINERS AND ALL MALE WORKERS BY AGE, UNITED
STATES, 1950

Age

Coal Miners

All Workers

Ratio Coal Miners
to all Workers
(x 100)

20924

91.8

74.8

123

25-29

139.2

97.8

142

30-34

197.8

149.8

132

35-44

506.4

360.7

140

45-54

1,520.4

1,067.5

142

55-59

3,326.3

2,048.2

162

60-64

6,723.1

3,021.4

222

SOURCE: Philip E. Enterllne, "Mortality Rates Among Coal Miners,"
American Journal of Public Health. Vol. 54, No. 5, May
1964, p. 761.
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that especially for diseases of the respiratory system, tuberculosis,
and lung cancer, excess mortality among coal miners increases with
44/
age, suggesting the importance of environmental factors."-—

Some

of these environmental factors are discussed below.
Coal Dust.

Coal dust is formed by the fragmentation process of

mining and by the handling of the coal. Merely the transporting of
coal along a conveyor belt releases a fine dust into the air that
eventually settles everywhere in the area.

The continual breathing

of the dust leads to a recognized disease labeled pneumoconiosis,
commonly called "Black Lung."
Pneumoconiosis is defined by the Surgeon General of the United
States as follows:
Coal miners' pneumoconiosis is a chronic chest disease,
caused by the accumulation of fine coal dust particles in
the human lung. In its advanced form, it leads to severe
disability and premature death.-£/
Pneumoconiosis is recognised in two forms, simple and complicated.

Simple pneumoconiosis is accompanied by pinpoint, nodular

lesions distributed throughout the lungs which reduce the ability
of the system to transfer oxygen from the lung to the blood.—
Complicated pneumoconiosis, as shown in Figure 2, incurs progressive
massive fibrosis as a complex reaction to the dust which results in
47/
"marked pulmonary Impairment and considerable respiratory disability."-—

M / Ibid., p. 767
45/ U. S. Congress, Legislative History. Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act. Committee on Education and Labor, U. S. House
of Representatives (Washington, D. C:Government Printing Office,
March 1970), p. 7.
^/jbld.
^Z/jbid., pp. 7-8.
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FIGURE

2

DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF COMPLICATED PNEUMOCONIOSIS (P.M.F.)

SOURCE: Dr. Keith Morgan, "Lung Volumes in Active Coal Miners,"
Paper and Proceedings of the National Conference on
Medicine and the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969 (Washington, D. C., June 15-18, 1970), p. 162.

Perhaps a more practical description of pneumoconiosis is that
given by Dr. Lorin E. Kerr, assistant to the executive medical officer
of the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund:
At work you are covered with dust. It's in your
hair, your clothes and your skin. The rims of your
eyes are coated with it. It gets between your teeth
and you swallow it. You suck so much of it into your
lungs that until you die you never stop spitting up
coal dust. Sometimes you cough so hard that you wonder
if you have a lung left. Slowly you notice you are
getting short of breath when you walk up a hill.
Finally, just walking across the room at home is an

effort .£§/
According to Dr. W. S. Lalnhart, "pneumoconiosis in bituminous
coal workers was not recognised as a specific disease entity until
about 1936 when the Medical Research Council of Great Britain initiated a series of studies relating to the epidemiology, pathology, and
49/
roentgenography of chest diseases in coal miners."—

By 1948, the

British Government was paying compensation to miners with confirmed
cases of the newly recognized disease.—'

In the United States,

however, pneumoconiosis was never wholeheartedly accepted as a
specific disease entity until the Public Health Service released its
study of respirable coal dust contamination in 1969.

This was in

spite of the fact that earlier statistical studies by the U. S.
Public Health Service indicated "that, in relation to the general
working male population, bituminous coal miners have five times the

M/Robert G. Sherrlll, "The Black Lung Rebellion," The Nation.
April 28, 1969, p. 535.
4£/w. S. Lalnhart, et. al. Pneumoconiosis In Appalachian
Bituminous Coal Miners, Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
(Cincinnati, Ohio: Public Health Service, 1969)p. 3.
50/Robert G. Sherrlll, CJK cit., p. 530.
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death rate from respiratory diseases and eight times the number of
occupational respiratory diseases.'£1/
The close association of pneumoconiosis with the environment
was underscored by Dr. Enterline's 1964 study, "Mortality Rates Among
Coal Miners."

Dr. Enterllne notes that after British recognized

pneumoconiosis and began dealing with dust control in coal mines in
1936, the death rate among coal miners was reduced by roughly half.
The death rate among United States coal miners in 1950, which was
approximately the same rate as Britain had in 1932, was twice as much
as Great Britain's 1950 death rate. (See Table 41)

Dr. Enterllne

concludes by stating:
When we examine the British experience it seems
clear that the poor health which has prevailed In
this important segment of our working population is
not a 'necessary evil' for workers in the coal mining
industry.52/
The 1969 Lalnhart report by the Public Health Service, which
was the result of a 1963-65 prevalence study, stated:
.coal workers' pneumoconiosis is a serious
widespread problem in Appalachia. Ten per cent of the
working miners and almost 20 per cent of the non-working
miners showed roentgenographic evidence of this disease.^/
About one-third of the working miners with definite
roentgenographic evidence of disease showed complicated
pneumoconiosis; almost one-half of the non-working
miners, roentgenographically classified as definitely

II.' TRW Systems Group, op. cit.. p.4-3.
52/ phillp E. Enterllne, op^ cit., p. 766.
J5r/ in testimony on this particular point, the Surgeon General
of the United States said "data from postmortem examinations would
indicate an even higher prevalence of the disease." U. S. Congress,
Legislative History. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. Committee
on Education and Labor, U. S. House of Representatives (Washington,
D. C : Government Printing Office, March 1970), p. 7.

TABLE 41
COMPARISON OF DEATH RATES PER 100,000 BETWEEN COAL MINERS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND AND WALES BY AGE

Age

United States
1950

England and Wales. Annual Average
1949-1953
1930-1932

20-24

342

170

381

25-34

439

186

417

35-44

816

345

645

45-54

1,865

912

1,146

55-64

5,151

2,640

2,373

SOURCE: Philip E. Enterllne, "Mortality Rates Among Coal Miners,"
American Journal of Public Health. Vol. 54, No. 5, May
1964, p. 766.

having pneumoconiosis, showed complicated disease.—1

It is estimated that 100,000 of the nation's active and retired miners
are afflicted by pneumoconiosis.-—'
Charts 17, 18, and 19 were taken from the Lalnhart's Public
Health Service report in 1969. Chart 17 shows that there is a significant relationship between definite signs of pneumoconiosis and the
number of years worked in a mine.

This seems to strongly support the

observation of Dr. Philip Enterllne "that respiratory disease is
environmentally induced in coal mines."52/
Chart 18 indicates a strong relationship between pneumoconiosis
and the number of years worked in a mine by working face workers.
Since miners employed at the face are closer to the source of the
released dust, it would be expected that their incident rate of
definite pneumoconiosis would be greater than the average working
miner.

This conclusion is supported by the data presented in Charts

17 and 18. The regression line in Chart 18 has a steeper slope than
the regression line in Chart 17.

This indicates that working face

workers appear to experience a greater incident rate of pneumoconiosis when compared to all working miners for the same number of years
underground.
Chart 19 presents the findings of definite pneumoconiosis by
age and years underground among working and non-working miners. As
might be expected, the highest incident rates were found among the

^/ibid..

p ~

JJ5/w. s. Lalnhart, et. a l . , o£. c i t . . p. 116.
^/philip E. Enterllne, op. cit.. p. 763.

CHART

17

DEFINITE PNEUMOCONIOSIS BY YEARS OF UNDERGROUND EXPERIENCE,
WORKING MINERS
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SOURCE: W. S. Lalnhart, et. al. Pneumoconiosis in Appalachian
Bituminous Coal Miners. Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (Cincinnati, Ohio: Public Health Service,
1969), p. 56.

CHART

18

DEFINITE PNEUMOCONIOSIS BY YEARS OF UNDERGROUND EXPERIENCE, WORKING
FACE WORKERS
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SOURCE: W. S. Lalnhart, et. al. Pneumoconiosis In Appalachian
Bituminous Coal Miners. Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (Cincinnati, Ohio: Public Health Service,
1969), p. 56.

CHART

19

ROENTGENOGRAPHIC FINDINGS OF DEFINITE PNEUMOCONIOSIS BY AGE AND YEARS
UNDERGROUND AMONG WORKING AND NON-WORKING MINERS

SOURCE: W. S. Lalnhart, et. al. Pneumoconiosis in Appalachian
Bituminous Coal Miners. Department of Health, Education
and welfare (Cincinnati, Ohio: Public Health Service,
1969), p. 54.

oldest miners who had spent the greatest number of years In the mines.
Most interesting was the indication that present working miners in
the oldest age bracket and with 30 or more years underground mining
experience had a higher incident rate than their non-working counterparts.

The working miners with 30 or more years In the mines have

undoubtedly spent most of that time since massive mechanization began
in the mines.

On the other hand, it is likely that the non-working

miner had considerably less time exposure to mechanization during his
span of time in the mines.

Thus, it appears that the increase of

mechanization is directly related to a higher incident rate of
pneumoconiosis.

This is supported by the observation of Henry N.

Doyle of the National Institute of Occupational Health In Stockholm,
Sweden:
The high incident of pneumoconiosis among bituminous
coal miners appears to be directly attributable to increased
mechanization. Although classical silicosis was not uncommon
among bituminous coal miners prior to the introduction of
modern mining machines the incidence of coal workers'
pneumoconiosis appears to have increased dramatically about
1950.57/
The President of the United Mine Workers of America, W. A. Boyle,
voiced a similar belief by stating that ".

.

.the increasing Inci-

dence of coal miners' dust disease has developed because of the
58/
introduction of mechanical machinery in the mine.'1-—'

•=JZ/Henry N. Doyle, "The Impact of Changing Technology on Health
Problems in the Coal Mining Industry," Papers and Proceedings of the
National Conference on Medicine and the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act of 1969 (Washington, D. C., June 15-18, 1970), p. 197.
58/u. S. Congress, Coal Mine Health and Safety, Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
United States Senate, Ninety-first Congress, First Session, on S.355,
S.467, S.1094, S.1178, S.1300, and S.1907, February 27, March 7, 12-14,
18, 20, 26 and May 2, 1969 (Washington, D.C:Government Printing Office,
1969), p. 458.
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As a final comment on Chart 19, it should be pointed out that
the incident rate as detected solely by X-rays may, in actual fact,
be too low.

Many United States doctors and researchers subscribe to

the view of Dr. D. L. Rasmussen of the Appalachian Regional Hospital
in Beckley, West Virginia, that the "impairment in respiratory
function of coal miners (simple pneumoconiosis) is poorly related to
59/
the degree of abnormality exhibited on the chest roentgenogram."—
This is in agreement with research findings in Britain that only a
small proportion of disability is related to the extent of pneumoco60/
niosis as described by the radiological category.—
The belief that X-rays do not necessarily indicate the total
incidence of simple pneumoconiosis led to the highly controversial
1969 workmen's compensation law in West Virginia that gave compensation for pneumoconiosis by the "performance" as well as by the X-ray
appearance of coal miner lungs. X-ray evidence, the lav states,
"shall not necessarily be conclusive" in the diagnosis of lung
61/
disease.*—*

This law, passed with the help of a three-week wildcat

strike of West Virginia's coal miners, is less strict than the
62/
earlier pneumoconiosis laws in Alabama (passed in 1952)
and

5 9 / D T . D . L. Rasmussen, "Impairment of Oxygen Transfer in
Dyspnelc, Non-Smoking Soft Coal Miners from the Southern Appalachian
Coal Fields," Papers and Proceedings of the National Conference on
Medicine and the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969
(Washington, D . C , June 15-18, 1970), p. 147.
60/R. G. Carpenter and A. L. Cochrane, "Death Rates of Miners
and Ex-Miners with and without Coalworkers Pneumoconiosis in South
Wales," British Journal of Industrial Medicine. Vol. 13, No. 2, April
1956, p. 102.

—^Robert G. Sherrlll, o ^ cit., p. 529.
j£/lbid.. p. 530.
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Pennsylvania (initially passed in 1946)—

which require X-ray proof.

The Federal program of compensation for pneumoconiosis disability,
part of the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, also requires
strict X-ray confirmation.

This dependence on X-rays in the Federal

program has recently been under attack.

Representative Carl Perkins

of Kentucky stated:
I hate to see disabled people robbed this way, in
one sense of the word. To undertake to deny black lung
benefits solely on X-ray evidence as they are doing was
never intended by the Congress. It is a disgraceful
situation. They herd them up like sheep, send them
through a hospital X-ray laboratory, and then they
receive a black lung denial notice in the mail.64/

Noise.

Noise in coal mines is both a safety and health problem.

It is a safety problem since sounds of any magnitude are considerably
amplified by the confining nature of the mine.

Also, the varying

geological formations cause the same sound emissions to have different
reverberations from place to place.

These reasons result in a diffi-

culty for a miner to hear the sudden cracking of a potentially
dangerous roof or the creaking of a shifting timbered roof support or
the sounds of water behind a thin working face.

These warning sounds

that one might have heard in the past are not easily detected in the

—/Eugene A. Creany, "Statement Relating to Pneumoconiosis
(Coal Worker's Pneumoconiosis) as a Disabling Factor of Men Employed
in the Soft Coal Industry," Coal Mine Health and Safety, Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, U. S. Senate, Ninety-first Congress, First Session, on S.355,
S.467, S.1094, S.1188, S.1300 and S.1097, February 27, March 7, 12-14,
18, 20, and May 2, 1969 (Washington, D. C : Government Printing Office,
1969), p. 501.
M / B e n A. Franklin of the New York Times News Service in the
Morgantown, West Virginia, Dominion News. May 21, 1971.
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highly mechanized and noisy mine, even though noise emissions are often
cyclical.
It is estimated that the noise levels of the coal mining
machinery range anywhere from 105 to 124 dbs.—

Experts, however,

believe that continual exposure to over 90 dbs during an eight hour
shift will cause a hearing impairment.—

Thus, a severe health

problem from noise does exist in the mines, especially to the operators of machinery at the working face.

The TRW Systems Group report

concluded that "most of the equipment used In the coal mines generate
sound levels of such magnitude that continued exposure will cause
hearing impairment.'*-^'

A professor of audiology at West Virginia

University claimed in an interview that the present cycles of noise
and silence are such that a miner retiring after 20 to 30 years in
the mine will usually have a hearing impairment and require a hearing
68/
aid.—

The professor also noted that the simple covering of open

parts of a continuous mining machine —openings that are not necessary
for a particular function or machine efficiency-- could muffle the
69/
machine noise by 6 to 8 dbs.*—*

However, the professor claimed,
1,
70/
the manufacturer had no pressure to engineer a quieter machine.*'
Other Problems. There are a number of other problems that

•££/Ray J. Hayes, "Origin and Levels of Noise in Coal Mines,"
Papers and Proceedings of the National Conference on Medicine and the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (Washington, D. C.,
June 15-18, 1970), p. 79.
££/TRW Systems Group, op. cit., pp. 6-64.
67/ibid.
-r-§/lnterview with Dr. William T. Brandy, Assistant Professor of
Audiology and Speech, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West
Virginia, June 3, 1971.
69/ Ibid.
70/ Ibid.

contribute to poor health conditions in the mine.

Examples include

contaminated air, unsanitary food consumption, rates, and a lack of
hygienic relief facilities. However, it was not the purpose of this
section to survey all of the factors, but only to show that some
major health hazards are definitely attributable to developments in
the technology of mining coal in the United States.

The Costs of Health and Safety in the Coal Mines
Health.

There has been very little research done on the costs

and benefits of improved health conditions in the bituminous coal
industry.

The little that has been done has dealt with pneumoconiosis

and typically involves the simple totaling of costs of the various
Black Lung compensation packages.
Lucille M. Langlois, in a study titled "Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis —

A Comparative Cost Analysis," attempts to aggregate the

separate costs of pneumoconiosis and compare them with the costs of
preventing the disease.—
In the individual sector, Langlois estimated the total income
loss from pneumoconiosis to be $23 million and "out-of-tho-pocket"
medical expenses to be $6 million, for a total cost burden to miners
of $29 million.

Industry costs of loss of production and/or

loss of productivity from a more skilled worker was estimated at $20
million.

The training of replacement miners would cost industry $1

— S e e Lucille M. Langlois, "Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis — A
Comparative Cost Analysis," U. S. Department of the Interior,
Bureau of Mines, unreleased information circular.
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million.

Compensation, a transfer cost via the United Mine Workers

of America Welfare and Retirement Fund, and/or Workmen's Compensation
and/or Social Security, was estimated as $11 million.

Capital costs

for equipment that would allow safer and healthier mining were estimated at $24.5 million with an additional $1 million for health and
safety detection apparatus.

Public welfare, a spill-over cost, was

estimated at $7 million and the cost of research and inspection by
federal and state agencies was estimated at $5 million.

These

estimates did not include intangible losses, such as a poor industry
image and effects on the family of the afflicted miner.
Table 42 presents the above estimates.

It shows that the real

social cost burden is roughly $50 million a year.

Transfer costs, a

redistribution of income, are only relevant in comparing sector gains;
they net out when the entire economy is considered.

Production costs

are included as real costs since they indicate the cost of lost
production, or according to Langlois, the cost of an "inefficient
utilization of resources within the economy. "22/

Income costs are

included as real costs since "they Imply unemployment, i.e., inefficient use of human resources that deprives society of some further
potential output that might have been obtained from the disabled
73/
miners,"--—' and alternative employment in the present coal producing
fields is assumed negligible.

Since estimated real social control

costs totaled $30 million, Langlois concluded that the net tangible
social gain from controlling pneumoconiosis would approximate $19.5

llf
Ibid., p. 72.
73/ ibid.
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TABLE

42

COMPARATIVE COST ANALYSIS OF HEALTH A N D SAFETY IN THE BITUMINOUS
COAL INDUSTRY
(Millions of Dollars)

Sector

(1)

(2)

Cost Burden

Control Costs

Fteal Transfer

INDIVIDUAL
Income loss
Medical
Sector
total
INDUSTRY
Production
Training
Compensation
Ventilation
and dust
control
Medical
surveillanct
Sector
total
PUBLIC
Welfare
Research and
inspection
Sector total

'OTAL(SOCIAL)

Real

Transfer

(1) - (2)
Net Group Cost of CW]
Real

Real and
Transfer

$23
6

0
0

NA
NA

NA
NA

$23
6

0
0

$29

0

0

0

$29

$29

$20
1

0
0

0
NA

0
NA

0

$11

NA

NA

NA

NA

?24.5

0

NA

NA

1.0

0

$21

$11

?25.5

0

-$4.5

$6.5

0

$ 7

0

0

0
0

0
$ 7

$5
$5

0
0

-$5.0

$2.0

$5.0

NA

?30.5

NA

$19.5

NA

NA • Not applicable
SOURCE: Lucille M. Langlois, "Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis — A
Comparative Cost Analysis," U. S. Department of Interior,
Bureau of Mines, unreleased information circular, p. 68.

million annually.

This figure is a minimum, since intangible factors

would mainly contribute to the social cost figure.
Recent information indicates that Langlois's figures may be
significantly underestimated, especially in the transfer categories.
The Federal Black Lung program, including administrative costs, is
presently costing $275 million annually and this is expected to reach
74/
$375 million by July, 1972.—
million annually in 1969.—'

Pennsylvania alone was paying $141

Fortunately, whether or not the absolute

costs are accurate, there is no present evidence to believe that the
control costs would exceed the social gains.
Safety.

The first known effort to quantify part of the accident

cost in bituminous coal mining was in 1939, when testimony by the
National Bituminous Coal Commission before the Senate Committee on
Mines and Mining estimated the direct operator costs at 4.5$ per ton
and the indirect operator costs at 20$ per ton.—

The latter inclu-

ded interrupted production, loss of time, loss of tonnage, and a
reduction in morale.

The total operator cost of 24.5$ per ton was

approximately 12.6 per cent of the f.o.b. price, using $1.94 as the
f.o.b. underground bituminous coal price in 1940.—
This estimate was updated by a much later study done for the
78/
Bureau of Mines using 1965 data.—

Using workmen's compensation

— / B e n Franklin of the New York Times News Service in the
Morgantown, West Virginia, Dominion News, May 21, 1971.
•TJJ/W. S. Lalnhart, et. al., op. cit., p. 19.
76/U. S. Congress, Inspections and Investigations in Coal Mines.
Hearings before the Committee :on Mines and Mining, U. S. Senate, 76th
Congress, First Session, on S.2420, June 1-20, 1939 (Washington, D.C:
Government Printing Office, 1939), p. 4.
77/Bituminou8 Coal Data (Washington, D . C : National Coal Association, 1969), p. 73.
78/ TRW Systems Group, op. cit., p. 4-2.
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insurance rates in Pennsylvania, which were $7.40/$100 of payroll
cost, it was found that the coal industry paid $38.5 million for
insurance in 1965.

"In 'Safety Management' by Sitnonds and Grinaldi,

the authors show the indirect costs to industry of accidents are from
79/
one to four times as high as the direct insurance costs."—

Thus,

the total operator cost in 1965 could have been up to $154 million.
This is approximately 31$ per ton, or 6.3 per cent of the f.o.b.
underground bituminous coal price per ton.

This is a conservative

figure, since Pennsylvania's workmenJs compensation insurance rates
are lower than in most coal producing states due to stricter regulations and a more rigorous enforcement of the safety regulations.
(See Table 28).
The TRW Systems Group study also points out that in the same
year, 1965, the steel industry paid an average insurance rate of
$3.63/$100 of payroll.

If the coal industry could reduce accidents

so as to pay the same rate as the steel industry, coal industry
insurance savings would approximate $20 million.

Using the Simonds

and Grinaldi indirect cost multiplier mentioned above, total annual
savings could approximate $100 million or 20$ a ton.
Even though operators have experienced a total reduction in the
per cent of accident costs per ton since 1939, which is not particularly surprising due in part to the rigid rate structures and low
liability limits allowed by workmen's compensation insurance, the
significant decline of accidents until the early 1950's, and the
decline of employment per ton mined, it appears that the social cost

of each individual accident has been rising.

This is the conclusion

of Dr. David B. Brooks, former Chief of the Division of Mineral
80/
Economics in the Bureau of Mines.—
Brooks calculated the average cost of non-fatal accidents in
terms of loss of production.

This was done by multiplying labor

productivity by average daily labor cost by the average number of
days lost per accident.

The results are presented in Table 44.

In addition to direct costs, individual costs were estimated
from the annual reports of the United Mine Workers of America Welfare
and Retirement Fund.

In 1966, the Fund spent $39,708,802 for 10,446

miners who experienced accidents.
for 10,164 men.

In 1967, the figure was $42,613,926

Thus, the medical costs in 1966 and 1967 were between

$3,600 and $4,200 per person, and apparently were rising rapidly.
Brooks assumed that cases carried over a year were balanced by those
not eligible by the Fund.

Combining these medical costs with the

operator costs (as shown in Table 43) yields the minimum cost per
non-fatal accident of between $9,300 and $9,900 in 1967.

Stated

Brooks:
By summing all of the tangible costs to society
for which data were available, we found that the minimum
cost of each non-fatal accident is about $9,500 and that
of each fatal accident, $8,000 in the first year and
roughly $2,500 per year for the next 6 to 12 years.
These figures exclude certain personal costs for which
data could be obtained given additional time, and they

— D a v i d B. Brooks, Comment prepared in response to Question
No.7, "What was the cost of these accidents?" submitted bv, the Senate
Republican Policy Committee in reference to the proposed Coal Mine
Safety Act, July 17, 1969, p. 1.

exclude all physical costs of mine damage for which no
data are available.^1/
Taking Brooks' figures of 10,164 non-fatal accidents and 220
fatalities in 1967, the total minimum social cost of all accidents in
that year totaled $98,318,000. This does not include fatality carryover costs from previous years.

TABLE

43

OPERATOR COSTS OF EACH NON-FATAL ACCIDENT IN THE
BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY
(Current Dollars)

1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
1959
1958

SOURCE:

5,699
5,405
5,019
4,822
4,523
4,215
3,918
3,699
3,602
3,419

David B. Brooks, Comment prepared in response to
Question No. 7, "What was the cost of these accidents?"
submitted by the Senate Republican Policy Committee
in reference to the proposed Coal Mine Safety Act,
July 17, 1969, p. 1.

—/David B. Brooks, Memorandum to Harry Perry, Special Assistant
to the Assistant Secretary of Mineral Resources, Department of the
Interior, July 18, 1969.
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Summary of Findings
The mining of bituminous coal remains a very dangerous occupation.

The primary blame for the continuation of many of the problems

can be placed on four parties:

the Federal Government's Bureau of

Mines, the state governments, the union and the coal operators.

To

some extent, miners themselves might be blamed for personal carelessness; however they generally are victims, directly or indireetly, of
primary negligence by one or more the above parties.
In addition to the lack of adequate health and safety requirements and the haphazard enforcement of existing requirements, the
increase of mechanization has contributed to a deterioration of health
and safety conditions in the mines.

Use of continuous mining machines

sacrifices health and safety for production.

The design of the

machine, for example, often leaves the operator under unsupported
roof.

The machine's mining method causes increased amounts of coal

dust and methane gas to be released, as compared to the former
conventional mining method.

The coal dust, particularly in the vici-

nity of the working face, causes pneumoconiosis, a serious and sometimes latent disease that is becoming more prevalent among miners.
The release of the methane gas sets up a. potentially explosive
situation that could easily be sparked by boring drill bits or faulty
electrical equipment.

The machinery has also contributed to other

health problems, such as hearing loss.
In addition to a detrimental effect on health, mechanization has
in some cases increased the accident rate record in the industry.
The fast moving machinery operates in poorly lighted areas, which

163

contributes to many accidents.

In the underground mines, the accident

severity rate, as defined by the U.S. Bureau of Mines, appears to be
increasing.

The accident frequency rate, as defined by the U.S.

Bureau of Mines,appears to be stable but remains significantly higher
than in the steel and motor vehicle industries.

The fatality rates

per thousand men employed and per million man-hours indicate no
general decline since 1950 and remain considerably higher than in the
less mechanized mines located in foreign countries.

CHAPTER

VI

WORKER WELFARE AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS IN THE BITUMINOUS
COAL MINING INDUSTRY SINCE THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF MECHANIZATION BY THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA

The Welfare and Retirement Fund : A Historical' Introduction
In 1946, the first United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement
Fund was negotiated by John L. Lewis and J. A. Krug, Chief Administrator for the Federal Government Coal Mines Administration.

Details

concerning the negotiation of the Welfare and Retirement Fund have
been presented in Chapter III.
In addition to the creation of the Welfare and Retirement Fund,
the Krug-Lewis Agreement of 1946 authorized an official medical
survey of the coal industry, to be directed by Navy Rear Admiral Joel
T. Boone.

The Boone report revealed that retired and disabled coal

miners were existing in conditions of considerable poverty.

Only 51

per cent of the coal miner families received their water from water
purification plants, and "outhouses" were the prevailing bathroom
facilities. Most coal mining communities did not have garbage
collection or sewage disposal systems. Moreover, these coal miner
families experienced rates of tuberculosis and infant mortality
considerably higher than national averages.—
To some extent, the New Deal Administration of Franklin D.
Roosevelt had been aware of the situation in the coal fields.

In

— Rear Admiral Joel T. Boone, U.S. Navy: A Medical Survey of
the Bituminous Coal Industry, Department of Interior (Washington,
D . C : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947).
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1933, the Administration had implemented plans to move unemployed
miners into planned new agriculturally based communities.

One of these

new towns was Arthurdale built with Federal funds near Morgantown,
West Virginia, and inhabited by two hundred unemployed miners and
2/
their families who had been living in the Morgantown area.—
The United Mine Workers of America took the position that the
conditions described in the Boone report were the consequence of
employment in the coal industry.

The union called for alleviation of

the poverty conditions and assurance that future employment in the
industry would not result in old age destitution.

The union insisted

that the problem of old age security for miners should be borne as a
cost of production by the coal industry.
The United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund was set up
as a separate union-industry entity financed by a royalty per ton of
coal mined in organized mines. As shown in Table 19, the royalty per
3/
ton has been 40$ since 1952.—

In 1950,the Fund was renegotiated as

part of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement and the earlier
Fund was combined into it.

The Fund is an irrevocable trust that is

administered by three trustees:

one designated .by the union, one by

the coal operators, and the third by consensus between the union and
operator trustees.

Each trustee serves for the term of the National

Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement subject only to death or resignation.

—'See John P. David: "Arthurdale: The Success Story that Failed,"
Social Welfare in Appalachia, Vol. 3, 1971, pp. 36-40.
3/
— In addition to the 40$ per ton on union coal, a producer is
required to pay 80$ per ton on any handled non-union coal.
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Title to all money received by the Fund is vested exclusively in the
trustees of the Fund.

The trustees established three components

through which the Fund would channel benefits.

The first would

provide pensions to eligible miners, the second would provide health
care and medical service to eligible miners, and the third would
provide survivor lump-sum or burial benefits.
There was relatively little disagreement among the Fund trustees
about the three major thrusts of the Fund, but there emerged considerable disagreement on the issue of pension eligibility.

The

United Mine Workers of America, with the Boone report in mine,
strongly resisted Industry proposals to limit any pension benefit to
employees of employers signatory to the agreement.

John L. Lewis,

the Union's first trustee, held that pension benefits should be
available "to etch qualified member of the union who had on or before
January 1, 1948, reached or thereafter reaches 60 years of age and
had twenty years of service."—

This totally inclusive proposal

was rejected by Mr. Van Horn, the coal operator's first trustee, on
the grounds that the Fund was not financially capable of financing
such a broad scheme. Moreover, according to Van Horn, since many
union members were not employed by operators signatory to a union
contract, only the employees of signatory companies should be those
who receive pension benefits. A compromise was then advanced by
Thomas Murray, who was the neutral trustee. Murray's plan estab7*7
— Thomas E. White, "Development and Operation of the Welfare
and Retirement Fund in the Bituminous Coal Industry" (unpublished
Ph. D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.,
1954), p. 60.
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lished qualification classes and a structure of points that were
designed to limit the number of eligible pension applicants without
the criterion that applicants would be employed by a signatory
company.

The plan was rejected, and Murray resigned his post as a

trustee.
Unable to activate the Welfare and Retirement Fund package,
Lewis called a strike in the spring of 1948.

Thereupon President

Truman invoked, for the first time, the new Taft-Hartley Act and
created a Board of Inquiry.

Within a few days, Senator H. Styles

Bridges became the new neutral trustee and quickly proposed a new
solution: only miners who left the industry after May 28, 1946, were
eligible for pension benefits.

Lewis accepted this plan, even though

Fund monies would not be freely channeled to help the poverty stricken
miners described in the Boone report.

The only program for those

miners already disabled by the industry was a physical rehabilitation
and maintenance aid effort conducted by the Fund's Medical, Health,
and Hospital Service.

The trustees discontinued this program for

disabled miners in early 1954, contending Federal and State agencies
were responsible for the effort.—
The reasons for Lewis's decision to accept the plan can only be
inferred.

The year 1948 was the time Lewis realized the need for

readjustment in the coal industry so that it would remain competitive
with the other fuel industries. More important, he began to foresee
that the union would have to play the leading role in the readjustment effort by encouraging mechanization and aiding concentration in

— New York Times, January 21, 1954, p. 1.
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the industry.

Said Lewis in 1948, "if the operators of this country

can't give any leadership on the commercial side of the industry the
UMW will.

.

."—

Lewis also undoubtedly realized that the days of

coal mining as a highly labor-intensive industry were soon to be
over.

Under these conditions it is likely Lewis felt the United

Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund should provide a cushion
for the workers who would fall victim to the impending stabilization
efforts in the industry, and also insure better living standards for
those who would survive in the industry.

This would agree with the

observation made by White that the role finally agreed upon for the
United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund was "to shift the
emphasis from the old, sick, and disabled miners and families to
those more recently attached to the industry."—

The Welfare and Retirement Fund : Programs. Benefits and Eligibility
The renegotiated Welfare and Retirement Fund was a major part
of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950.

The Fund

could enjoy a successful operation only if the union adhered to the
"gentlemen's agreement" in the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 which encouraged mechanization and discouraged labor
8/
unrest and general walk-outs.—

As a result, no authorized strikes

in the coal fields have occurred during the entire twenty-year period

— T. N. Bethell, Conspiracy in Coal (Nashville, Tennessee:
Southern Student Organizing Committee), p. 7.
— Thomas E. White, op. cit., p. 86.
8/
~"
— This point is discussed in more detail in Chapter VII.

Included in this study.

This agreement was of crucial importance to

the Fund, which remained wholely dependent upon the royalty per ton
produced in union mines.

The initial Fund of 1946 had experienced

failure because of repeated interruption of the royalty payments by
officially-called strikes.

Thus, a major effect of the National

Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, or Mechanization Agreement,
was the continuous funding and successful functioning of the renegotiated Welfare and Retirement Fund.

Table 44 presents Fund income

and expenditures since 1951.
Medical, Health and Hospital Service.

The Welfare and Retirement

Fund provides major medical, health and hospital service to eligible
coal miners and their families.

The scope and thoroughness of the

Fund's activity in this particular benefit area have made an important
contribution to raising and expanding the level of health and medical
care available to those in the industry.

Table 45 shows that the

miner's life span has been increasing since 1947, and part of the
reason is due to the medical and hospital service component of the
Welfare and Retirement Fund.
The medical, health and hospital service of the Fund is a medical
service, not an insurance program.
of the Fund.

There are ten area medical offices

Each "has arranged with certain clinics, doctors and

hospitals to provide beneficiaries with services authorized by the
Fund."-'
_
— United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund:
Handbook of Medical, Health and Hospital Services (Washington, D . C ,
July 1969), p. 8.

TABLE

44

INCOME AND EXPENDITURES OF THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA WELFARE AND RETIREMENT
FUND
(Millions of Dollars)

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

129.9

125.7

129.7

132.4

127.9

152.9

155.3

138.3

131.0

127.6

0.4

0.8

1.8

2.5

1.3

1.3

1.8

4.8

1.9

2.5

130.3

126.5

131.5

134.9

129.2

154.2

157.1

143.1

132.9

130.1

42.5

51.8

58.9

64.1

69.9

73.2

75.0

76.7

78.3

79.0

27.9

59.3

65.6

57.5

42.8

47.5

59.6

58.1

57.8

61.2

8.9

11.7

10.6

7.5

2.9

3.3

3.4

3.7

3.8

3.7

2.7

3.5

3.9

4.0

3.6

3.7

3.9

4.1

4.3

4.4

Total expenditures

82.0

126.4

139.0

133; 3

119.1

127.7

141.9

142.6

144.2

148.3

Fund Reserve

99.3

99.5

92.0

93.6

103.6

130.2

145.3

145.8

134.5

116.3

Royalty Income
Investment Income
Total Income
Pension expenditure
Medical Benefit
expenditure
Survivor Benefit
expenditure
Adminis trative
expenditure

Cont'd

TABLE
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(Cont'd)

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

114.5

123.6

123.2

133.5

142.6

146.5

159.8

163.1

157.5

166.7

174.7

2.2

0.5

1.9

2.4

2.5

1.6

4.4

4.7

5.7

7.5

7.1

116.7

124.1

124.1

135.9

145.1

148.1

164.2

167.8

163.2

174.2

181.8

70.0

60.1

59.6

58.7

62.1

82.1

85.7

96.7

96.0

123.1

121.6

55.0

50.6

50.5

52.2

48.8

52.8

45.5

50.2

55.1

65.6

83.2

3.7

3.3

3.4

3.7

3.7

3.8

4.0

5.1

7.5

8.3

8.8

4.4

4.2

4.2

. 4.2

4.3

4.7

4.7

4.9

5.2

5.7

6.4

Total expenditures

133.1 , 118.2

117.7

118.8

118.9

143.4

139.9

156.9

163.8

202.7

220.0

Fund Reserve

, 99.8

113.1

114.0

140.2

145.0

169.3

180.1

179.5

151.1

112.9

Royalty Income
Investment
Income
Total Income
Pension expenditure
Medical Benefit
expenditure
Survivor Benefit
expenditure
Administrative
expenditure

105.8

SOURCE: Annual Reports, United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund.

TABLE

45

AVERAGE AGE OF DEATH OF U.S. COAL MINERS
AS COMPARED TO THE AVERAGE AGE OF DEATH
OF U.S. MALES

Average Age of Death
Year

U.S. Coal Miners

U.S. Males

1947

56

66

1964

73

69

SOURCE: United Mine Workers of America Journal,
August 15, 1966.

The Fund provides the following services to beneficiaries by
participating clinics and doctors:
. Specialist consultations and specialist office care,
including diagnostic evaluation, treatments and outpatient
minor surgery.
. Medical management services for patients with long-term,
chronic illnesses —including office, clinic or in-hospital
services.
. Examination and treatment of patients admitted to participating hospitals —

by participating doctors.

. Surgery when performed in hospitals on the Fund list by
surgeons with whom the Fund has special arrangements.
. X-ray and laboratory services, electrocardiograms and
other tests for diagnosis and treatment.
. Cast application and removal.
. Physical therapy when performed under supervision of
doctors with whom the Fund has participating arrangements.
. Obstetrical service, including prenatal and postnatal
care, by a participating physician in a participating
hospital.
. Diagnosis and short-term treatment for mental illness,
when recommended by a psychiatrist and authorized in
advance by the Area Medical Office.
At participating hospitals, attended by participating physicians,
beneficiaries may obtain the following services:
. Outpatient diagnostic X-ray and laboratory services;
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electrocardiograms and other tests for diagnosis and
treatment.
. Outpatient X-ray

or other types of radiation treatment.

. Other outpatient services such as cast application and
removal and physical therapy.
. Inpatient care for whatever time is medically necessary.
. Special duty nursing care in cases of critical illness
for limited periods, upon approval by the Area Medical
Office.
In addition, a variety of other services is available to
beneficiaries.
Convalescent Care
When a patient no longer requires acute general hospital care,
but continues to need bed care under medical supervision, the Area
Medical Office assists his physician in finding available convalescent
facilities.

The Fund does not pay for nursing home residence for the

chronically ill or aged.
Home Care
Skilled staff from the Area Medical Office assist

doctors and

families in arranging adequate care in the home for beneficiaries
with long-term illnesses or severe disabilities, including visiting
nursing service when available.
Equipment
A hospital bed, wheel chair, walker, positive pressure breathing
apparatus or other special equipment will be provided by the Fund for
the patient'8 home use when recommended by a physician.

Drugs
Certain drugs prescribed by participating physicians for specified long-term illnesses may be provided at Fund expense.

Each

participating physician has been given a list of these illnesses and
the approved drugs.
Rehabilitation
When disability prevents a beneficiary from returning to normal
activity, the Area Medical Office promptly starts a program for his
rehabilitation and helps make arrangements for early referral to state
vocational rehabilitation services, special rehabilitation centers
or other available community resources.

In addition, the Fund Area

Medical Offices assist beneficiaries seeking disability benefits
under the Federal Old Age and Survivors Disability and Health (OSADHI)
program.

To date, more than 25,000 disabled beneficiaries have been

helped in this fashion,most of whom subsequently qualified for the
monthly OASDHI disability payments.
Other individualized services, such as the following, may be
provided when recommended by the patient's doctor or designated
specialist and authorized in advance by the Area Medical Office:
. Appliances such as braces, artificial limbs, artificial
eyes and hearing aids.
. Eyeglasses necessitated by eye surgery, primarily cataract
glasses.
. Oral surgery, such as surgery for mouth or jaw tumors,
repair of fractured jaw or facial bones.

Hospitalization

only is authorized for other oral surgery or dental

procedures when hospitalization is essential to safety of
the patient because of an existing serious medical problem.
. Surgery for congenital defects, if the child is not
eligible for care under the Crippled Children's or other
public programs.
. Tonsil and adenoid surgery will be considered for Fund
payment on written recommendation from a participating
pediatrician, internist or ear, nose and throat specialist.
A handbook outlining all of these services in detail and advising how they may be secured is furnished to all beneficiaries.—
Eligibility for the medical, health and hospital service has
changed repeatedly over the years.

As Dr. Donald L. Rasmussen has

pointed out, the medical care provided by the Fund is excellent if
one is fortunate enough to q u a l i t y . — I n i t i a l l y many more people
were eligible than are eligible today.

Miners totally disabled while

working, for example, now have their Fund cards withdrawn within
four years from the date of last employment.

Thus, a miner younger

than 55 is most likely in serious financial difficulty if he
suffers a disabling accident.

Once he reaches the retirement age

of 55 he becomes eligible for a pension and re-eligible for a Fund

— U n i t e d Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund:
Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1970 (Washington, D.C., August
1970), pp. 8-10.
— U n i t e d States Congress, U. S. Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, UMW Welfare and Retirement Fund, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Labor, 91st Congress, Second Session, July 29, August
17 and 26, 1970 (Washington, D. C : Government Printing Office, 1971),
p. 42.
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hospital card if he satisfies the retirement eligibility requirements.
Unemployed miners are also vulnerable since, as of July 1960, they
lost their Fund cards after one year of the date of their last employment.
Present eligibility requirements for the medical, health and
12/
hospital care benefits a r e : —
A. Miners and Pensioners
1.

Working miners are eligible while regularly
employed in the coal industry as an employee in
a classified job for an employer signatory to
the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement.
Eligibility continues while miners are so
employed and for one (1) year thereafter while
unemployed.

2.

Miners awarded workmen's compensation payments
for a mine injury or occupational disease sustained
while employed in a classified job in the coal
industry may continue to be eligible for Hospital
and Medical Care Benefits while unemployed and
receiving workmen's compensation payments and for
one (1) year thereafter up to a maximum of four
(4) years from the date of last employment.

3.

Trust Fund pensioners are eligible provided
they are not employed in an occupation outside
the coal industry.

B. Dependents
1.

Wife of miner and dependent unmarried children up
to age 22.

2.

Unmarried dependent grandchildren up to age 22
provided they are living in the miner's household and their parents are deceased.

3.

Parents of the miner or his wife who have been
dependent upon and living with the miner for at
least one year.

— U n i t e d Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund,
Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1970 (Washington, D . C , August
1970, pp. 11-13.
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4.

Unremarried widows and unmarried dependent children
up to age 22 of deceased miners and pensioners are
eligible during the period they receive Widows and
Survivors Benefit payments.

Employment will not disqualify unmarried children up to
age 22 if they are full-time students.
C

Beneficiaries 65 Years of Age and Over
Beneficiaries age 65 and over must be enrolled in medical
insurance under Medicare to receive Trust Fund authorized
services which are not provided by Medicare.

For the fiscal year ending in June 1971, the Medical, Health and
Hospital Service program arranged for service to over half a million
beneficiaries and used the services of 7,872 physicians and 1,620
13/
hospitals.—The benefits included 535,616 days of hospitalization
and 482,054 visits by physicians in addition to 1,264,738 consultative,
diagnostic, and therapeutic services by specialists and group practice
14/
clinics and at outpatient and emergency facilities.—
Another example of the impact of the Welfare and Retirement Fund
in the medical area is the Miners' Memorial Hospital Association.

In

1955 this Association, sponsored and controlled by the United Mine
Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund at a total cost of $26 million,
opened ten hospitals in Kentucky, West Virginia, and Virginia, each
with a complete complex of physician offices.

These hospitals were

built primarily to serve area miners, but also served the entire
local community.

The Fund sold the hospitals in 1963, and they are

presently operated by Appalachian Regional Hospitals, Inc., a non-

T37
— United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund:
Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1971 (Washington, D . C , August
1971), p. 14.
^Ibid.
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profit group established by the Board of National Missions of the
United Presbyterian Church, U. S. A.

In addition to an interest in

hospital service, the Welfare and Retirement Fund has supported the
development of numerous group practice clinics throughout the United
Mine Workers' membership area.

The Fund has arrangements with the

clinics to provide medical services to Fund beneficiaries.
Widows and Survivors Benefits.

The widow and survivor benefit

program serves the dependents of deceased working and pensioned miners.
The amount of compensation has varied over the years.

Presently, a

working miner's widow receives a $5,000 survivors benefit.

An initial

payment of $350 is made, which is followed by $75 a month for fiftynine months.

The final payment is $225. Widows of pensioned miners

receive $2,000 with an initial payment of $350, followed by $75 a
month for twenty-two months.

If the widow also dies, children

dependents continue to receive the remaining survivor benefit payments.
If no dependents survive the miner or pensioner, a $350 funeral
expense benefit is paid to the person in charge of the arrangements.
Table 46 presents the annual number of payments and yearly expenditure
on widow and survivor death payments since 1951.
During the entire payment period, widows and children are
eligible for hospital and medical care benefits.

If a widow remarries,

her hospital and medical care benefit card is withdrawn, but her
payments continue.

Children of the remarried widow, however, continue

their eligibility for hospital and medical care benefits until the
payment period if completed.

TABLE

46

ANNUAL NUMBER OF PAYMENTS AND EXPENDITURE ON WIDOW AND
SURVIVOR DEATH PAYMENTS BY THE UNITED MINE WORKERS
WELFARE AND RETIREMENT FUND

Year

sr of Deaths

Expenditure
(in millions)

1951

7,229

$6.3

1952

5,614

4.9

1953

4,598

3.5

1954

3,768

3.1

1955

3,374

2.9

1956

3,698

3.3

1957

3,719

3.4

1958

4,233

3.7

1959

4,060

3.8

1960

4,219

3.7

1961

3,965

3.7

1962

3,690

3.3

1963

4,066

3.4

1964

4,075

3.7

1965

4,041

3.7

SOURCE: Robert J. Myers, "Experience of the UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund," industrial and Labor Relations Review, Volume
10, Number 1, October 1956, p. 96; "Further Experience of the
UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund," Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, Volume 14, Number 4, July 1961, p. 558;
"The Mine Workers' Welfare and Retirement Fund: Fifteen Years'
Experience," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Volume 20,
Number 2, January 1967, p. 268.
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Present eligibility requirements for the widows and survivors
benefits are:—'
A.

B.

The dependent survivors of deceased miners are
eligible for Widows and Survivors Benefits
provided the miner was at the time of death:
1.

Regularly employed in the coal industry
as an employee in a classified job for an
employer signatory to the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement. Eligibility
continues while the miner is so employed
and for one (1) year thereafter while
unemployed.

2.

Unemployed and receiving workmen's compensation for an injury or occupational disease
sustained while employed In a classified job
in the coal industry. Eligibility may
continue while the miner is receiving
workmen's compensation payments and for one
(1) year thereafter up to a maximum of four
(4) years from the date of last employment.

3.

Receiving Trust Fund pension payments and
not employed in an occupation outside the
coal industry.

The following dependent survivors of deceased miners
may be considered for Survivors Benefits:
1.

Widows who were living with or being supported
by the miner at time of death.

2.

Dependent unmarried children of deceased miners
who were under age 22 at date of miner's death.

3.

Parents of deceased miners who were dependent
upon and living with the miner in his household for one year preceding the date the miner's
death occurred.

4.

Unmarried grandchildren of a miner under twentytwo (22) years of age who were dependent upon
and living with the miner at the time of death,
provided both parents of the children are deceased.

— U n i t e d Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund:
Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1970 (Washington, D . C , August
1970), p. 13.

C.

Payment of the Funeral Expense Benefit for eligible
deceased miners and pensioners who leave no dependent
survivors will be made in the amount of $350 to the
persons responsible for burial expenses of the deceased.

Pension Benefit.

The pension benefit provides limited monthly

compensation to retired miners who satisfy the eligibility requirements.

The amount of the payment was initially $100 each month after

reaching the age of 62.
60.

In 1949 the retirement age was lowered to

Effective February 1, 1961, the pension was reduced to $75.

pension was then raised to $85 effective February 1, 1965;
effective October 1, 1965;
effective August 1, 1969.
lowered to 55.

$115 effective July 1, 1967;

The

$100

and $150

In February 1955, the retirement age was

The pension benefit is paid in its full amount in

addition to any other income, such as the payments shown in Tables
47 and 48 from Social Security, Workmen's Compensation and Black
Lung Benefits.

Pensioners and their dependents are also eligible for

medical, health, and hospital care benefits.
Eligibility requirements depend primarily on when the miner
ceased working.

The various requirements In effect from 1965 to

April 1, 1971 w e r e : — /
A.

For miners who cease working In the coal Industry
after February 1, 1965.
1.

Age 55 or over at date of application.

2.

Twenty years' service as an employee in a
classified job for an employer in the coal
industry.

—'United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund:
Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1970 (Washington, D. C , August
1970), pp. 11-12.

TABLE
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PENSIONERS INCOME FROM SOCIAL SECURITY
January 1971
TOTAL

OLD AGE PENSION

DISABILITY PENSION

Number of
pensioners

Number
receiving

Average
monthly

Number
receiving

Average
monthly

Number
receiving

Average
monthly

67,203

60,086

$132.67

51,330

$127.42

8,756

$162.97

Percentage

100.00

89.40

-

76.38

-

13.02

-

55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75-79
80-84
85 and older

7,943
12,094
12,836
12,224
11,057
7,805
3,244

4,383
9,552
12,516
11,938
10,856
7,714
3,127

162.89
148.95
139.14
131.21
126.97
106.41
96.97

_
5,179
12,516
11,938
10,856
7,714
3,127

Age Group

Total

SOURCE: United Mine Workers Journal, October 1, 1971, p. 8.

_
137.05
139.14
131.21
126.97
106.41
96.97

4,383
4,373
t

-

162.89
163.05
-

TABLE
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PENSIONERS RECEIVING BLACK LUNG AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS
January 1971
BLACK LUNG BENEFITS
Age Group

Number of
pensioners

Number
receiving

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

Monthly
average

Number
receiving

Monthly
average

67,203

17,901

$210.21

3,243

$151.10

Percentage

100.00

26.64

-

4.83

-

55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75-79
80-84
85 and older

7,943
12,094
12,836
12,224
11,057
7,805
3,244

1,240
2,351
4,147
4,398
3,098
1,948

Total

719

207.30
214.06
214.12
213.70
207.86
202.45
184.96

SOURCE: United Mine Workers Journal, October 1, 1971, p. 8.

724
918
711
397
315
119
59

174.34
157.41
151.78
142.81
108.56
113.18
176.50

3.

B.

Permanently ceased working following regular
employment for at least one full year as an
employee in a classified job for an employer
signatory to the National Bituminous Coal
Wage Agreement.

For miners who cease working in the coal industry
before February 1. 1965.
1.

Age 55 or over at date of application.

2.

Twenty years' service as an employee in a classified
job for an employer in the coal industry within the
thirty-year period immediately preceding date of
receipt of application by the Trust Fund. (This
eligibility requirement became effective in 1953.)

3.

Regular employment in a classified job in the
coal industry immediately prior to May 29, 1946.

4.

Permanently ceased working following regular
employment as an employee in a classified job for
an employer signatory to the National Bituminous
Coal Wage Agreement.

Credit toward the required twenty years' service is
based on earnings. A year's credit is given if the applicant's earnings equal the amount obtained by multiplying
one-half the number of days the bituminous miners were
active by the daily base rate. Applicants who earned less
than the required amount receive proportionate credit to
the nearest quarter-year.
Applicants who were awarded workmen's compensation
payments for a mine injury or occupational disease
sustained while employed in a classified job in the coal
industry may receive credit while unemployed and receiving
workmen's compensation payments up to a maximum of four
years from date of last employment in the coal industry.
Limited credit is also given for service in the Armed
Forces during war or national emergency provided the miner
left classified employment in the mines to enter the service.
To meet the requirement of regular employment for one
full year Immediately prior to retirement, applicant must
have worked for at least twelve months and must have
earned at least an amount obtained by multiplying the
daily base rate by the average number of days the bituminous mines were active during the year. The applicant may
have up to a period of four years to accumulate the required
earnings just prior to retirement, provided he has at least
a half year'8 service credit during each of the four consecutive twelve-month periods.
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Miners who file applications for pension while
working are paid beginning the month following
their last work date. Miners who ceased working
before filing for pension are paid retroactive
to the month following receipt of their application by the Trust Fund up to a maximum of six (6)
payments.

Effective April 1, 1971, the trustees of the Fund made significant
changes in Parts A and B of the requirements presented above.

The

changes were designed to place greater emphasis on employment in
mines signatory to the United Mine Workers of America contract.

The

new regulations aro:—•
A.

Miners who cease working after February 1, 1965.
1.

Age 55 or over at date of application.

2.

Twenty years' classified service as an employee
in the coal industry with a minimum of five
years' service after May 28, 1946 for employers
signatory to the UMWA bituminous coal wage
agreement.
This requirement will remain in effect through
December 31, 1976. Beginning January 1977, six
(6) years of signatory service will be required
as a part of the necessary twenty (20) years'
service. For each year after 1977 an additional
year of signatory service will be required up to
1981, at which time ten (10) years of signatory
service will be required as a part of the necessary
twenty (20) years.
Employment in the coal industry after April 1, 1971
will be crediced toward eligibility for Trust Fund
pension only if it is performed for employers
signatory to the UMWA bituminous coal wage agreement.

3.

Ceased work in the coal industry Immediately
following regular employment as an employee In a

— United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund:
Report for the Year Ending June 30. 1971 (Washington, D.C., August
1971), p. 11.

classified job for an employer signatory to the
Agreement for a period of at least one (1) full
year.
B.

Miners who ceased working before February 1, 1965.
1.

Age 55 or over at date of application.

2.

Twenty years' classified service as an employee in
the coal industry within the 30-year period preceding date of receipt of application by the Fund,
with a minimum of five (5) years' service after
May 28, 1946 for employers signatory to the UMWA
bituminous coal wage agreement.

3.

Ceased work following regular employment as an
employee in a classified job for an employer
'Signatory to the Agreement.

The pension plan for the national officers of the United Mine
Workers of America is not handled through the Welfare and Retirement
Fund.

Prior to 1959, national officer pensions were paid directly

from the Union treasury.

However, in 1964 the Union transferred

$1,500,000 from its treasury to a special account at the National
Bank of Washington for the purpose of providing pensions at full pay
18/
to national officers who have served more than ten years.—

The Impact of the Welfare and Retirement Fund as a Stabilizing
Influence in the Industry

It has been stated that the trustees cf the Welfare and Retirement Fund agreed not to use the Fund to benefit the poverty-stricken
retired and disabled miners who left the industry prior to May 28,
1946, with the exception of a small and short-lived rehabilitation
program.

It was also stated that perhaps the trustees felt that the

— L e t t e r from Joseph Yablonski to Messrs. W. A. Boyle, et. al.,
November 18, 1969, p. 4.
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Fund, particularly the pension component, had a major role to play as
a compensating influence for miners displaced by mechanization
following the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950.
Table 49 presents the annual change in estimated union membership and number of pensioners since 1951. Although a man need not
be a member of the United Mine Workers of America when he obtains
his pension, he must have worked his last year in a signatory mine
and satisfied the other requirements listed in the preceding section.
Thus, the annual change in union membership is an approximate indicator of the number of miners who worked their last year in a signatory
mine and might be eligible for a pension at that time or in the
future.

Many miners, of course, might leave the industry prior to

twenty years of service, but generally operators prefer to keep the
relatively younger employees since they adapt more easily to the
increasingly sophisticated equipment.

In addition, there is a possi-

bility that those employed in the major coal fields exhibit little
voluntary job mobility, which would contribute toward a preference
for occupational stability.

The figures remain a rough approximation,

however, as deaths, permanent occupational shifts, and other factors
have not been netted out.
No concrete conclusions can be obtained from Table 49.

How-

ever., the significant decrease in union membership in view of the
relatively slow and recently stable increase in pensioners suggests
that a considerable number of retired miners affected by the Mechanization Agreement are not being serviced by the pension program.

Mr.

Harry Huge, the plaintiff lawyer with the Arnold Porter law firm in
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TABLE

49

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA MEMBERSHIP AND
WELFARE AND RETIREMENT FUND PENSIONERS, 1951-1970

Year

UMWA
i
Membership—

1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

349,405
293,293
248,986
212,129
185,499
185,182
176,901
160,438
157,505
139,038
118,929
115,389
104,950
104,156
94,229
95,648
98,623
97,123
92,353
92,565

a/
— UMWA membership
year into union
more productive
high. Estimate

was estimated by dividing average tonnage per man
coal production. If, as possible, union mines are
than the average mine, the presented estimate is
includes working miners only.

SOURCE:

Annual
Change

Fund
Pensioners

- 56,112
- 44,307
- 36,857
- 26,630
317
— 8,281
— 16,463
- 2,933
- 18,467
- 20,109
- 3,540
- 10,439
794
- 9,927
+ 1,419
+ 2,975
- 1,500
- 4,770

38,690
45,339
50,055
54,937
59,482
61,546
63,009
64,367
65,491 '
65,624
66,759
66,411
65,717
64,658
66,721
70,530
70,165
69,750
68,380
67,405

+

212

Annual
Change

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-

6,649
4,716
4,882
4,545
2,064
1,463
1,358
1,124
133
1,135
348
694
1,059
2,063
3,809
365
415
1,370
975

Union coal production was obtained from Table 19;
average tonnage per man year was obtained from Bituminous
Coal Data (Washington, D. C : National Coal Association,
1969), p. 8, updated by Mrs. Betsy Kraft; number of
pensioners was obtained from the annual reports of the
United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund.
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19/
Washington, D.C. who worked on the Blankenship vs. Boyle case—, has
estimated

that there are today approximately 50,000 to 100,000

20/
retired miners who have been denied or are not eligible for pensioner—
The regulation that the miner's last year in the mines must have
been with an employer signatory to the National Bituminous Coal Wage
21/
Agreement, which was not required until 1960,— is one of the eligibility requirements that has been responsible for denying pensions.
22/
The trustees, in recent suits,— under pressure to defend this
requirement, asserted "that the requirement is necessary to the
validity of the Fund under Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act as
amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
23/
1959."—' The court agreed that the Taft-Hartley Act required each
pensioner to have some history of contributory employment, but felt
that it was highly unreasonable and discriminatory "to award a

—Blankenship v. Boyle, U. S. District Court, District of
Columbia, No. 2186-69, 1971. This $75 million suit was filed by 70
disabled miners and miners' widows against the United Mine Workers
Welfare and Retirement Fund, charging the Fund had been mismanaged,
misused, and that they were victims of a conspiracy to deprive them
of their rights.
—^Interview with Mr. Harry Huge, May 25, 1971.
21/
— R o b e r t J. Myers, "The Mine Workers' Welfare and Retirement
Fund: Fifteen Years' Experience." Industrial and Labor Relations
Review. Volume 20, Number 2, January 1967, p. 267.
22/
— R o a r k V. Boyle, U. S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia,
No. 23,138, August 14, 1970; Reese v. Boyle. U. S. Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia, No. 23,139, August 14, 1970; Fuller v. Boyle.
U. S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, No. 23,140, August 14,
1970.
23/
— U n i t e d States Congress, U. S. Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, UMW Welfare and Retirement Fund, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Labor, 91st Congress, Second Session, July 29,
August 17 and 26, 1970 (Washington, D . C : Government Printing Office,
1971), p. 190.
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a pension to a man who has worked only one year in contributory
employment and to deny one to a man who has worked 19 out of his 20
24/
years (but not the last year) in contributory employment.—

This

opinion was a reason for the change in work requirements at signatory
mines for pension eligibility effective April 1, 1971, as presented
in the preceding section.
The regulation that required a miner's last year of employment in
a signatory mine had its most serious impact upon lald-off miners who
were forced by immediate economic pressures to turn to jobs wherever
available for their last few working years.

These jobs were often

in non-union mines, especially in eastern Kentucky where union mines
25/
were rapidly shifting to non-union operations.— The result of this
eligibility requirement, and the others that were designed to limit
eligible Fund beneficiaries, was that the United Mine Workers Welfare
and Retirement Fund did not receive the full impact of the industry
adjustments caused by the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of
1950.

Thus, regardless of the intentions of the Fund's initial

trustees, there seems to be little evidence that the United Mine
Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund served or is serving as a cushion
against the technological unemployment Lhat developed after the National
Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, commonly known as the Mechanization Agreement.

— / Ibid., p. 197.
25/
— S e e , for example, Tom Bethell, "South-East Coal Company in a
Battle for Life," Appalachian Lookout, Volume 1, Number 1, December
1968; Wall Street Journal. March 15, 1963, p. 1; and a discussion on
this point in Chapter VII.

The Impact of the Welfare and Retirement Fund as an Organizing Tool

Table 44 presented expenditure and income data which pertain to
the United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund from 1951 to 1970.
Since 1969, the Fund has been the subject of criticisms at Congressi26/
onal hearings— and, as mentioned in the preceding section, has been
the defendent in a number of suits.

These attacks have altered Fund

policies, and data since 1969 are likely to differ from data during
the 1950-1969 period.

The important variables in Table 44 were total

income, total expenditures, and unexpended reserves.

Total income,

made up primarily of tonnage royalty payments, increased over the
time period, aided more by the gradual increase in national coal
production than hindered by the gradual reduction in the share of
total coal production from union mines.

Total expenditures for

various benefits, however, remained relatively stable from 1952 to
1967.

As a result, as shown in Chart 20, unexpended reserves accumu-

lated as much as $180.1 million by 1968.
While it might be interesting to analyze the shifts of emphasis
among the various expenditure categories, it would be difficult to
generalize since regulations governing the benefit expenditures have
changed considerably during the time span.

This is permitted by the

agreement, as "the trustees of the Fund have full authority .
to determine the types and amounts of benefits and to establish

— S e e , for example, United States Congress, Committee of Labor
and Public Welfare, UMW Welfare and Retirement Fund, Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Labor, 91st Congress, Second Session, July 29,
August 17 and 26, 1970 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office,
1971).
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CHART 20
UNEXPENDED RESERVES HELD BY THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF
AMERICA WELFARE AND RETIREMENT FUND
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SOURCE: Annual Reports. United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement
Fund.

194

27/
eligibility requirements."—
These "benefits are subject to termination, suspension, revision or amendment by the Trustees in their
'28/
discretion at any time.'1—

Examples of such changes are the partial

curtailment of survivor benefits in 1953, the increase in survivor
benefits in 1957, and the reduction in the monthly pension from $100
to $75 a month in 1961.
The trustees had not set a minimum amount or per cent of total
income to hold In reserve so as to insure the solvency of the Fund.
If in any year expenditure exceeded income, benefit and eligibility
changes were imposed by the trustees so as to continue the growth of
the unexpended reserve variable.

One reason, undoubtedly, for the

effort to build up the reserve was to insure solvency of the Fund
during any work stoppages in the industry.

Otherwise the Fund would

be highly dependent on uninterrupted production.

It is interesting to

note, in any event, that technological change or mechanization in the
industry did more for the unexpended reserve balance than for any of
29/
the benefit services that the Fund had promised to provide.—
The growth and purpose of the unexpended reserve balance has
been a subject of considerable controversy, and a number of suits
have been filed by rank and file miners charging that the Fund monies
30/
have not properly been handled.—

Not only did the unexpended

2T7
— United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund,
Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1967 (Washington, D. C , August
1967), p. 4.
•28/lMd.
29/
— C . L. Christenson, Economic Redevelopment in Bituminous Coal
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 211-212.
30/
• ^ See, for example, Blankenship v. Boyle, U. S. District Court,
District of Columbia, No. 2186-69, 1971.

reserve balance grow at a rapid rate, but also a considerable portion
of the unexpended reserve balance was held as demand deposits in cash,
as shown in Table 50.
There appears to be two major reasons to explain the high
unexpended reserve balance and high liquidity.

First, as mentioned

previously, the present United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement
Fund was re-negotiated in 1950 as part of the National Bituminous
Coal Wage Agreement of 1950. The original fund, negotiated in 1946,
experienced initial operational difficulties, in particular a lack of
money to finance benefit programs.

These financial problems were

caused by post World War II work stoppages that interrupted royalty
payments.

Consequently, the trustees encouraged a substantial

highly liquid reserve, although as stated, at no time were any guidelines established with respect to the desired ratio of unexpended
reserve to expenditures and the desired ratio of liquid cash to
unexpended reserves.

On the cash question, Miss Josephine Roche,

director of the Fund from 1946 to 1971 and the neutral trustee from
1950 to 1971, stated "that she favored maintaining an amount equal to
several months' expenditure in cash, because 'that is the only way
31/
you can be sure'."—'

In the Blankenship v. Boyle opinion, however,

Judge Gesell noted that "such naivete by a trustee is unacceptable,
particularly in light of the trustee's knowledge that short-term
Government securities, which the evidence showed were redeemable on
one-half hour notice, for example, were readily available and would
31/
— Blankenship v. Boyle. U. S. District Court, District of
Columbia, No. 2186-69, 1971, p. 10.

TABLE

50

CASH BALANCES HELD IN THE NATIONAL BANK OF
WASHINGTON BY THE UNITED MINE WORKERS WELFARE
AND RETIREMENT FUND, SELECTED YEARS

Fiscal Year

Amount of Cash in
Demand Deposits at
End of Year
(in millions)

Percentage of Cash
to the Fund's Total
Resources

1951

$29

29%

1956

30

23

1961

14

14

1966

50

34

1967

75

44

1968

70

39

SOURCE: Blankenship v. Boyle, U. S. District Court, District of
Columbia, No. 2186-69, 1971, p. 8.
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have generated substantial income for the Fund while still assuring
maximum liquidity."—
A second explanation was that the unexpended reserve balance had
a role to play in the organizing activities of the union.
accomplished in two ways.

This was

Since the creation of the re-negotiated

Fund in 1950, the Fund dealt solely with the National Bank of Washington, D . C , and was the bank's largest customer.

Since 1949, the

National Bank of Washington has been owned and controlled by the
United Mine Workers of America, which held 74 per cent of the voting
33/
stock in 1971.—

According to Judge Gesell in his opinion on

Blankenship v. Boyle, the trustee's decision to leave cash in the
bank without interest over a twenty-year period "greatly benefited the
34/
bank and the union, as the bank's majority shareholder."— In an
average year, the United Mine Workers of America collected about
$1.5 million in dividends made possible by the Fund's subsidization
35/
of the bank.—'

United Mine Workers' President Boyle called the

arrangement "good business for any bank" and "good business for the
36/
union."——

Thus, although the Welfare and Retirement Fund was

legally independent of the United Mine Workers of America, the Union
was able to transfer into its coffers a substantial portion of the
interest payments that could have been used by the beneficiaries of
the Welfare and Retirement Fund.

—^Ibid.. p. 4.
—'ibid., p. 15.
35/
—'Ward Sinclair, "The UMW's Last Chance," The Progressive.
May, 1971, p. 35.
—

The Washington Post, February 12, 1971, p. A-15.
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Another way that the unexpended balance was of Importance to the
union was its use to purchase selected stock in public electric utilities that were burning little union coal.

Usually the union would

then also grant certain businessmen loans to purchase stock in the
37/
same utilities.—

The businessman, who was Cyrus Eaton in the case

of efforts at the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company and Kansas
City Power and Light Company, would then use his votes and the proxies
from the Welfare and Retirement Fund to gain a seat on the utility's
Board of Directors and initiate efforts to force the management of
38/
the utility to purchase more union coal.—^^

For example, in the

case of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, the Fund's
ownership of 130,000 shares which were controlled by Eaton was a
major factor in the company's 1966 decision to sign a long-term
supply contract with the unionized North American Coal Company, a
firm operated by Henry S. Schmidt who was also the industry trustee
39/
of the Fund at the time.—

In 1970, the common stock portfolio of

the Fund consisted totally of 17 electric utilities worth $39 million
and showed a loss of over $5 million.—

In 1960, utility common

stock investments (book value) were approximately 3 per cent of the
Fund's assets, while by the late 1960s they were approximately 26 per
41/
of the Fund's assets.—

__
— T h e loan granting policy of the United Mine Workers of
America will be discussed in detail in Chapter VII.
38/
— I n t e r v i e w with Leon Yablonski, former international organizer
for the United Mine Workers of America, May 15, 1971.
— ' T h e Washington Post. February 10, 1971.
— Fortune. January 1971, p. 149.
Ai/
— R o b e r t J. Myers, cj>. cit., pp. 270-71.
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The indirect method of organizing described above was caused,
to some extent, by the financing arrangement of the Welfare and
Retirement Fund.

The United Mine Workers of America was no longer

interested in the general walkout as a technique to press its
demands, as such an action would financially cripple the Welfare and
Retirement Fund.

Walkouts might also anger the approximately 65,000

pensioners and thousands of other Fund beneficiaries, many of whom
remained voting members of the United Mine Workers of America.

If

the strategy of the trustees was to utilize indirect organizing,
they must have known that walkouts as official union tactics to press
for demands would not frequently occur.

This, in turn, suggests

that high liquidity for the Fund would not be necessary.
Although the United Mine Workers of America has maintained that
the questioned channeling of the Fund's cash and investments, both
of which constitute the unexpended reserve balance, will be beneficial to the Fund and the Union in the long run,

it seems that the

intimate relationship between the United Mine Workers of America's
organizing activities and the investment decisions of the Welfare
and Retirement Fund's trustees resulted in a conscious effort to
raise the unexpended reserve balance, while at the same time stabilizing expenditure levels and holding constant the royalty payment per
ton of union coal.

This has resulted in lower and/or fewer benefits

than those that could have been available during the past twenty
years for miners affected by the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of 1950.
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Comparison of Pension, Health, and Insurance Benefits Among the
Steel. Automobile, arid Bituminous COal Industries

Pensions.

As previously mentioned in the section on programs,

benefits, and eligibility of the United Mine Workers Welfare and
Retirement Fund, the Fund pension payment is independent of any other
income received by the pensioner.

This policy is in contrast to the

plans in effect in the steel and automobile industries which use a
formula to alter pension payments according to the amount received
from social security.

As presented in Table 51, however, total pension

payments, including social security, were significantly higher in
1967 in the automobile and steel industries than in the bituminous
coal industry regardless of the industry's adjusted pension amount.
The total monthly payments were $301, $286, and $251 in the automobile,
steel and bituminous coal industries respectively.

This is the

reverse of the situation in 1952, as shown in Chart 21, when the
total monthly payment to retired miners was significantly higher than
in the other two industries.

The payments then were $185 in the

bituminous coal industry, $125 in the automobile industry, and $120
in the steel industry.
Health and Insurance.

Table 52 presents data on health and

insurance programs available in the steel, automobile, and bituminous
coal industries in four time periods, the most recent being 1966.
The data can be effectively used to make general comparative observations about services and benefits available to those who may qualify
in the three industries.
The 1954 comparison revealed that the United Mine Workers had

TABLE

51

ILLUSTRATIVE MONTHLY PENSIONS PAYABLE TO HOURLY WORKERS WITH SELECTED NEGOTIATED
PLANS IN SELECTED YEARS, 1952-1967

Year

Ford Motor Company-United
Automobile Workers

U.S. Steel Corp.-United
Steelworkers of America

Bituminous Coal IndustryUnited Mine Workers

Eligible
Age

Eligible
Age

Eligible
Age—

Pension Pension &
only
Soc.Sec.—'

Pension Pension,&
only Soc.Sec.—

Pension Pension„&
only Soc.Sec.—

1967

65

$165^

$301

65

$150

$286

55

$115

$251

1959

65

75

201

65

78

204

60

100

226

1952

65

40

125

65

35

120

60

100

185

*

Benefit for workers beginning work in indicated years after 30 years of continuous service,
assuming level monthly earnings of $400.

—

Indicates eligibility for pension benefits only.
are available together only after age 65.

Pension and Social Security benefits listed

2/
— Benefit formula effective in 1969.
3/
— Represents maximum old-age (primary) benefits in effect in 1967.
SOURCE: Old Age Income Assurance, Subnitted to the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, U. S. Congress, Part II, December 1967 (Washington, D . C : Government Printing
Office, 1968), p. 91.

o
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CHART

21

ILLUSTRATIVE MONTHLY PENSIONS AND SOCIAL SECURITY PAYMENTS
TO HOURLY WORKERS, ASSUMING AGE 65 AFTER BEGINNING WORK IN
INDICATED YEARS WITH 30 YEARS OF CONTINUOUS SERVICE AT LEVEL
MONTHLY EARNINGS OF $400
310
300
t

United Automobile Workers/

290

/>
280

/.•united Steelworkers

o
Q

270

.•/

//

3 260

//

g 250
o

v.

•S 24 °
u 230
| 220
& 210
ft 200
•H

3 19 °

£ 180
« 170
•H

o 160
w
•a 150

J MO
o

130

•H
CO

8 120
110
100
1952

1959

1967

SOURCE: Old Age Income Assurance, Submitted to the Subcommittee on
Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, U. S. Congress,
Part II, December 1967 (Washington, D . C : U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1968), p. 91.

TABLE 52
COMPARISON OF HEALTH AID INSURANCE PLAHS IN THE STEEL, MOTOR VEHICLE, AHD BITDMHODS COAL IHDDSTBIES IH SELECTED TEARS

LIFE INSURANCE

ACCIDENTAL DEATH AHD DISMEMBERMENT
Death or aultiSingle disdlaaeaberaent
—tieraent

HOSPITALIZATION

ACCIDEHT AHD SICKNESS
Weekly
Aaount

Each disability,
duration in weeks

Duration in Days

U.S. STEEL CORPORATION AHD
UNITED STEEL WORKERS
1954

$3,000-5,500*

Bo cov >rage

26

120

1958

3,500-6,000*

Bo cov irage

42-57*

26

120

1962

4,000-6,500*

Ho cov srage

53-68*

26

UO

1966

4,500-7,000*

No cov irage

63-78*

26

365

26

120

26

120

26

365

52

365"

$40

GENERAL MOTORS COIPOIATIOH
AHD UNITED AOTO WORKERS
1954

$2,500-5,000*,c

1958

3,500-7,500*,c
,c

One-half of
life Ins.
-do-

One-fourth
of life Ins.
-do-

$28-45.50*
35-85*

1962

5,500-10,500*

-do-

-do-

55-U0**

1966

6,CO0-ll,500*,c,k

-do-

-do-

60-120*

1

BITUMIHOOS COAL INDUSTRY
AHD UNITED MINE WORKERS
Ho aaxlana*

1954

$1,000*

No coverage

No coverage

1958

1,000*

Ho coverage

Ho coverage

Ho aaxiaua*

1962

1,000*

Ho coverage

Ho coverage

No maximum*

1966

1,000°

Ho coverage
1

Ho coverage

Ho aaxiaua*

Cont'd,

TABLE 52 (Cont'd)
SURGICAL1"
Host Expensive Operation

Tonsillectoay

Append—
ectoay

Hospital

Maxiaua
Compensation
per disability

EMPLOYEE
CONTRIBUTION

MAiEurmb

MEDICAL1
Days

Surgical

Hospitalisation
Days
Duration

U.S. STEEL CORPORATION
AHD UNITED STEEL WORKERS
1954

$200

$40

$100

Ho coverage

No coverage

$60

10

90

10

e

V

1958

300

50

150

Ho coverage

Ho coverage

1962

300

50

ISO

Ho coverage

No coverage

90

10

Ho coverage

90

10

70

$50

120

120

70

120

1966

300

50

150

No coverage

$225

$30

$100

$5 per day

!

$6.25-7.40 Monthly,
no dependents;
$7.50-8.65 aonthly,
with dependents*
$7.50-9.00 aonthly,
' no dependentsi
$9.50-11.00 aonthly,
with dependents*
•tone
•one

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORAIIOH
AHD UNITED AUTO WORKERS
$350

1954
300
1958

42.50

125

1st day,$12.50,
2nd-4th Day,$5
per day. Thereafter, $4 per
day"

491.50

$0.40-0.90 weekly*;
one-half of Blue
Cross and/or Blue
Shield Plan.
$0.50-1.30 weekly*;
one-half of Blue
Cross and/or Blue
Shield Plan

Cont'd.

3

TABLE 52 (Cont'd)

SURGICAL1*

MEDICALf

Most Expen- Tonsill- Appendsive Operaectoay
ectomy
tion

Hospital

EMPLOYEE
CONTRIBUTION

MATERNITYb

Maximum Compen- Days
sation per disability

Surgical Hospitalization
Days Duration

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
AND UNITED AUTO WORKERS
$450

$67.50

$157.50

450

67.50

157.50

1962

1st day, $15, 2nd20th day, $6 per
day. Thereafter,
$4.80 per day
-do-

- $1,785

365

1,785

365

$90

90 n

365

365 n

$0.80-1.80 weekly*

Hone

1966
BITUMINOCS COAL INDUSTRY
AND UNITED MIHE WORKERS
1954

Full Payment*

1958

- do-

1962

-do-

1966

-do-

Full Payment*

No aixlamr,
-do-

-do-

No MiTlmim

Full Payment

e.o

e,

Full Payaent °

No asxlaiim

Ho aaxiaua

Hone

-do-

None

-do-

Hone

-do-

Hone

TABLE

B E N E F I T

C

Life Insurance

52 (Cont'd)

O V E R A G E
Hospitalization

D U R
Surgical

I

H G

R

Medical

E T I K E M E N T
Pensioner Cost

U.S. STEEL CORPORATION AND
UNITED STEEL WORKERS
1954

$1,250

None

1958

$l,300-l,550h

No coverage

(i)

1962

-do-

No coverage

None

1966

NA

No coverage

NA

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
AND UNITED AUTO WORKERS
1954
1958

Same as for active enployee
if 10 years or sore service
-do-

Same as for active employee

1962

-do-

-do-

1966

HA

-do-

No coverage

Full cost, hospitalization and
surgical
Full cost, hospitalization,
surgical and medical.
One-half, of Blue Cross and/or
Blue Shield Plan
NA

BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY
AHD UNITED MINE WORKERS
1954

Same as for active employee

Same as for active employee

None
None

1958

-do-

-do-

1962

-do-

-do-

None

1966

KA

-do-

None

NA - Data not available
a - Varies with wage rate. Employee may purchase additional insurance by paying full cost,
b - Covers both employee and dependents.
Cont'd

TABLE
c
d

-

e f g b 1 i k a
n
o

-

52 (Cont'd)

Life insurance for enployee age 65 or over when hired is $500.
Funeral expense of $350 laaediately on death, additional $650 in eleven equal aonthly payments of $50 and a twelfth final payment of
$100; if no surviving dependents, benefit Halted to funeral expense of $350.
Widow and dependent children eligible for benefits dueing 12-aonth period following death of miner.
Covers only the employes except in the bituminous coal industry, where both employee and dependents are covered.
Covers both employee sad dependents except in the bituminous coal industry, where only dependents are covered.
Varies according to wage rate laaediately prior to retirement.
Financed by active employees and company contributions.
Benefit for employee age 65 or over when hired is $35 per week.
Plus $100 a aonth payable for 24 months to widow (or dependent widower), dependent unmarried children under 21, or to dependent parents.
Thereafter, $100 a aonth is payable to widow (or dependent widower) who is age 50 or over on date of eaployse's death until the earlier
of death, remarriage or age 62 (not payable for any aonth widow can qualify for Mother's Insurance under Social Security).
In approved nursing homes, convalescent and long-term illness cars for 730 days.
Prenatal and postnatal care covered.
Specified expensive drugs requiring long and continued use out of hospital are provided.

SOURCE: Digest of 100 Selected Health and Insurance Plana Under Collective Bsrgsinlng. Early 1966. U.S. Dapartaent of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Bulletin 1502, September 1966, pp.66-69, 86-89, 110-113; Digest of 100 Selected Health and Insurance Plana
Under Collective Bargaining. Winter 1961-1962. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin, 1330, June 1962,
pp. 96-101, 126-131, 162-167; Digest of 100 Selected Health and Insurance Plans Under Collective Bargaining. Early 1958. U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 1236, October 1958, pp. 106-111, 142-147, 172-177; Digest of 100
Selected Health and Insurance Plans Under Collective Bargaining. 1954. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Bulletin 1180, June 1955, pp. 100-105, 124-129, 154-159.
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by far the most comprehensive health and insurance program.

The

United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund was the only one of
the three plans that was completely financed by the employer and
provided full coverage to all eligible employees, dependents, and
retired employees.

By 1966, the other industries were also completely

financing their health and insurance programs, but had yet to provide
continued full coverage to retired employees.
A comparison of life insurance benefits showed that the United
Mine Workers had consistently lagged behind the other two industrial
unions in that area.

In 1954, the United Mi,ne Workers Welfare and

Retirement Fund provided a $1,000 policy for working and retired
miners, and this amount remained the same in the other three time
periods.

The policies in the automobile and steel industries varied

according to the hourly wage rates of the employees.

In 1954, the

minimum policy in the steel industry's plan was $3,000 and the maximum
was $5,500.

In the automobile industry's plan, the minimum policy

was $2,500 and the maximum was $5,000. By 1966, the minimum and
maximum policies in the steel industry's plan were $4,500 and $7,000
respectively, while the minimum and maximum in the automobile
industry's plan were $6,000 and $11,500 respectively.

In both the

steel and automobile industries, however, the policies were reduced
according to a set schedule after the pensioner reached the age of 65.
The steel and bituminous coal industries were lagging in
coverage for accidental death and dismemberment.
industry alone provided coverage in this area.

The automobile

Both the United

Automobile Workers and the United Steelworkers had accident and

sickness insurance in all four time periods.

However, the United

Mine Workers had not obtained any coverage in this area.
Of the three industries, the United Mine Workers Welfare and
Retirement Fund provided the best coverage in the areas of hospitalization, surgical, medical, and maternity care.

Even in the relative-

ly recent 1966 packages, both the automobile and steel industry
plans have allowances and time limitations, while the Welfare and
Retirement Fund provides coverage for any necessary length of time
and expense.

The Welfare and Retirement Fund ranked first in provid-

ing for retired employees since it continued full coverage, while
the automobile industry had only limited coverage and the steel
42/
industry totally discontinued its coverage.—

Summary
Welfare and retirement benefits in the bituminous coal industry
are distributed through the United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement
Fund, a legally independent entity financed by a royalty on every ton
of coal from a unionized mine.

The Fund was first negotiated in 1946

and was re-negotiated as part of the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement in 1950.
One of the primary purposes of the Fund, as envisioned by the
United Mine Workers of America, was to help alleviate the low living
standards and poor health conditions that prevailed throughout the
coal fields among disabled and retired miners.

However, the Fund's

programs, as finally agreed to by the negotiating parties, were
_
— T h i s observation was based on the 1962 comparison, as data
were not available in the 1966 time period.

mainly directed toward miners who were working as of May 28, 1946.
The first major function of the Welfare and Retirement Fund was
to assist miners who were the victims of industry reorganization
efforts.

The massive mechanization in the mines that followed the

signing of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 was
accompanied by major readjustments in the labor force, including
considerable unemployment, and new health and safety hazards.
Basically, the idea was that mechanization and less labor unrest in
the coal fields would improve the competitive position of coal.
This, in turn, would result in increased and steady production,
allowing the Fund uninterrupted flow of financial resources to assist
those affected by the mechanization.

By 1953, however, the Fund's

trustees began to reduce the duration of benefits to impose additional
eligibility requirements in some programs. As a result, many miners
who were affected by mechanization did not obtain

services from

Fund benefit programs.
Until the late 1960s, when the trustees of the Fund began to
alter their policies in response to attacks from critics, the Fund's
fastest growing program was its unexpended balance.

Part of the

balance was kept in a multi-million dollar checking account at the
union-owiied National Bank of Washington.

Since the union earned

stock dividends from the Bank, it was able to financially benefit
from the poor investment decision of the Fund's trustees.

Part of

the balance was also used to invest in low-growth utility stocks.
This was done in cooperation with the union as an effort to pressure
electric utilities to purchase coal from union mines instead of non-
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union mines.

The use of the unexpended banaces for such purposes

necessitated that Fund beneficiaries obtain lower and/or fewer benefits
than could have been available.
There is no doubt that the programs provided by the United Mine
Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund were excellent when first implemented, and that many programs today are excellent for those who
qualify.

In 1952, for example, a comparison of pension, medical,

health and hospital service programs in the bituminous coal industry
with those available in the benchmark steel and motor vehicle industries shows that the plan negotiated by the United Mine Workers was
by far superior in every category.

Since that time, however, the

United Mine Workers plan for eligible employees has remained basically
unchanged while the plans in the benchmark industries have improved
significantly.

In 1966, for example, total pension payments available

to any eligible retired employee were considerably higher in the
benchmark industries than in the bituminous coal industry.

The plans

negotiated in the benchmark industries also provided more liberal
benefits in certain categories, such as life and sickness insurance.
However, the United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund maintained
a more comprehensive health plan for eligible working miners, pensioners, and their families.

CHAPTER

VII

PRACTICES OF THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA WITHIN
THE BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY SINCE THE ENCOURAGEMENT
OF MECHANIZATION

Discriminatory Policies
Since 1950, the United Mine Workers of America has engaged in a
number of practices beneficial to the larger coal mining operators
but detrimental to the smaller operators.

The reason for the discri-

minatory effort was the union's position that the industry, in order
to compete with other fuels, should mechanize its mines to become
more efficient in the production of coal.

This policy, as John L.

Lewis pointed out in 1952, contributed to ".
of production into fewer units .

.

.

. the concentration

. more of the obsolete units will

fall by the board and go out of production."—

A major step toward

concentrating production into fewer units was the National Bituminous
Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, which imposed identical demands or* all
unionized coal mines in the industry regardless of mine location,
mechanized operations, seam thickness, size of operation, and other
factors.
Since 1950, the national agreements and amendments have been
tailored to the terms accepted by the more efficient, mechanized,
and larger mines.

This was made possible In 1950 by the creation of

the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association (BCOA), an alliance of

— T. N. Bethell, Conspiracy in Coal (Nashville, Tennessee,
Southern Student Organizing Committee), p. 7.
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the Northern Coal Operators' Association and operators of the
captive mines owned primarily by steel producers.

Members of the

Bituminous Coal Operators' Association employed about 60 per cent of
2/
the unionized bituminous coal miners.—

Voting power was based on

coal tonnage, and thus, for example, the Consolidation Coal Company
3/
alone could control 52 out of 110 votes in a typical year.—

The

national contracts have consistently been initially negotiated
between the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association and the United
Mine Workers of America which meant that major coal producers were
able to dictate contract terms to the many smaller, unionized
producers.

Many smaller operators complained that such an arrange-

ment "constituted a conspiracy between the union and the big operators to suppress competition and force the smaller companies out of
4/
business."—
The contract negotiation policy described above was formally
stated in writing in an amendment to the National Bituminous Ccal
Wage Agreement of 1950 negotiated in 1958 by the Bituminous Coal
Operators' Association
The

and the United Mine Workers of America.

amendment's Protective Wage Clause prohibited the union from

entering into any wage agreement "applicable to employees covered
by this contract" en any terms other than "those specified in this
contract."—

In return, signatory companies agreed not to market

2/
— Wall Street Journal, December 4, 1958, p. 2.
3/
— T. N. Bethell, ot>. cit., p. 6.
-^Wall Street Journal. March 31, 1970.
-(ibid., February 25, 1971.
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non-union coal, lease coal fields to non-union operators, or have
relations of any nature with non-union operations.

The clause also

established the Joint Industry Contract Committee to enforce the
provisions of the Protective Wage Clause and obtain certificates of
compliance from all union mines.—
The Protective Wage Clause was not received with industry-wide
enthusiasm among unionized producers.

For example, the Southern Coal

Operators' Association, which had previously agreed to the Bituminous
Coal Operators' Association and United Mine Workers of America
contract settlements, refused to endorse the clause without reservation.

Mr. Joseph Moody, then President of the Southern Coal Operators'

Association, announced that he could only approve the amendment "for
and on behalf of such members as may thereafter authorize him in
writing to do so."—
The Protective Wage Clause put pressure on small unionized
mines as well as non-unionized operations.
Kentucky was typical.

The situation in eastern

In eastern Kentucky there were two basic types

of unionized mines with railroad facilities.
of operating divisions of major companies.

The first type consisted

Their large and highly

mechanized mines had no difficulty in selling all of the tonnage
produced, mainly due to the sales organization and orders of the
parent firm.

The second type consisted of independent companies of

moderate size in possession of limited reserves, high capacity

— Bethell, op_. cit., p. 10.
7/
— C. L. Christenson, Economic Redevelopment in Bituminous Coal
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 269.
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cleaning plants, and good railroad connections.

These companies

were easily able to absorb higher sales volume, and thus they began
to provide cleaning and distribution service to the growing number
of truck mines, very small non-union mines that utilized trucks to
haul the coal from the mine sites.
Truck mines in eastern Kentucky accounted for a significant share
of the area's coal production.

As shown in Table 53 the share of the

total coal production in eastern Kentucky attributed to truck mines
8/
increased from 23 per cent in 1951 to 42 per cent in 1959.—

The

Protective Wage Clause was aimed at the threat posed by the non-union
truck mines and also the independent unionized railroad mines on
which the truck mines depended.
The formal declaration of the discriminatory policy, which an
informed management official told Christenson was the idea of repre9/
sentatives of some large commercial operators—, paved the way for a
series of successful anti-trust suits against the union and major
operators by smaller coal producers.

Partial union exemption from

anti-trust liability had been granted by the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
the Clayton Act.

One section of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, for

example, stated specifically that "no unicu shall be liable for acts
of its officers that violate the anti-trust laws, except on 'clear
proof1 of the officers "actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts'."—

17:
—'ibid.,

Perhaps more significant, however, were

p. 270.

- ' i b i d . , p. 269.
~^Wall Street Journal. February 25, 1971.

TABLE

53

CHANGES IN POSITION OF EASTERN KENTUCKY TRUCK MINES, 1951-1958

No. of rail
mines

1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959

SOURCE:

260
306
285
306
298
174
183
152
124

No. of truck
mines

Average total
employees
all mines

Tonnage all
Per cent
mines
tonnage
(000 omitted) from truck
mines

2,593

52,734

62,371

1,877

45,962

43,717

1,785

39,669

42,332

1,647

32,632

36,098

2,114

36,331

42,655

2,551

37,609

46,129

2,574

34,673

45,411

2,624

31,945

39,532

2,458

29,393

34,653

23%
24
25
28
31
39
41
42
42

Per cent
employees in
truck mines

34%
32
34
39
48
53
57
60
63

Calculations from Kentucky Annual Mine Reports as published in C. L. Christenson, Economic
Redevelopment in Bituminous Coal (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 270.
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the interpretations of the Sherman Act made by the United States
11/
Supreme Court in the cases of Apex Hosiery Company v. Leader,—
12/
United States v. Hutcheson,—
13/
Union No. 3, IBEWr—

and Allen Bradley Company v. Local

Summarized, the decisions stated that union

activities did not violate the Sherman Act unless the union worked
14/
together with business to suppress competition.—

These decisions

provided precedence for a 1965 Supreme Court decision concerning the
United Mine Workers of America and the National Bituminous Coal
Wage Agreement—

in which the "majority agreed in principle that a

union could be found in violation of antitrust laws for signing an
agreement obligating the union to impose specified wage and other
conditions on other e m p l o y e e s . " — T h e prevailing opinion, written
by Justice White, said: "We think a union forfeits its exemption
from the antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that it has agreed
with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other
bargaining units."—
A number of small mine operators quickly brought suit against
the United Mine Workers of America on grounds that the United Mine
Workers of America's Protective Wage Clause violated the antitrust

— ' 3 1 0 U. S. 469 (1940)
— ' 3 1 2 U. S. 219 (1941)
— ' 3 2 5 U. S. 797 (1945)
14/
— S a n f o r d Cohen, Labor in the United States. Third Edition,
(Solumbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1970), p. 481.
—-^United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965).
—'wall Street Journal. March 31, 1970.

218

18/
laws.—

The United States Supreme Court disposed of most of the

cases "on procedural grounds without squarely deciding whether the
19/
UMWA agreement violated the antitrust laws.'L-i

On March 2, 1971,

however, the United States Supreme Court declined to review a
decision by the U. S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati.
The Circuit Court of Appeals decision affirmed a 1968 verdict by the
Federal District Court in Chattanooga, Tennessee, that granted triple
damages of $1.5 million from the United Mine Workers of America to
a small operator, the Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company.

The

District Court ruled that the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agree20/
ment of 1950 violated the Clayton Antitrust A c t . —
On May 17, 1971, the United States Supreme Court declined to
disturb a lower court's decision in the case of South-East Coal
Company v. United Mine Workers of America and Consolidation Coal
Company that found both defendents guilty of conspiracy in violation
of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.

Treble damages totaling $7,231,356

were to be paid to South-East Coal Company, half by each defendent.
Details of this case reveal considerable union effort in pursuing a
discriminatory policy toward smaller unionized operators.

18/
— S e e , for example, John L. Lewis and Josephine Roche as
Trustees oi the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement
Fund, and Henry C. Schmidt, Trustee, Plaintiffs v. James M. Pennington, Raymond Phillips, and Burse Phillips, Individually and Trading
as Phillips Brothers Coal Company, Defendents, v. United Mine
Workers of America, Cross-Defendent, U. S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee, Northern Division, Knoxville,
Tennessee, Civil Action Number 3431.
—'wall Street Journal. Kay 18, 1971.
—'wall Street Journal. March 31, 1970.
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The South-East Coal Company, a medium-sized independent operation in eastern Kentucky with two mines, a railroad connection, and a
multi-million dollar cleaning plant, had been a signatory to the
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 and its later amendments, including the 1958 amendment which contained the Protective
Wage Clause.

The Consolidation Coal Company had acted as South-East's

selling agent, since the South-East Coal Company had only a small
sales organization.

Until 1958, Consolidation Coal Company handled

21/
annually on the average $3.5 million worth of South-East*s coal.—'
In 1958, however, the president of the South-East Coal Company asked
the United Mine Workers of America for a special contract with a
lower royalty payment into the United Mine Workers of America Welfare
and Retirement Fund, so as to mechanize its mines and competitively
22/
mine thinner seams of coal.—

The Protective Wage Clause barred

any concession, even though it was later revealed, as a result of
financial reports required by the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, that the United Mine Workers of America
loaned South-East Coal Company's rival, the West Kentucky Coal Company,
almost one million dollars to maintain royalty payments into the
23/
United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund.— In
addition, the union has from time to time made special arrangements
24/
for firms to pay less than the standard 40c a ton royalty.—
__
— ' T . N. Bethell, "South-East Coal Company in a Battle for Life,"
Appalachian Lookout, Vol.1, No. 1, December 1968, p. 5.
ii'lbid.
23/
— T . N. Bethell, Conspiracy in Coal (Nashville, Tennessee:
Southern Student Organizing Committee), p. 12.
—'wall Street Journal, November 28, 1962 and March 15, 1963.
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The West Kentucky Coal Company, until 1953, was the only nonunion firm among the top ten coal producers.

In 1952, the United

Mine Workers of America made loans to Cyrus Eaton, who began to
purchase stock in the coal company.

In 1953 Eaton became Chairman of

the Board of Directors of the West Kentucky Coal Company and immedi25/
ately the company signed a union contract for 3,000 miners.—
Although union officials stated that Eaton's loans were made to
organize miners at the company, investment in West Kentucky Coal
26/
continued after the union contract was signed.-^- From 1953 to 1958,
the United Mine Workers of America loaned an additional $25 million
to Eaton, as he merged West Kentucky Coal with the non-union Nashville
27/
Coal Company, which employed 1,000 miners.—

All of this activity,

which occurred during the period 1954-1964, allowed the highly
mechanized West Kentucky Coal Company to reduce its price per ton
from $3.70 to $2.90 and to increase its share of the Tennessee
28/
Valley Authority's market from 9.6 per cent to 16.2 per cent.— As
a result, many small unionized operators in the Sequatchie Valley of
Tennessee and in eastern Kentucky that had mined most of their coal

257
— N a t h a n Caldwell and Gene Graham, "The Strange Romance Between
John L. Lewis and Cyrus Eaton," reprinted in United States Congress,
House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, Amendments to Federal Coal Mine Safety Act, Hearings before the General
Subcommittee on Labor, 88th Congress, First Session, on H.R. 23 and
similar bills, August 8 and 9, September 18, 19 and 20, 1963 (Washington, D . C : Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 264.
26/
— T. N. Bethell, Conspiracy in Coal(Nashville, Tennessee:
Southern Student Organizing Committee), p. 9.
27/
—'Nathan Caldwell, op_. cit., pp. 264-65.
28/
— Fortune, January 1971, p. 148.
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for the Tennessee Valley Authority, the world's largest coal buyer
by 1964, were driven out of business.

In recent years, the Tennessee

Valley Authority has bought increasing amounts of coal from strip
mines, mainly those operated by major unionized companies.
Nathan G. Caldwell, a staff writer for the Nashville Tennessean,
has reported another example of the discriminatory policy that
affected the smaller unionized mines.

Caldwell claims that the union

29/
controlled West Kentucky Coal Company—^^ shipped coal on barges to
Tennessee Valley Authority generating plants, thereby breaking a
strike at small unionized mines in the Sequatchie Valley of Tennessee
30/
adjacent to the power facilities.—
Eaton's $35 million loans were made on very favorable terms.
If the stocks Eaton put up as collateral rose in value, he could
withdraw them. On the other hand, if the stocks went down, he
31/
suffered no loss since additional collateral was not required.— A
typical note said:
At any time prior to or at the maturity of this note,
I shall have the right to tender to the payee the security
pledged as collateral for the note in full satisfaction of
any amounts due on account of principal or interest. If
such tender is made, I shall have no further interest in
the collateral or in the excess of the value of the collateral over the amount due under this note, and I shall have
2C •'
— ' T h e union held as collateral all 50,000 shares of preferred
stock and 480,000 out of 857,264 shares of common stock, according
to J. Davitt McAteer, Editor, Coal Mining Health and Safety in West
Virginia (published by the editor: July 1970), p. 347.
30/
— ' N a t h a n Caldwell, op. cit., pp. 264-65.
— ' i b i d . , p. 265.

no liability for any deficiency in the value of the
collateral below the amount due under this note.32/
The effort to phase out small production units in eastern
Kentucky was partially successful.

Those units who remained in

operation, like the South-East Coal Company, generally went non-union.
The lack of unionized miners in eastern Kentucky, an area where the
union had initially great difficulty in organizing, was one of the
primary reasons advanced by the United Mine Workers of America Welfare
and Retirement Fund when it decided to discontinue operation of the
Miners' Memorial Hospitals in Whitesburg, McDowell, Hazard, and
Middlesboro on July 1, 1963.
The South-East Coal Company went non-union on March 1, 1962.
After that date, the Consolidation Coal Company sold none of South33/
East Company's coal.—

Although by that time the legality of the

Protective Wage Clause was under scrutiny by the courts, the major
operators and the union had made another agreement that required a
double royalty (80c per ton until 1971) to be paid into the United
Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund on any non-union
34/
coal handled by unionized operators.—
The South-East Coal Company brought suit against Consolidation
Coal Company and the union in 1966, "charging that the 1950 agreement
and its amendments constituted a conspiracy to restrain trade in

UTibTdT
33/
— T . N. Bethell, Conspiracy in Coal (Nashville, Tennessee:
Southern Student Organizing Committee), p. 13.
34/
— Fortune, January 1971, p. 148.

35/
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.''—

As stated previously,

this occurred by forcing an agreement, tailored to the larger
mechanized mines, on smaller operations in an attempt to reduce the
number of coal producers and, in addition, aid the larger producers
to obtain a larger share of the market.

The United Mine Workers of

America subsidized the West Kentucky Coal Company in an effort to
concentrate production units in Kentucky and Tennessee until 1963,
when the union cancelled its loans for a loss of $8 million and
sold its interests to the Island Creek Coal Company of Huntington,
'

36/

West Virginia.—

Both Island Creek Coal Company and West Kentucky

Coal Company have since been acquired by Occidental Petroleum
Corporation.
The trial judge at the Federal District Court in Lexington,
Kentucky, told the jury "that, while the agreement between the UMW
and the major operators was not itself illegal, the agreement would
on its face violate the Sherman Act if the jury found proof that
the agreement had been entered into with the intent of driving some
coal operators out of business, or with the knowledge that it would
37/
have that effect."— A guilty verdict was returned on October 28,
1968 and was affirmed by the United States Appeals Court in Cincinnati.
In May 1971, the United States Supreme Court refused to review the
case and thereby upheld the decision of the lower courts.

On

35/
—'Wall Street Journal, May 18, 1971, p. 4.
— T . N. Bethell, Conspiracy in Coal (Nashville, Tennessee:
Southern Student Organizing Committee), p. 9.
—

Wall Street Journal. May 18, 1971, p. 4.
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October 15, 1971, the two

defendents each paid South-East Coal

Company $4,453,500 making the total settlement, including assessed
38/
damage, court costs, and interest, $8,907,000.—'
The United Mine Workers of America and the major operators
attempted to concentrate production units with the use of a second
method.

The mechanization process, although it is usually accompan-

ied by higher wage rates, decreases labor costs while increasing
39/
fixed charges per unit of output.— On the other hand, mines that
have little mechanization tend to continue having wage payments as
40/
a major component of unit costs.—

Thus, any method to force wage

rates higher in the less mechanized mines would successfully limit
the market in which the smaller mines could compete.
On December 15, 1954, the United Mine Workers of America and
Consolidation Coal Company (then known as Pittsburgh-Consolidation
Coal Company) petitioned the Secretary of Labor for a determination
of prevailing minimum wages under the terms of the Walsh-Healoy
41/
Public Contracts A c t . —

The Act permitted the Secretary of Labor

to set a minimum wage in those industries that sold more than
$10,000 worth of goods and services to any Uniced States Government
agency, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority.

Significantly, during

the 18 years prior to IS54 that the statute was on the record, the
coal industry had not sought to avail itself of the privileges and

38/
— Charleston, West Virginia Sunday Gazette Mail, October 17,
1971, p. 20-A.
39/
— C. L. Christenson, op_. cit., p. 262.

•42/ibid.
—'ibid., p. 263.

42/
the protection of the A c t . —
In August 1955, the Secretary of Labor announced the determination of the prevailing wage to be paid by coal companies engaged in
more than $10,000 worth of business with the Tennessee Valley Authority.

As stated by the determination, the non-union mines were

43/
required to raise their wages to union levels prevailing in 1955.—
The ruling was appealed by non-union operators, but the courts upheld
the right of the United States Department of Labor to enforce the
Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act.
On September 18, 1958, the United States Department of Labor
raised the minimum wage to $2,745 an hour (at 50c per hour)paid to
miners producing coal for Government contracts in excess of $10,000
44/
a year.—' This is an example of an attempt by the United States
Department of Labor to keep the prevailing non-union minimum wage in
line with the wages paid in unionized mines, even though the unionized
wages often rose to higher levels ahead of determinations made by the
45/
Secretary of Labor.—

Nevertheless, the advent of prevailing mini-

mum wage for non-unionized suppliers of the Tennessee Valley Authority
was of assistance to the mechanized unionized producers, such as

42/
—Testimony, John L. Lewis, President United Mine Workers of
America, in Public Hearings on. the Determination of Prevailing Minimum Wages for Bituminous Coal Industry Under the Walsh-Healey Public
Contracts Act (U. S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour, and Public
Contracts Divisions, February 1955), I, pp. 17-18.
—'wall Street Journal, March 4, 1958.
44/
—'Wall Street Journal, September 23, 1958.
45/
————
— C . L. Christenson, op. cit., p. 266.

West Kentucky Coal Company, in obtaining a larger share of the
Tennessee Valley Authority business.

The smaller, less mechanized

producers were generally priced out of the Tennessee Valley Authority
market by their increased labor costs and either ceased operations,
or, as in the previously discussed case of the Nashville Coal Company,
were purchased by major operators.

Business Practices
With the signing of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
of 1950, the United Mine Workers of America increased its participation in a number of business activities to the extent that "the
aims, interests, and policies of the union and the companies became
inextricably intertwined."—
The union's purchase of control in the National Bank of Washington has already been mentioned in Chapter VI. The United Mine
Workers of America, with Cyrus Eaton acting as John L. Lewis's
47/
financial advisor,— began its stock purchase of the National Bank
48/
of Washington in 1949 and expanded its holdings in 1954.— By 1969,
the United Mine Workers of America owned 736,944 out of one million
49/
shares in the bank.—
A union owning or controlling a bank is not unique.

For example,

the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, led by Sidney Hillman,

46/
—'Fortune, January 1971, p. 78.
47/
—'Nathan Caldwell, op. cit., p. 262.
— ' N e w York Times. April 17, 1960, p. 1.
49/
— L e t t e r from Ralph Nader to Ralph Yarborough, Chairman,
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate,
Washington, D. C , April 26, 1969.
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began the Amalgamated Bank of New York in 1923.

One reason for the

establishment of the Amalgamated Bank was to grant loans to members
of the union who had only work to offer as collateral.—

The

United Mine Workers of America, on the other hand, was not interested
in having the National Bank of Washington provide any special services
to rank and file miners.

Instead, the bank was considered an invest-

ment, a vehicle to indirectly transfer monies from the legally
separate United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund
51/
to the treasury of the United Mine Workers of America—, and a means
of making loans amounting to over $15 million to coal producers for
52/
mine mechanization.—

According to Federal District Court Judge

Gesell, Barnum L. Colton, who was asked by Lewis to head the bank,
"was well aware of the propensity of the union to use the bank for
union objectives, as witnessed by his remarkable personal financial
dealings with the union, the bank's loans to coal operators backed by
union collateral, and the unusual financial relationship between the
53/
union and Cyrus Eaton, which the bank aided."—
The purchase of control in the West Kentucky Coal Company has
been described in detail in the preceding section.

In addition, the

United Mine Workers of America had financial dealings with other
coal companies through Lewmurken, Inc.

Lewmurken, Inc. was named

— ' " T h e Inheritance,"film produced for the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America's Fiftieth Anniversary Convention, 1964.
— ' This point is discussed in detail in Chapter VI.
52/
— ' Nathan Caldwell, op. cit., p. 266.
53/
Blankenship v. Boyle, U. S. District Court, District of
Columbia, No. 2186-69, 1971, p. 21.
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after John L. Lewis, Philip Murray, and Thomas Kennedy, the three
national officers of the union at the time the corporation was
founded.

Incorporated in Delaware, Lewmurken Inc. main offices were

listed as the same address as the headquarters of the United Mine
Workers of America in Washington, D.C.

The union made loans to

Lewmurken Inc., payable on demand which have yet to be repaid.

A

$1.5 million loan, for example, that appeared in the first submitted
records required by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, has continued to remain on records subsequently
54/
submitted.—
Lewmurken Inc., was active prior to 1950.

The Rocky Mountain

Fuel Company, with Josephine Roche as President, had 23 per cent of
its stock owned by Lewmurken Inc. when the coal company was liquidated in 1947. The stock was held as collateral on a $709,693 loan
made to the firm.—

Miss Roche became managing director of the

United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund in April,
1948, and from 1950 to 1971 she was also the Fund's neutral trustee.
She was ordered to vacate the trustee position by Federal District
Court Judge Gesell in 1971, and voluntarily resigned as managing
56/
director in the same year.—

Federal Judge Gesell's decision found

Miss Roche guilty of having taken part in a conspiracy with the
National Bank of Washington, the United Mine Workers of America, and

54/
— ' F o r example, see the Annual Report of the United Mine Workers
of America submitted to the Office of Labor Management and WelfarePension Reports, BLMR File No. 000063, year ending December 31, 1967.
—'Time, June 2, 1947, p. 88.
56/
— U n i t e d Mine Workers of America Journal, October 1, 1971, p.14.

others against the beneficiaries of the Fund.—
Lewmurken Inc., also has an outstanding loan of $375,000 to the
58/
Freeport Coal Company of Morgantown, West Virginia.—

Freeport Coal

Company, which was not listed in the Morgantown, West Virginia telephone directory in 1971, has leased its land to the Kingwood Mining
Company, a non-union coal mining operation headquartered in neighboring
59/
Preston County, West Virginia.—
In 1956, the United Mine Workers of America joined into a partnership with C. H. Sprague and Company of Boston, General Coal Company of
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh-Consolidation Coal Company of New York (later
renamed Consolidation Coal Company), Island Creek Coal Company of
Huntington, West Virginia, the Norfork and Western Railroad, Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad, Virginian Railway, and Pocahontas Fuel to
form American Coal Shipping Inc.—

The joint venture was intended to

stimulate coal exports and coal production in the United States by
making available low-cost transoceanic transportation in specially
equipped and converted World War II Liberty ships. American Coal
Shipping purchased one Liberty ship outright for $775,000, chartered
thirty others from the U. S. Government, and acquired stock control of
A. H. Bull Steamship Line.—

The union invested $3.4 million for a

57/
— United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund, Report for
the Year Ending June 30, 1971 (Washington, D . C , August 1971), p. 24.
——
.
-«__
— L e t t e r from Joseph Yablonski to Messrs. W. A. Boyle, et. al.,
November 18, 1969, p. 3.
^'ibid.
— ' N e w York Times, October 4, 1956, p. 65.
— U n i t e d Mine Workers of America Journal. June 15, 1956.
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62/
33 per cent interest.—

Although little information is available

about the failure of American Coal Shipping, the Union has been
receiving payments since January 1, 1963 from A. H. Bull Steamship
Company.

In the annual report filed by the union to the Office of

Labor-Management and Welfare-Pension Reports for the year ending on
December 31, 1967, A.H. Bull Steamship Company owed the union $334,791
and the union held fleet and real estate mortgages as collateral.
There were many other business-related investments as well, such
as $16 million worth of stock in the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad.
This was in addition to the Chesapeake and Ohio stock held by the
United Mine Workers of America as collateral for loans made to Cyrus
Eaton.

After the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of

1959 required the United Mine Workers of America to submit its first
detailed financial report, the New York Times claimed that the United
63/
Mine Workers of America was the wealthiest union in the land-.—

At

that time, the net assets of the United Mine Workers of America were
$110,315,080.
The purpose of the various investments described above was
stated at the United Mine Workers of America Convention in Cincinnati
in 1960.

Union officers claimed "that $70 million in union funds

invested in coal companies and other corporate ventures had brought
it substantial profits, safeguarded job opportunities and helped
spread unionization in the last ten y e a r s . " — M a n y of the activities,

— ' N e w York Times, April 17, 1960, p. 1.
-^'ibid.
— ' N e w York Times. October 7, 1960, p. 10.
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the officers' reports concluded, "had been devoted to cooperating with
the industry in protecting coal against the competitive inroads of oil
and natural gas."—'

Emphasis on Production
Since the early 1950s,

the United Mine Workers of America has

been particularly interested in maintaining high levels of production.
Under the agreement establishing the Welfare and Retirement Fund, a
royalty per ton of unionized coal was paid into the Fund.

The royalty,

only 5c a ton when the Fund was initially negotiated in 1946, was
raised to 40c in 1952 and had remained at that level until the expiration of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968 on
October 1, 1971.

Since the company would contribute the royalty based

on production rather than employment, the union apparently calculated
that the payment would return to the workers part of the benefits
derived from increased mine mechanization.

In Chapter VI, the "pay-

as-you-go" structure of the Welfare and Retirement Fund, which became
highly dependent on incoming royalties and vulnerable to production
stoppages, was discussed in detail.
As shown in Table 54, work stoppages in the early 1950's were
relatively frequent, reaching a high of 560 in 1952.

In late 1952,

however, the union sent a special memorandum to all locals warning
them that unauthorized wildcat strikes would result in a $100 per day
fine from the national union.—'

Table 54 shows that work stoppages

—'interview with Leon YablonsKi, California, Pa., March 15, 1971.

TABLE
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WORK STOPPAGES IN THE BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY,
1950-1970
Workers involved 1/
Year

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
Mean

1960
1961
1962

Number
Number
Per
of work (thousands) stoppage
stoppage

Man-days idle during year

Percent
of total
employed

Number
Percent
(thousands) of total
working
time 2/

Per
worker
involved

Renegotiation
of national
agreements

430
549
560
392
208
292
266
161
136
146

165.0
213.0
472.0.
130.0
81.9
77.5
84.8
46.4
29.7
64.0

384
388
843
332
394
265
319
288
218
438

44.8
57.3
143.9
44.9
35.8
35.4
37.1
20.2
15.4
35.9

9,320.0
887.0
2,760.0
418.0
344.0
273.0
377.0
136.0
102.0
1,560.0

9.9
0.9
3.3
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.2
0.2
3.4

56.5

x

4.2
5.8
3.2
4.2
3.5
4.4
2.9
3.4

X
X
X
X
X
-

314

136.4

434

51.8

1,617.7

2.4

11.9

120
117
121

37.3
25.1
34.3

310
215
283

22.1
17.1
24.5

137.0
90.7
191.0

0.3
0.2
0.5

3.7
3.6
5.6

24.4

„

-

Cont'd
to
to

w

TABLE
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Workers involved —
Year

Number
of work
stoppages

1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

131
111
145
160
207
266
457
184

38.0
56.8
62.6
88.1
62.9
206.4
206.0
81.7

512
432
551
304
776
451
445

500

198.6

397

Mean
1970

Number
(thousands)

(Cont'd)

Man-days idle during year

Per
stoppage

Percent
of total
employed

Number Percent
Per
(thousands) of total worker
working
involved
time 2/

290.

27.6
41.7
47.5
67.?
47.1
163.3
159.1

234.0
340.0
258.0
629.0
158.0
956.6
900.6

59.2

389.5

0.7
0.9
0.8
1.9
0.5
2.9
2.7
1.1

143.1

627.0

1.8

6.2
5.9
.4.1

7.1
2.5
4.6
4.4
4.8
3.2

Renegotiation
of national
agreements

X
X
X
-

_

— Workers are counted more than once if involved in more than one stoppage during a year. Because
workers are counted each time they are involved in a strike, it is possible to derive a ratio in excess
of 100 per cent.
2/
— Idleness as a per cent of estimated working time was calculated on the basis of a ratio of time lost
to time worked plus time lost.
NOTE: These data include only stoppages lasting one full day or shift or longer and involving 6
workers or more. The number of stoppages and workers relate to those stoppages that began in a year;
man-days of idleness are derived from all stoppages in effect in a year.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Fact Sheet on Collective Bargaining in the Bituminous Coal Industry,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release 71-430 (Washington, D . C : Government Printing Office,
August 2, 1971), p. 5.
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after 1952 declined significantly to a low of 111.
work stoppages again began to rise considerably.

By 1968, however,

At that time, "in

an attempt to curb unauthorized strikes, provision was made to reduce
the bonus and to withhold pay" negotiated in the National Bituminous
Coal Wage Agreement of 1968 "for absences due to strikes under specific conditions."—

This action was accompanied by the union policy,

stated by United Mine Workers of America President W. A. 'Tony* Boyle
at hearings before a Senate Subcommittee in 1969 that "the UMWA will
not abridge the rights of mine operators in running the mines.
68/
we follow the judgment of the coal operators, right or wrong."—
During the late 1950's, the United Mine Workers of America took
two significant steps revealing its continuing concern for industry
production.

First, in April 1957, the union established a Research

and Marketing Department, "a step almost unique in United States
Unions."—'

Then, in 1959, the United Mine Workers of America joined

with the coal operators and the railroads to form the National Coal
Policy Conference.

The union annually contributed approximately

$75,000 to this organization.—
The National Coal Policy Conference was a lobbying effort to
— U . S. Department of Labor, Fact Sheet on Collective Bargaining
in the Bituminous Coal Industry, Bureau of Labor Statistics, News
Release 71-430 (Washington, D. C.Government Printing Office, August 2,
1971), pp.1-2.
68/
— F o r t u n e , January 1971, p. 147.
69/
— R o b e r t T. Adams, "Technology and Productivity in Bituminous
Coal, 1949-59," Monthly Labor Review, October 1961, p. 1083.
70/
'
—'Letter from Ralph Nader to Ralph Yarborough, Chairman,
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, Washington, D. C , April 26, 1969.

protect and promote the coal industry by taking stands on various
Congressional matters pending in Washington, D.C.

According to Harry

Moses, who represented the captive mines in the Conference, the
union "joined us without reservation in all our efforts to combat the
influence of competitive fuels, government interference, and unreasonable safety regulations."—'
The position of the union on mine health and safety has already
been analyzed in detail in Chapter V.

From the material presented,

the conclusion drawn was that the union had not done as much as it
could in

these areas. According to Joseph A. Loftus in the New York

Times, the union "virtually adopted the position of the operators that
safety" and health "improvements that cost money would hurt coal's
72/
competitive position" and therefore should not be encouraged.—
Joseph Yablonski, a member of the United Mine Workers of America
International Executive Board prior to his murder in January 1970,
also claimed that the union's "international officers meet regularly
with coal corporation executives and the BCOA to decide on various
73/
degrees of inaction on coal mine health and safety."—

Relationship with the Rank and File
To obtain his goal of national bargaining on an industry-wide

71/
— ' T . N . Bethell, Conspiracy in Coal (Nashville, Tennessee:
Southern Student Organizing Committee), p. 2.
— ' N e w York Times, November 22, 1968.
73/
— L e t t e r from Joseph Yablonski to Messrs. W. A. Boyle, et. al.,
November 18, 1969, p. 5.
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contract, John L. Lewis had to consolidate his power at union headquarters.

For this reason, the independently run districts that

characterized the early years of the United Mine Workers of America
had to be brought under control either by election of local union
officials loyal to Lewis or by appointment of officers.

The latter

was accomplished by use of the trusteeship, as provided for in the
International Constitution.

A district could be placed under trustee-

ship for a variety of reasons, but the one used most frequently was
the inability to repay large organizing loans borrowed from the union's
national headquarters.

Presently, only four of the twenty-three

districts elect their district officers and only one district,
District 5 in southwestern Pennsylvania, elects both district officers
and its representative on the International Executive Board.

In the

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, it is stated
that the use of the trusteeship for a time period greater than 18
months must be justified to the United States Department of Labor's
Office of Labor-Management and Welfare-Pension Reports.

The Depart-

ment of Labor filed suit in 1964 to force the United Mine Workers of
America to terminate many of the trusteeships pad to permit the
election of district officials.

The Government claims that the elec-

tion of district officials is required by the Bill of Rights portion
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.

The

United States Department of Justice, however, did not take action on
74/
the case until July 1971, and the case has since been delayed.—

— B l a c k Lung Bulletin. August 1971, p. 4.

The rank and file have limited voice in the national agreements.
Prior to 1950, the negotiations between Lewis and the operators were
attended by many reporters.

Since 1950, however, the negotiations

have been conducted in secrecy.
other industries.

.

"In contrast to the practices in

. usually even sources close to Mr. Lewis" were

not aware that he was "dealing for new terms until both sides are
75/
ready to announce agreement."—Thus, it is hardly surprising that
when Joseph Moody, newly elected President of the Bituminous Coal
Operators Association, spoke to the news media about upcoming contract
negotiations in 1971, United Mine Workers President Boyle reacted by
stating: "It has long been the policy of both sides not to attempt to
carry out negotiations in the newspapers.

.

. we regret very much

Moody's ill-conceived attempt to change this procedure."—Negotiated
contracts are ratified by the select 125 man National Scale and Policy
Committee.

Rank and file demands are not actively solicited, and

rank and file approval is not necessary for contract ratification.
The rank and file have, over the past two decades, taken occassional unilateral action forcing the national union to reopen the
negotiated contract.

In late 1963, for example, a group of United

Mine Workers miners traveled to Washington, D. C

to ask national

officers to reopen the contract that had been negotiated in 1958.
Apparently, union officials had felt that the coal industry was not in
a healthy financial condition and had chosen to continue the 1958
77/
contract beyond its expiration date.—
At the meeting in union
—'Wall Street Journal, September 23, 1958, p. 2.
— Morgantown, West Virginia, Post, July 20, 1971, p. 2-A.
77/
—'Wall Street Journal, August 30, 1963, p. 18.

headquarters, Pennsylvania miners requested increased fringe benefits
and rigid safety provisions, while Kentucky miners asked for a special
contract based on the piece-work pattern for the smaller less mecha78/
nized mines.—

In early 1564, the union negotiated a new contract

and one day later 18,000 miners in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio,
West Virginia, and Pennsylvania went on a wildcat strike for 18 days
due to "dissatisfaction with the agreement approved on March 23 by the
United Mine Workers' National Policy Committee and the Bituminous Coal
79/
Operators A s s o c i a t i o n . " — T h e strike, however, did not cause the
contract negotiated in 1964 to be reopened.
A few years later, another rank and file walkout forced the
union to renegotiate a new contract.

On April 1, 1966, the union's

National Scale and Policy Committee agreed to a contract that raised
the hourly wage rates for continuous miner operators, electricians
inside the mine, and mechanics by $1.32 an hour, but postponed any
wage rise to other employees until April 1, 1967.
"Peabody Contract,"

Dubbed the

named after one of the country's largest coal

producers that played a major role in preparing the agieement, it
caused 50,000 miners to go on a 17-day wildcat strike.

The union and

the operators quickly renegotiated the agreement so as to include
immediate benefits for all employees retroactive to April 1, 1966.
In 1969, another significant wildcat strike took place for 23
days in West Virginia.

The walkout, which began on February 10 and

79/
— U . S. Department of Labor, Fact Sheet on Collective Bargaining in the Bituminous Coal Industry, Bureau of Labor Statistics, News
Release 71-430 (Washington, D . C : Government Printing Office, August
2, 1971), p. 7.
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involved approximately 45,000 miners, was a successful effort to obtain
legislation in West Virginia that provided for Workmen's Compensation
benefits for Black Lung.
in Chapter V.

Details of this legislation have been discussed

"The wildcat that started the .

the way by the local presidents;
his district officers.

.

.

. rumble was led all

80/
it was discouraged by B o y l e — a n d by

."—'

Since the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968, which
expired October 1, 1971, the number of wildcat strikes and the number
of miners involved has increased significantly, as shown in Table 55.
A recent example was the 1970 20,000-man wildcat strike organized by
the Disabled Coal Miners of Southern West Virginia to protest the
decision of the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement
Fund to withdraw miner health cards if firms were not contributing
82/
their full 40c royalty to the Fund—, and to manipulate eligibility
requirements for services available to retired, sick, and disabled
miners.

These Fund practices, stated Federal District Court Judge

Gesell, were "highly improper, .

.

83/
. arbitrary and capricious."—

From the discussion above, it is apparent that the strategy of

80/
— W . A. Boyle, President, United Mine Workers of America.
—'Robert G. Sherrill, "The Black Lung Rebellion," The Nation,
April 28, 1969, p. 529.
82/
—According to the United Mine Workers Journal, August 15, 1967,
p. 13, :,when a signatory operator is found by the Fund to be in flagrant violation of the trust provisions of the Agreement, the eligibility of his employees for Fund benefits is terminated and may be
restored only if and when arrangements satisfactory to the Trust Fund
have been made to discharge the operator's indebtedness to the Fund
as shown by Trust Fund audit."
83/
— - Blankenship v. Boyle, U. S. District Court, District of Columbia, No. 2186-69, 1971, pp.25-26.

John L. Lewis was to isolate himself from the rank and file miners so
that he would have a free hand in dealing with the industry.
ing to Paul Jacobs quoted by Bethell, ".
tic domination of the union . . .
responsive to his membership ~
them .

.

.

Accord-

.it was Lewis's autocra-

it was because Lewis was not

indeed, because he was protected from

. that permitted the coal industry to automate without

resistance from its workers."—
continue during the 1950s,

The policy was able to successfully

during the brief Presidency of Thomas

Kennedy, and during the early years of W. A. Boyle's Presidency.
Since the middle 1960s,

however, the miners have become increa-

singly restless demanding a greater voice in union affairs, more
fringe benefits, more security, and more union concern and pressure
for health and safety legislation.

The feeling is-,according to

Monslgnor Charles Owen Rice of Pittsburgh, that "the union that once
protected the men from the bosses has become the union that protects
85/
the bosses from the men."—

President W. A. Boyle has been increas-

ingly reluctant to venture out into the coal mining areas.

In

February 1969, for example, only the "unusual passage of a resolution
. . .

by 3,000 West Virginia miners requesting that he come and

address them in West Virginia" caused Boyle to make an appearance
86/
before the miners.—--

Foftune analyzed the close of the 1950-70 era

with the observation that "W.A. Boyle has lost control of his membership."*!'
84/
—'T.N. Bethell, Conspiracy in Coal (Nashville, Tennessee:
Southern Student Organizing Committee), p. 8.
85/
— Fortune, January 1971, p. 78.
Of. I

"

'

—'Letter from Ralph Nader to Ralph Yarborough, op. cit.
87/
—'Fortune, January 1971, p. 78.

CHAPTER

VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The United Mine Workers of America began encouraging mechanization
and concentration in the coal mining industry immediately after the
end of World War II.

The coal industry was in danger of losing primary

markets, such as home heating and the railroads, and in order to
obtain new markets a competitive relationship with other basic fuels
had to be assured.

The various actions that the union encouraged were

a restructuring of the industry so as to create more efficient and
concentrated production units;

higher wage rates and mine mechaniza-

tion so as to assist the industry in obtaining greater volume at lower
per unit costs;

and Improvement of labor-management relations so as

to assure uninterrupted production to new markets, such as the growing
electric utility market.

The operators agreed to cooperate with the

union in implementing these goals when both parties signed the National
Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, the first industry-wide agreement that is also frequently referred to as the Mechanization Agreement.
The Mechanization Agreement included written provisions that
increased wage rates in the industry and established a reorganized
Welfare and Retirement Fund.

The "gentleman's agreement" that accom-

panied the contract was an understanding that the union would not
resist mechanization and industry reorganization efforts if part of
the benefits would be willingly granted to the union.

The acceptance

of the "gentleman's agreement" by both parties is important if one is
to fully understand the activities and docile attitude of the union
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for a twenty-year period beginning in 1950.
The union did not negotiate another completely new contract until
1968.

Until that time, wage adjustments were handled through perio-

dic amendments to the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950,
carefully gauged to productivity advances in the coal industry.
Simultaneously, the union initiated efforts to unionize companies by
unique methods, such as bankrolling a trusted financier who then
merged purchased non-union operations into a single unionized production unit.

Various antitrust suits have found the union guilty of

practicing discrimination tactics that favored the larger operators.
In addition, the union aided and participated with industry in
business ventures that were designed to assist the coal industry in
obtaining a firm foothold in the nation's energy market.

Such

activities confirm the hypothesis that the economic interests of both
the United Mine Workers of America and the major coal operators have
become increasingly similar.
The union claimed publicly that its cooperation with industry
would assure a healthy future for the coal industry and would also
improve the standard of living for the miners who remained employed
in the mechanized operations. The latter objective is specifically
examined in Chapters IV and V.
Chapter IV examined wages and earnings in the coal fields since
1950.

Usually wage rates are compared on an hourly or weekly basis

either with previous years, other industries, or productivity guidelines.

In coal mining, such comparisons are misleading due to the

variation in annual working days in the coal industry.

Comparing

annual earnings with the motor vehicle and steel industries, it was
found that bituminous coal miners generally obtain lower annual
earnings than workers in the other two industries, and,in addition,
the gap was widening.

Comparing annual earning increases in bitumin-

ous coal mining to increases that would be justified by the noninflationary national productivity standards recommended by the
President's Council of Economic Advisers, it was found that earnings
rose annually at a rate below national and industry productivity
increases. Annual earnings in both the motor vehicle and steel
industries were noticeably closer to national and respective industry
productivity movements.

The findings presented in Chapter IV confirm

the hypothesis that the average annual earnings of coal miners have
increased at a slower rate than the average annual earnings of workers
in the benchmark steel and motor vehicle industries since the advent
of mechanization in the United States bituminous coal mines.
Chapter V examined health and safety in the coal mining industry
since 1946.

The era of mechanization that began in the late 1940s

and diffused rapidly throughout the coal fields was not accompanied
by tough health and safety requirements until 1969.

The union showed

little interest in enforcing safety in union mines, as permitted by
the incorporation of the Federal Mine Safety Code in all contracts
negotiated since 1946.

In addition, the union joined industry to

form the National Coal Policy Conference, which lobbied on Capitol
Hill against legislation that would interfere with coal's competitive
relationship with other energy fuels.

Thus, successful efforts to

obtain rigid coal mine health and safety requirements were often the
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result of public and rank-and-file outrage after serious coal mine
tragedies.
The coal industry has lagged behind other industries in protecting its workers due to the coal industry priorities of competing with
other fuels, the meager amounts of money allocated by the industry
to safety research and development, the lack of enforcement from the
union and government agencies, and the lack of government legislation.
Problems such as roof falls at or near the working face of the coal
seam and accidents resulting from the operation of fast-moving
machinery in poorly lighted areas have been known for decades.

These

are the reasons that underground coal mining has an annual accident
severity rate that averages seven times as high as in the steel
industry and nineteen times as high as in the motor vehicle industry.
The accident frequency rate in underground coal mining is nine times
that in the steel industry and nineteen times that in the motor
vehicle industry.

Since 1950, the number of fatalities per 1,000 men

working and fatalities per million man-hours worked have not shown a
downward trend.

These findings confirm the hypothesis that the advent

of mechanization was not accompanied by an improved worker safety
record in the mines.
Union officials have recently admitted that they had no idea
mechanization side-effects would cause such serious health problems
to the coal miners.

A major health problem is pneumoconiosis, or

Black Lung, caused by the continual inhalation of fine coal dust
particles produced by underground cutting machines such as the
continuous miner.

Pneumoconiosis is now recognized as a serious
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occupational disease in United States coal fields, decades after
detection and preventive measures were introduced in Europe.

Rank-

and-file efforts to obtain compensation for pneumoconiosis from
federal and state agencies were recently successful without initial
union concern or interest.

Doctors knowledgeable in the study of

pneumoconiosis fear that the incident rate of Black Lung has yet to
peak, as those miners who entered the mines in the 1950s and therefore spent their entire careers in highly mechanized mines are just
beginning to notice the effects of the cumulative deposits of dust
in their lungs.

Other latent effects of mechanization include spine

and back problems and hearing loss.

The evidence presented in

Chapter V confirms the hypothesis that conditions adversely affecting
the health of working coal miners have occurred since the advent of
massive mechanization in the underground bituminous coal mines.
The union negotiated the Welfare and Retirement Fund in 1946,
and the Fund became the union's primary means of handling the effects
of mechanization in the coal industry.

The Fund established a

retirement program which never succeeded in providing a cushion for
the miner displacement that resulted from advancing productivity and
rising wage scales. Also, the Fund established an excellent program
that provided medical service and hospital care for miners and their
families.

However, eligibility restrictions, a reduction in benefits,

the fact that the royalty per ton that financed the Fund remained the
same from 1952 to 1971, and a conspiracy among the Fund's trustees,
the National Bank of Washington and the union against the beneficiaries of the Fund contributed to the decreasing effectiveness of the

program to those employed in the industry.

In 1952, total retirement

payments received by coal miners were 48 per cent higher than the
amounts received by workers in the motor vehicle and steel industries,
and the Fund's medical and hospitalization program was the best
available in the three industries.

By 1967, retirement payments in

bituminous coal mining were 20 per cent below those obtained in the
motor vehicle industry and 12 per cent below those obtained in the
steel industry.

In addition, the hospitalization and medical programs

in the other two industries had advanced significantly, while the
programs of the Welfare and Retirement Fund basically remained
unaltered.

The findings confirm the hypothesis that benefits availa-

ble from the United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund have
increased at a slower rate than benefits available to union employees
in the benchmark steel and motor vehicle industries since the advent
of mechanization in the United States bituminous coal mines.
The question that remains is whether miners obtained any benefits
from the Mechanization Agreement and its later amendments. The evidence
suggests that they did not, due in part to the lack of union interest
or ability to obtain the benefits and in part to the union's miscalculation of the immense social costs that would result from the mechanization and resulting worker displacement.

Further research and

study is needed to calculate the various social costs, since many can
be easily identified.

Major social costs of the Mechanization Agree-

ment include the effect of mechanization on the health of miners;
the widely dispersed technological unemployment that transferred a
cost burden to society in the form of relief, lack of purchasing

power, and occupational retraining;

the increase of influence by

coal companies which were aided in their concentrated growth by the
union;

and the expensive efforts to attract employment opportunities

to areas with a labor surplus.
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A

NATIONAL BITUMINOUS COAL WAGE AGREEMENT OF 1950
Effective March 5, 1950, to June 30, 1952
Executed at Washington, D . C , March 5, 1950

THIS AGREEMENT, made this 5th day of March, 1950, by and between
the coal operators and associations signatory hereto hereinafter
referred to as Operators, parties of the first part, and the International Union, United Mine Workers of America, hereinafter referred to
as Mine Workers, on behalf of each member thereof, party of the
second part, covering all of the bituminous coal mines owned or
operated by said first parties, amends, modifies and supplements
previous agreements as herein provided. This Agreement (subject to
the amendments, modifications and supplements as hereinafter provided)
carries forward and preserves the terms and conditions of the Appalachian Joint Wage Agreement (dated June 19, 1941) effective April 1,
1941, to March 31, 1943, the Supplemental Six Day Work Week Agreement,
the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement (dated April 11, 1945)
effective April 1, 1945, and all the various District Agreements
executed between the United Mine Workers of America and the various
Operators and Coal Associations (based upon the aforesaid basic
agreements) as they existed on March 31, 1946, subject to the terms
and conditions of this Agreement and as amended, modified and supplemented by this Agreement as herein set out.
WITNESSETH: It is agreed that this contract is for the exclusive
joint use and benefit of the contracting parties, as defined and set
forth in this Agreement. It is agreed that the United Mine Workers
of America is recognized herein as the exclusive bargaining agency
representing the employees of the parties of the first part. It is
further agreed that as a condition of employment all employees shall
be, or become, members of the United Mine Workers of America, to the
extent and in the manner permitted by law, except in those exempted
classifications of employment as hereinafter provided in this agreement. The Mine Workers intend no intrusion upon the rights of management as heretofore practiced and understood. It is the intent and
purpose of the parties hereto that this agreement will promote and
improve industrial and economic relationship in the bituminous coal
industry and to set forth herein the basic agreements covering rates
of pay, hours of work and conditions of employment to be observed
between the parties, and shall cover the employment of persons
employed in the bituminous coal mines covered by this Agreement.
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EXEMPTIONS UNDER THIS AGREEMENT
It is the intention of this Agreement to reserve to management
and except from this Agreement an adequate force of supervisory
employees to effectively conduct the safe and efficient operation of
the mines and at the same time, to provide against the abuse of such
exemptions by excepting more such employees than are reaonably
required for that purpose.
Coal Inspectors and Weigh Bosses at mines where men are paid by
the ton, Watchmen, Clerks, Engineering and Technical forces of the
operator, working at or from a District or local mine office, are
exempt from this agreement.
All other employees working in or about the mines shall be included in this Agreement except essential supervisors in fact such as:
Mine Foremen, Assistant Mine Foremen who, in the usual performance
of their duties, may make examinations for gas as prescribed by law,
and such other supervisors as are in charge of any class of labor
inside or outside of the mines and who perform no production work.
The Union will not seek to organize or ask recognition for such
excepted supervisor employees during the life of this contract.
The Operators shall not use this provision to exempt from the
provisions of this Agreement as supervisors, more men than are
necessary for the safe and efficient operation of the mine, taking
into consideration the area covered by the workings, roof conditions,
drainage conditions, explosion hazards, and the ability of supervisors,
due to thickness of the seam, to make the essential number of visits
to the working faces as required by law and safety regulations.
Disputes arising under this section shall be referred to a Joint
Board of Review consisting of two representatives of the Union and
two representatives of the Operators whose decision shall be final
and binding on the parties.

MINE SAFETY PROGRAM
(a) Mine Safety Code
The Federal Mine Safety Code for bituminous coal and lignite
mines of the United States, adopted pursuant to an agreement dated
May 29, 1946, between the Secretary of the Interior and the President
of the United Mine Workers of America and promulgated July 24, 1946,
is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference in this contract as
a code for health and safety in bituminous and lignite mines of the
parties of the first part, with the following exceptions and alterations:

(1) The opening paragraph beginning with the words "pursuant' to"
and ending with the words "Executive Order" is stricken out.
(2) The words "Coal Mines Administrator" are stricken out
wherever they appear.
(3) Sections 5 (a) and 5 (b) of Article XII and all of Article
XIV are stricken out.
(4) References in the Code to its effective date shall be deemed
to refer to the effective date of this contract.
(b) Enforcement
(1) Reports of the Federal Coal Mines Inspectors: Wherever
Inspectors of the Federal Bureau of Mines, in making their inspections
in accordance with authority as provided in Public Law 49, 79th
Congress, find that there are violations of this Code and make
recommendations for the elimination of such non-compliance, the
Operators shall promptly comply with such recommendations, except as
modified in paragraph two of this subdivision (b).
(2) Whenever either party to the contract feels that compliance
with the recommendations of the Federal Mine Inspectors as provided
above would cause irreparable damage or great injustice, they may
appeal such recommendation to the Joint Board of Review as hereinafter
provided.
(c) Review and Revision
In order to carry out the intent and purposes of the agreement
affecting the Mine Safety Code, it is agreed that from time to time
joint consultations shall be had with the U.S. Bureau of Mines looking toward review and appropriate revision of the Mine Safety Code.
(d) Joint Industry Safety Committee
There is hereby established under this Agreement a Joint Industry
Safety Committee composed of four members, two of whom will be
appointed by the Mine Workers and two of whom will be appointed by the
Operators, whose duty it shall be to (1) arbitrate any appeal which
is filed with it by any Operator or any Mine Worker who feels that
any reported violations of the Code and recommendation of compliance
by a Federal Coal Mine Inspector has not been justly reported or that
the action required of him to correct the violation would subject him
to irreparable damage or great injustice; and (2) to consult with
the U.S. Bureau of Mines in accordance with the provisions of Section
(c) above.
(e) Mine Safety Committee
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At each mine there shall be a Mine Safety Committee selected by
the Local Union. The Committee Members while engaged in the performance of their duties shall be paid by the Union, but shall be deemed
to be acting within the scope of their employment in the mine within
the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the state where such
duties are performed.
The Mine Safety Committee may inspect any mine development or
equipment used in producing coal. If the Committee believes conditions found endanger the life and bodies of the mine workers, it shall
report its findings and recommendations to the management. In those
special instances where the Committee believes an immediate danger
exists and the Committee recommends that the management remove all
mine workers from the unsafe area, the Operator is required to follow
the recommendation of the Committee.
If the Safety Committee in closing down an unsafe area acts
arbitrarily and capriciously, members of such Committee may be
removed from the Committee. Grievances that may arise as a result of
a request for removal of a member of the Safety Committee under this
section shall be handled in accordance with the provisions providing
for settlement of disputes.
The Safety Committee and Operators shall maintain such records
concerning inspections, findings, recommendations, and actions relating to this provision of the Agreement as may be required, and copies
of all reports made by the Safety Committee shall be filed with the
Operators.
(f) The International Union, United Mine Workers of America,
may designate memorial periods not exceeding a total of 5 days in the
period ending April 1st, 1951, and not to exceed a total of 5 days
in the period from April 1, 1951 to June 30th, 1952, provided it shall
give proper notice to each district.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
Each Operator who is a party to this Agreement will provide the
protection and coverage of the benefits under Workmen's Compensation
and Occupational Disease Laws, whether compulsory or elective, existing in the states in which the respective employees are employed.
Refusal of any Operator to carry out this direction shall be deemed
a violation of this Agreement. Notice of Compliance with this section
shall be posted at the mine.

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA WELFARE AND RETIREMENT FUND
OF 1950
A.

It is hereby stipulated and agreed by the contracting parties
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hereto that there is hereby created a Fund to be designated and known
as the "United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund of
1950." During the life of this Agreement, there shall be paid into
such Fund by each operator signatory hereto the sum of thirty cents
(30c) per ton of two thousand (2,000) pounds on each ton of coal
produced for use or for sale. Such Fund shall have its place of
business in Washingtnn, District of Columbia, and it shall be operated
by a Board of Trustees, one of whom shall be appointed as a representative of the Employers, one of whom shall be appointed as a representative of the United Mine Workers of America and one of whom shall be
a neutral party, selected by the other two. In the event of resignation, death, inability or unwillingness to serve of the Trustee
appointed by the Operators or the Trustee appointed by the United Mine
Workers of America, the Operators shall appoint the successor of the
Trustee originally appointed by them and the United Mine Workers of
America shall appoint the successor of the Trustee originally appointed by it.
The Operators signatory hereto do hereby appoint Charles A. Owen,
of New York City, as their representative on said Board of Trustees.
The United Mine Workers of America do hereby appoint John L. Lewis,
of Washington, D . C , as its representative on said Board of Trustees.
It is further stipulated and agreed by the joint contracting parties
that Josephine Roche, of Denver, Colorado is appointed as the neutral
Trustee. Said three Trustees so named and designated shall constitute
the Board of Trustees to administer the Fund herein created.
In the event of a deadlock on the designation or agreement as to
any future netrual Trustee, an impartial umpire shall be selected
either by agreement of the two Trustees, representatives of the contracting parties hereto, or by petition by either of the contracting
parties hereto to:the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia for the appointment of such an impartial umpire; All as
made and provided in Section 302 (c) of the "Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947."
It is agreed by the contracting parties hereto that the Trustees
herein provided for shall serve for the duracion of this contract and
as long thereafter as the proper continuation and administration of
said trust shall require.
It is agreed that this Fund is an irrevocable trust created
pursuant to Section 302 (c) of the "Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947," and shall endure as long as the purposes for its creation
shall exist. Said purposes shall be to make payments from principal
or income or both, of (1) benefits to employees of said Operators,
their families and dependents for medical or hospital care, pensions,
on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or
illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide
any of the foregoing, or life insurance, disability and sickness
insurance or accident insurance; (2) benefits with respect to wage

loss not otherwise compensated for at all or adequately by tax
supported agencies created by federal or State law; (3) benefits on
account of sickness, temporary disability, permanent disability, death
or retirement; (4) benefits for any and all other purposes which may
be specified, provided for or permitted in Section 302 (c) of the
"Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947," as agreed upon from time to
time by the Trustees including the making of any or all of the foregoing benefits applicable to the individual members of the United
Mine Workers of America and their families and dependents, and to
employees of the Operators other than those exempted from this Agreement; and (5) benefits for all other related welfare purposes as may
be determined by the Trustees within the scope of the provisions of
the aforesaid "Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947." Subject to the
stated purposes of this Fund, the Trustees shall have full authority,
within the terms and provisions of the "Labor-Management Relations
Act, 1947," and other applicable law, with respect to questions of
coverage and eligibility, priorities among classes of benefits,
amounts of benefits, methods of providing or arranging for provisions
for benefits, investment of trust funds, and all other related matters.
The aforesaid Trustees shall designate a portion (which may be
changed from time to time) of the payments herein provided, based
upon proper actuarial computations, as a separate fund to be administered by the said Trustees herein described and to be used for
providing for pensions or annuities for the members of the United
Mine Workers of America or their families or dependents and such other
persons as may be properly included as beneficiaries thereunder.
It is further agreed that the detailed basis upon which payments
from the Fund will be made shall be resolved in writing by the aforesaid Trustees at their initial meeting, or at the earliest practicable
date that may by them thereafter be agreed upon.
Title to all the moneys paid into and or due and owing said Fund
shall be vested in and remain exclusively in the Trustees of the Fund,
and it is the intention of the parties hereto that said Fund shall
constitute an irrevocable trust and that no benefits or moneys payable
from this Fund shall be subject in any manner to anticipation, alienation, sale, transfer, assignment, pledge, encumbrance or charge, and
any attempt so to anticipate, alienate, sell, transfer, assign, pledge,
encumber or charge the same shall be void. The moneys to be paid into
said Fund shall not constitute or be deemed wages due to the individual mine worker, nor shall said moneys in any manner be liable for
or subject to the debts, contracts, liabilities or torts of the parties entitled to such money, i.e., the beneficiaries of said Trust
under the terms of this Agreement.
The obligation
America Welfare and
become effective on
to be made on April

to make payments to the "United Mine Workers
Retirement Fund of 1950) under this contract
March 6, 1950, and the first actual payments
10, 1950, and thereafter continuously on the

of
shall
are
10th

day of each succeeding calendar month covering the production of all
coal for use or sale during the preceding month.
It is stipulated and agreed by the contracting parties hereto
that the Trustee designated by the United Mine Workers of America
shall be the Chairman of the Trustees of the Fund provided for in
this Agreement.
It shall be the duty of the Operators signatory hereto, and each
of them, to keep said payments due said Fund, as hereinabove described
and provided for, current and to furnish to the United Mine Workers
of America and to the Trustees hereinabove designated a monthly statement showing the full amount due hereunder for all coal produced for
use or for sale from each of the several individual mines owned or
operated by the said Operators signatory hereto. Payments to said
Fund shall be made by check payable to "United Mine Workers of America
Welfare and Retirement Fund of 1950" and shall be delivered or mailed
to the office of said Fund located at 907 Fifteenth Street, N.W.,
Washington,D.C., or as otherwise designated by the Trustees.
It is stipulated and agreed by the contracting parties hereto
that an annual audit of the Fund hereinabove described sh,
be made
by competent authorities to be designated by the Trustee
: said
Fund. A statement of the results of such audit shall '
.ie available for inspection of interested persons at the prin<- .j. office of
the Trust Fund and at such other places as may be designated by the
Trustees.
Failure of any Operator signatory hereto to make full and prompt
payments to the "United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement
Fund of 1950" in the manner and on the dates herein provided shall, at
the option of the United Mine Workers of America, be deemed a violation of this Agreement. This obligation of each Operator signatory
hereto, which is several and not joint, to so pay such sum* shall be
a direct and continuing obligation of said Operator during the life
of this Agreement and it shall be deemed a violation of this Agreement
if any mine to which this Agreement is applicable shall be sold,
leased, sub-leased, assigned, or otherwise disposed of for the purpose
of avoiding the obligation hereunder.
Action which may be required hereunder by the Operators for the
appointment of a successor Trustee representing them, or which may be
required in connection with any other matter hereunder, may be taken
by those Operators who at the time are parties hereto, and authorization, approval, or ratification of Operators representing fifty-one
percent (51%) or more of the coal produced for use or sale during the
calendar year previous to that in which the action is taken shall be
sufficient and shall bind all Operators.
B. It is hereby stipulated and agreed by the contracting
parties with respect to the Fund created by the National Bituminous

Coal Wage Agreement of 1947:
(1) The Operators signatory hereto agree to make payments
into said Fund on or before March 15, 1950, on account of all
coal produced for use or sale up to and including March 6,
1950, with respect to which payment has not heretofore been
made, such payments to be on the basis heretofore made by
said Operators under the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1947 and the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
of 1948, whichever is applicable.
(2) The Operators signatory hereto hereby renounce and
forever release any and all claim to or interest in payments
made into the said 1947 fund.
(3) The Trustees appointed pursuant to this Agreement are
hereby authorized and directed to accept into the new trust
fund hereby created and to devote for the purposes hereinabove
specified and enumerated, any and all trust funds remaining
unexpended or unobligated in said 1947 trust fund.
(4) The parties hereto agree that the best interest of the
beneficiaries of said trust fund would be served by having all
unexpended or unobligated funds therein transferred as above
provided, and agree that the Trustees thereof should transfer
such funds to the new trust fund created by this Agreement.
C. It is stipulated, understood and agreed by the contracting
parties hereto that the present practices with respect to wage deductions and their use for provision of medical, hospital and related
services shall continue during the terms of this contract or until
such earlier date or dates as may be agreed upon by the United Mine
Workers of America and any Operator signatory hereto.
D. It is the intent and purpose of the contracting parties hereto that full cooperation shall by each of them be given to each other,
the Trustees named under this Section and to all affected Mine Workers
to the eventual coordination and development of policies and working
agreements necessary or advisable for the effective operation of this
Fund.

WAGES AND HOURS
1. (a) For all inside employees a work day of eight hours from
portal to portal is established, including a staggered thirty minutes
for lunch, and without any intermission or suspension of operation
throughout the day.
For inside day workers these eight hours shall
be paid for at straight time rate. Overtime beyond eight hours per
day and forty hours per week shall be paid for at time and one-half
with no pyramiding of overtime. Straight time rates for inside day

workers shall be the total daily normal shift earnings for eight hours
divided by eight (8) hours.
(b) For all outside employees except those covered in paragraph (c) hereof (including all strip mine and coke oven employees),
a work day of seven hours and fifteen minutes is established including a staggered thirty minutes for lunch, and without any intermission
or suspension of operations throughout the day. These seven hours
and fifteen minutes shall be paid for at straight time rate. Overtime
beyond seven hours and fifteen minutes per day and thirty-six and
one-quarter hours per week shall be paid for at time and one-half
with no pyramiding of overtime. Straight time earnings for outside
day workers covered by this paragraph shall be the total daily normal
shift earnings for seven hours and fifteen minutes divided by seven
and one-quarter (7.25) hours.
(c) For all outside continuous employees who are engaged at
power houses, sub-stations and pumps operating continuously for
twenty-four (24) hours daily, and hoisting engineers, a work day of
eight hours is established, including a staggered thirty minutes for
lunch and without any intermission or suspension of operations throughout the day. These eight hours shall be paid for at straight time
rate. Overtime beyond eight hours per day and forty hours per week
shall be paid for at time and one-half with no pyramiding of overtime.
Straight time earnings for day workers covered by this paragraph shall
be the total daily normal shift earnings for eight hours divided by
(8) hours.
(d) All mine workers, whether employed by the month, day, or
tonnage, yardage, deadwork or footage rate, shall receive Four Dollars
and Seventy-five Cents ($4.75) per day in addition to that provided
for in the contract which expired March 31, 1946.
(e) Work performed on the sixth consecutive day is optional,
but when performed shall be paid for at time and one-half or rate and
one-half.
(f) Holidays, when worked, shall be paid for at time and onehalf or rate and one-half. Holidays shall be computed in arriving at
the sixth and seventh day in the week.
(g) iiinployees paid by the day or by the ton who start tu work,
that day shall be counted as a day's work in computing the sixth and
seventh day in the week provided they do not leave their employment
when work is available for them.
(h) Rockdusting shall be done at the expense of the coal
operator.

VACATION PAYMENT

An annual vacation period shall be the rule of the industry.
From Saturday, July 1, 1950, to Monday, July 10, 1950, inclusive, and
from Saturday, June 30, 1951, to Monday, July 9, 1951, inclusive, and
from Saturday June 28, 1952, to Monday July 7, 1952, inclusive, shall
be vacation periods during which coal production shall cease. Day men
required to work during this period at coke plants and other necessarily continuous operations or on emergency or repair work shall have
vacations of the same duration at other agreed periods.
All employees with a record of one year's standing (June 1, 1949,
to May 31, 1950, and June 1, 1950, to May 31, 1951, and June 1, 1951,
to May 31, 1952, respectively) shall receive as compensation for each
of the above-mentioned vacation periods the sum of One Hundred Dollars
($100), with the following exception: Employees who entered the armed
services prior to March 31, 1948, and who return to their jobs from
the armed services during the qualifying period shall receive the $100
vacation payment.
All the terms and provisions of district agreements relating to
vacation pay for sick and injured employees are carried forward to this
Agreement and payments are to be made in the sum as provided herein.
Pro rata payments for the months they are on the payroll shall be
provided for those mine workers who are given employment during the
qualifying period and those who leave their employment.
The vacation payment for each vacation period shall be made on
the last pay day occurring in the month of June of that year.
Failure of any Operator signatory hereto to make full and prompt
payments of the amounts required hereby, in the manner and on the dates
herein provided, shall, at the option of the United Mine Workers of
America, be deemed a violation of this Agreement. This obligation of
each Operator signatory hereto, which is several and not joint, to so
pay such sums, shall be a direct and continuing obligation of said
Operator during the life of this Agreement; and it shall be deemed a
violation of this Agreement if any time, to which this Agreement is
applicable, shall be sold, leased, sub-leased, assigned, or otherwise
disposed of for the purpose of avoiding the obligation hereunder.

CHECKOFF
The membership dues, including initiation fees, and assessments
of the United Mine Workers of America and its various subdivisions, as
authorized and approved by the International Union, United Mine Workers
of America, shall be checked off the wages of the employees by the
Operators covered by this contract and shall be remitted by the Operators to the properly designated officers of the Mine Workers for distribution to its various branches. Such remittances shall be accompanied by an itemized statement showing the name of each employee and the

amount checked off for dues, initiation fees and assessments together
with a list of employees from whom dues, initiation fees and assessments have not been collected.
In order that this section may become effective and operate within
the limitations of the "Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947" the Mine
Workers hereby agree to furnish, with all reasonable dispatch to the
respective Operators, and the Operators agree to aid, assist and
cooperate in obtaining written assignments from each employee so
employed. Upon the presentation to the Operators of such assignments
in such reasonable form as time and circumstances, looking to the
continuous and uninterrupted production of coal, may allow, said
Operators shall make deductions so authorized and deliver the same to
the designated District officer of the Mine Workers or to such authorized representative as may be designated by the Mine Workers.

DISTRICT AGREEMENTS

New Districts of the United Mine Workers of America may be
established.
This Agreement supersedes all existing and previous contracts
except as incorporated and carried forward herein by reference; and
all local agreements, rules, regulations and customs heretofore established in conflict with this Agreement are hereby abolished.
Prior practice and custom not in conflict with this Agreement may be
continued, but any provisions in District or Local Agreements providing for the levying, assessing or collecting of fines or providing
for "no strike", "indemnity" or "guarantee" clauses or provisions are
hereby expressly repealed and shall not be applicable during the term
of this Agreement. Wherever a conflict arises between this Agreement
and any District or Local Agreement, this Agreement shall prevail.
When day men are transferred to loading coal the individual affected,
if aggrieved, shall have the right of review under the settlement of
disputes procedures provided in this Agreement.
No District Contract or Agreement negotiated hereunder shall
become effective until approval of such Contract or Agreement by the
International Union, United Mine Workers of America, has been first
obtained.

SETTLEMENT OF LOCAL AND DISTRICT DISPUTES

Should differences arise between the Mine Workers and the Operators as the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement, or should differences arise about matters not specifically
mentioned in this Agreement, or should any local trouble of any kind
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arise at the mine, an earnest effort shall be made to settle such
differences immediately:
1.

Between the aggrieved party and the mine management.

2.

Through the management of the mine and the Mine Committee.

3. Through District representatives of the United Mine Workers
of America and a commissioner representative (where employed) of the
coal company.
4. By a board consisting of four members, two of whom shall
be designated by the Mine Workers and two by the Operators.
5. Should the board fail to agree the matter shall, within thirty
(30) days after decision by the board, be referred to an umpire to be
mutually agreed upon by the Operator or Operators affected and by the
duly designated representatives of the United Mine Workers of America,
and the umpire so agreed upon shall expeditiously and without delay
decide said case. The decision of the umpire shall be final. Expenses and salary incident to the services of an umpire shall be paid
equally by the Operator or Operators affected and by the Mine Workers.
A decision reached at any stage of the proceedings above outlined
shall be binding on both parties hereto and shall not be subject to
reopening by any other party or branch of either association except by
mutual agreement.

HOUSE COAL
House coal shall be sold to all employees, for their own household
use, at the cost of production, exclusive of sales and administrative
costs. Should any differences arise between the Mine Workers and the
Operator of any mine as to the price so to be charged for said coal,
such differences shall be settled under the terms of the Settlement of
Disputes section of this Agreement.

MISCELLANEOUS

1. Any and all provisions in either the Appalachian Joint Wage
Agreement of June 19, 1941, or the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of April 11, 1945, containing any "no strike" or "Penalty" clause
or clauses or any clause denominated "Illegal Suspension of Work" are
hereby rescinded, cancelled, abrogated and made null and void.
2. Any and all provisions of any contracts or agreements between
the parties hereto or some of them whether National, District, Local
or otherwise providing for a protective wage clause and a modification
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of this Agreement or said agreements if a more favorable wage agreement is entered into by the United Mine Workers of America, are hereby
rescinded, cancelled, abrogated and made null and void.
3. The contracting parties agree that, as a part of the consideration of this contract, any and all disputes, stoppages, suspensions of
work and any and all claims, demands or actions growing therefrom or
involved therein shall be by the contracting parties settled and determined exclusively by the machinery provided in the "Settlement of Local
and District Disputes" section of this Agreement; or, if national in
character, by the full use of free collective bargaining as heretofore
known and practiced in the Industry.
4. The United Mine Workers of America and the Operators signatory
hereto affirm their intention to maintain the integrity of this contract
and to exercise their best efforts through available disciplinary
measures to prevent stoppages of work by strike or lockout pending
adjustment or adjudication of disputes and grievances in the manner
provided in this agreement.

TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT

This agreement dated March 5, 1950, shall be effective as of March
5, 1950, and shall terminate June 30, 1952, PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That
either the "Parties of the First Part" or "Party of the Second Part"
may terminate this Agreement on or after April 1, 1951, by giving at
least thirty (30) days written notice to the other party of such desired
earlier termination date.
The foregoing termination provision shall not be construed to limit
or affect in any way the obligations of the parties relating to the
termination of contracts under the "Labor-Management Relations Act,1947."

NATIONAL CONFERENCES

It is hereby stipulated and agreed by all parties signatory hereto
that they, and each of them, will attend any conference or conferences
held under the terms of this Agreement and that such conference or
conferences shall be convened at Washington, District of Columbia,
unless such place of meeting is changed by mutual agreement of the
parties.

INTEGRATED INSTRUMENT
This Agreement is an integrated instrument and its respective provisions are interdependent and shall be effective from and after March
5, 1950.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the parties signatory hereto, pursuant
to proper authority, has caused this agreement to be signed by its
proper officers or representatives at Washington, D . C , on this the
5th day of March, A.D., 1950.

.UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA

By: JOHN L. LEWIS, President

THOMAS KENNEDY, Vice-President

JOHN OWENS, Secretary-Treasurer

District
District
District
District
District
District
District
District
District
District
District
District

No. 2
No. 3
No. 4
No. 5
No. 6
No. 8
No. 10
No. 11
No. 12
No. 13
No. 14
No. 15

By
By
By
By
By
By
By
By
By
By
By
By

James Mark
District No.
Frank Hughes
District No.
William Hynes
District No.
John Busarello District No.
Adolph Pacifico District No.
Thomas Rea
District No.
Sam Nicholls
District No.
Louis Austin
District No.
Hugh White
District No.
Frank D.Wilson District No.
Henry Allai
District No.
Frank Hefferly District No.

16
17
19
20
21
22
23
27
28
29
30
31

• By John T. Jones
' By William Blizzard
• By Abe Vales
• By William Mitch
• By David Fowler
• By Houston Martin
• By Ed. J. Morgan
• By W. A. Boyle
• By W. F. Minton
• By George J. Titler
- By Sam Caddy
•By Cecil J.Urbaniak

OPERATORS

Arkansas-Oklahoma Coal Operators Association
Central Pennsylvania Coal Producers Association
Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates, Coal Division
Georges Creek and Upper Potomac Coal Association
Illinois Coal Operators Association
Illinois Coal Strippers Association
Indiana Coal Operators Association
Indiana Coal Producers Association
Montana Coal Operators Association
Mason County Coal Producers Association
Northern Panhandle of West Virginia Coal Operators Association
Northern West Virginia Coal Association
Ohio Coal Association
JKetail Co?.i Producers Association of Greater Johnstown
Somerset County Coal Operators Association
Southern Ohio Coal Operators Association
Southwestern Interstate Coal Operators Association
Western Kentucky Coal Producers Association
Western Pennsylvania Coal Operators Association
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Winding Gulf Operators Association
Virginia Coal Operators Association
Alabama Commercial Coal Operators
Mary Frances Coal Company
Old La Belle Mine
American Eagle Colliery
Black Mountain Corporation
Coal Processing Corporation
Raleigh Wyoming Mining Company
Truax-Traer Coal Company (W. Va.)
West Virginia Coal and Transporting Company
The United Electric Coal Companies
Carpentertown Coal and Coke Company
The Coal Service Corporation
Davis Coal and Coke Company
Jewell Ridge Coal Corporation
Johnstown Coal and Coke Co. (Crichtdn No. 4 Mine, Nicholas Co., W.Va.)
Kelley's Creek Colliery Company
C H. Mead Coal Company
Pittsburgh Consolidated of Kentucky
The Powhatan Mining Company
The Red Parrot Coal Company
Stonega Coke and Coal
Warner C Mieries Company
West Virt iiia Coal and Coke Corporation
Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Company
Bear Coal Company
Black Diamond Coal Company
Boulder Valley Coal Company
Calumet Fuel Company
Centennial Coal Company
Champion Coal Mining Company
Clayton Coal Company
Colorado and Utah Coal Company
Colowyo Coal Company
Consolidated Coal and Coke Company
Domestic Coal Company
Edna Coal Company
Farmers Mine
Graden Coal Company
Hayden Coal Company
Huerfano Coal Company
Imperial Coal Company
Kerr Coal Company
Keystone Coal Company
Louisville-Lafayette Coal Company
Moffat Coal Company
Minnequa Coal Company
McNeill Coal Corporation
Pluto Coal Mining Company
W. E. Russell Coal Compary
Victor American Fuel Company
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St. Louis, Rocky Mountain and Pacific Company
Big Horn Colleries Company
Colony Coal Company
Rock Springs Fuel Company
Gunn Quealy Coal Company
Kemmerer Coal Company
Union Pacific Coal Company
Hi-Heat Coal Company
Independent Coal and Coke Company
Kaiser Steel Corporation
Liberty Fuel Company
Lion Coal Corporation
Peerless Coal Company, Inc.
Royal Coal Company
Spring Canyon Coal Company
Standard Coal, Inc.
United States Fuel Company
Utah Fuel Company
Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Company
Russell Fork Coal Co., Inc.
Taylor Coal Mining Company
Jones Motor Sales, Inc.
Southern Coal Producers Association
Big Sandy-Elkhorn Coal Operators Association
Greenbrier Coal Operators Association
Harlan County Coal Operators Association
Hazard Coal Operators Association
Kanawha Coal Operators Association
Logan Coal Operators Association
New River Coal Operators Association
Operators Association of the Williamson Field
Pocahontas Operators Association
Southern Appalachian Coal Operators Association
Upper Buchanan Smokeless Coal Operators Association
Jacobs Fork Pocahontas Coal Company
Marianna Smokeless Coal Company
New River and Pocahontas Consolidated Coal Company
Steel Captive Group
Armco Steel Corporation
Bethlehem Collieries Corporation
Bethlehem Collieries Corporation (W. Va.)
The Minds Coal Mining Corporation
Monroe Coal Mining Company
The Buckeye Coal Company
Olga Coal Company
The Youngstown Mines Corporation
Consumers Mining Company
Crucible Steel Company of America
H. C Frick Coke Company
Geneva Steel Company
Inland Steel Company
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Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation
Republic Steel Corporation
Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company
Standard Fire Creek Coal Company
United States Coal and Coke Company
Weirton Coal Company
Wheeling Steel Corporation
National Mines Corporation
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APPENDIX B

SEVERITY RATE COMPUTATION RESULTS FOR THE BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY
IN 1965

Location

Underground

Function

Coal Fragmentation

Severity
Rate

Cause

Falls of roof:
While mining
While moving machinery
While moving, setting up, or
operating continuous machines
All others
Falls of roof or face material
from pressure bumps or bursts
Falls of face or rib:
While mining
While moving machinery
While moving, setting up, or
operating continuous machines
All other
Other falling materials or
objects
All other
Slips or falls of persons:
On same level:
From handtools slipping or
breaking
While operating or moving
machinery
All other
From an elevation:
All other
Handtools:
Picks
Hammer or Sledges
All other
Explosives and breaking agents:
Industrial explosives
Premature shot or blast
Charging or tamping
Misfire or digging into
unexploded holes
Shot breaking through rib
or pillar
Blowout or windy shot

437.419
85.882
574.886
150.756

51.999
54.554
2.037
26.936
3.949

5.015

1.003
2.586
5.074
0.1881
1.077
3.620
2.645

0.3761
0.3605
0.8502
2.496
0.2899

(Continued)
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(Continued)

Severity
Rate

Location

Function

Cause

Underground
(Cont'd)

Coal Fragmentation

33.632
Flying fragments
Suffocation from explosives
smoke
0.0392
Caps or detonators
6.9035
4.431
Airdox
Insufficient warning or
1.442
improper blasting lines
0.1410
All other
Machinery:
72.189
While moving mining machines
Power drills (except for roof
bolting)
45.911
While setting up mining machines 46.334
While operating mining machines
75.178
While moving, setting up, or
operating continuous-mining
173.990
machines
Subtotals or average
Coal fragmentation
(1869.7)

Material
Handling

Falls of roof:
While loading
While moving machinery from
one working place to another
While moving or placing cars
in active working places
All other
Falls of face or rib:
While loading
While moving machinery from
one working place to another
While moving or placing cars
in active working places
All other
Other falling materials or
objects:
Rolling, shifting or sliding
material
Falling equipment or machinery
under repair
Rushes, rolls, or slides of
coal or rock
All other
Slips or falls of persons:
On same level:

731.190
85.882
25.177
303.797
137.427
2.037
0.1959
7.899

8.408
25.389
5.830
1.003

(Continued)
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Location

Function

Underground
(Cont'd)

Material
Handling

•

(Continued)

Severity
Rate

Cause

While operating or moving
machinery
While handling materials
All other
From an elevation
While handling materials
While operating or moving
machinery
All other
Handling materials
Props, ties or timbers
Coal
Rock or slate
Rails
Wire or wire ropes
Roof-bolting materials
Handling, moving or installing
conveyor pans
Flying particles while loading
car of coal, rock or gob
Flying particles while handling
all other material
All other
Handtools:
Shovels
All other
Haulage:
Struck, run over, or squeezed
between cars or motors:
Coupling or uncoupling
Switching, spragging,
blocking or braking
Pulling, pushing or dropping
Operating or riding
All other
Squeezed between car or motor
and rib, timber or roof:
Coupling or uncoupling
Switching, spragging,
blocking or braking
Pulling, pushing or dropping
Operating or riding
All other
(Continued)

2.351
40.868
10.148
1.316
2.022
0.3761
53.856
27.269
21.741
17.913
12.510
1.567
8.866
0.1959
2.155
82.999
0.7836
3.808

92.778
43.4426
28.362
80.099
33.107

*7.980
25.040
49.100
168.379
8.886

APPENDIX B

Location

Function

Underground
(Cont'd)

Material
Handling

(Continued)

Severity
Rate

Cause

Derailments:
Rerailing cars or motors
Collisions (cars or motors under
control)
Runways (cars or motors not
under control)
Falling, slipping or jumping
in or from cars or motors
Shuttle cars or mobile electric
trucks:
Falls of roof or face from
shuttle cars or mobile electric
trucks knocking out support
Struck or run over
Squeezed between shuttle car
or mobile electric trucks and
roof, rib, machine, etc.
All other
Miscellaneous haulage:
Coupling or uncoupling (cars
not moving)
Ropes or cables on haulage
Slips or strains from pulling,
pushing or dropping car by
hand
Riding or getting on or off
conveyor belts
Flying particles on haulage
Falls of roof or face from cars
or motors knocking out support
All other
Machinery
Belt conveyors
Chain, bucket or shaker conveyors
loading machines (including selfloading heads)
While moving loading machines or
self-loading heads
Scraper conveyors
While moving any machines except
mining and loading machines
Flying particles set in motion by
machinery (except roof-bolting
equipment)

28.033
59.028
90.548
153.734
56.321

24.448
32.970

300.033
38.177

3.056
24.201

4.075
8.776
0.8776
25.138
11.989
56.372
10.473
39.164
9.654
1.704
65.963

(Continued)
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Location

Function

Underground
(Cont'd)

Material
Handling

Ground
Control

(Continued)

Severity
Rate

Cause

Flying particles set in
motion by roof bolting
equipment
Falls of roof or face from
machinery knocking out
support
All other

71.777
13.541

Subtotal or average, material
handling

(3334.7)

0.8776

Falls of roof:
While testing or taking down
157.033
roof
While setting or pulling
577.542
timber or props
While preparing or installing
109.754
roof bolts
150.756
All other
Falls of face or rib:
While testing or taking down
roof
0.3291
While setting or pulling
timbers or props
52.8771
While preparing or installing
8.110
roof bolts
All other
3.949
Other falling materials or objects *
Props or timbers
6.747
Objects dropped or throw by coworker
1.128
All other
0.5015
Slips or falls of persons:
On the same level:
From handtools slipping or
2.006
breaking
All other
5.074
From an elevation:
Due to failure of scaffolds,
ladders, etc.
2.112
All other
0.1181
Handtools:
Axes, hatchets or adzes
0.8933
Crowbars or bars
3.597
(Continued)

APPENDIX B

Location

Underground
(Cont'd)

Function

Ground
Control

Environmental
Control

(Continued)

Severity
Rate

Cause

Saws
Hand wrenches or other tools
used to install roof bolts
All tools in hands of fellow
workers
Flying particles from handtools or objects worked on
All others
Machinery:
Power drills for installing
roof bolts
Power equipment (except drills)
for installing roof bolts
Subtotal or average, ground
control
Inrush of water and material
Slips or falls of persons:
On the same level:
While escaping another hazard
• From an elevation:
While escaping another hazard
Stepping or kneeling on sharp or
loose objects:
Stepping on nails or other sharp
objects
Stepping on loose objects
Knee or hand injuries while
working on all fours
Striking or bumping against
objects
Explosions of gas or coal dust:
Open lights
Matches, igniters or smoking
Electric arc
Defective flame safety lamp
All other
Suffocation (no flames or smoldering) :
From natural mine gases
From foreign gases (gasoline
fumes, etc.)
Mine fires and suffocation from
fires:

2.030
0.3840
3.064
24.382
1.269

41.617
16.220
(1171.6)
47.016

3.362
0.2272

0.7052
12.663
7.385
3.875
0.0549
117.751
236.203
0.0940
1.755

0.1254
0.0313

(Continued)
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Location

Function

Underground
(Cont'd)

Environmental
Control

Shaft and
Slope

(Continued)

Severity
Rate

Cause

Mine fires: initiated by
electricity
Other fires
Belt conveyors
Equipment or material
Burning or exploding oil,
gasoline, etc.
Miscellaneous causes:
Flying particles from draft
or wind
Acetylene or electric
welding,(burns,flashes,
or flying particles)
Irritations or burns from
battery fluid or corrosive
materials
Burns from controlled fires
All other
Subtotal or average, environmental control

211.571
0.0118
48.379
0.0940

0.0039

1.136

1.904
0.1019
4.760
(699.2)

Support
Systems

Slips or falls of persons:
On same level:
0.3526
Caused by electric current
Electricity (including sparks or
flashes:
Trolley wire or pole
23.970
Transformers, generators, etc, 0.0940
Permanent or semipermanent
power or lighting circuits
23.978
Locomotives cr shuttle cars
25.451
1.042
Mining or loading machines
Cutout switches or junction
boxes
2.030
Cables on mobile or portable
machinery and haulage
equipment
8.404
All other
24.487
Subtotal or average, support
systems
(109.8)

Coal Fragmentation

Falls of roof:
Slips or falls of persons:
On same level:
All other

0.5955

(Continued)
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(Continued)

Severity
Rate

Location

Function

Shaft and
Slope
(Cont'd)

Coal Fragmentation

Subtotal or average coal fragmentation

Material
Handling

Falls of roof:
While moving or placing cars
in active working places
All other
Slips or falls of persons:
On same level:
While handling materials
While operating or moving
machinery
All other
From an elevation:
While handling materials
All other
Handling materials:
Props, ties, or timbers
Rock or slate
All other
Haulage:
Squeezed between cars or motors
and rib, timber, or roof:
Operating or riding
Collisions (cars or motors
under control)
Runways (cars or motors not
under control)
Falling, slipping, or jumping
in or from cars or motors
Miscellaneous haulage: Ropes or
cables on haulage
Other falling materials or
objects:
Falling cages
Subtotal or average, material
handling

•-

Ground
Control

Cause

Falls of roof:
While setting or pulling
timbers or props
Falls of face or rib:
Slips or falls of persons:

(0.6)

1.175
0.0235

0.1332
0.0118
1.7866
0.2390
0.1763
0.1410
0.0157
0.4545

0.0470
0.1959
0.6269
0.0784
0.1175

47.0158
(52.2)

0.5642
0.0039

(Continued)
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Location

Shaft and
Slope
(Cont'd)

Function

Ground
Control

Environmental
Control

Surface

Coal Fragmentation

Material
Handling

B

(Continued)

Severity
Rate

Cause

Slips or falls of persons:
On same level:
All other
Handtools:
Crowbars or bars
All other
Subtotal or average, ground
control
Slips or falls of persons:
From an elevation:
Falls of persons down shaft
or slope
Stepping or kneeling on sharp or
loose objects:
Stepping on nails or other
sharp object
Stepping on loose objects
Explosions of gas or coal dust:
Electric arc
Machinery
Miscellaneous causes: Flying
particles from draft or wind
Subtotal or average

Explosives and breaking agents:
Caps or detonators
Machinery:
Power drills

Falls of coal or overburden:
While moving machinery from
one working place to another
All other
Other falling materials or
objects:
Props and timbers
Rolling, shifting, or sliding
materials
Falling equipment or machinery
under repair
Rushes, rolls, or slides of
coal or rock

0.5955
0.2508
0.0313
(1.4)

23.8213

0,0235
0.0940
94.0316
0.0039
0.0039
(118.0)

0.1881
0.7836
(1.0)

0.1528
0.1959

0.0940
1.6456
23.5549
0.0627

(Continued)
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Location

Function

Surface

Material
Handling

(Continued)

Severity
Rate

Cause

All other
Slips or falls of persons:
On same level:
While handling materials
From handtools slipping or
breaking
While operating or moving
machinery
All other
From an elevation:
While handling materials
While operating or moving
machinery
All other
Handling materials:
Props, ties, or lumber
Coal
Rock or slate
Rails
Wire or wire ropes
Roof-bolting materials
Flying particles from handling materials
All other
Haulage:
Mine-gage haulage:
Struck, run over, or
squeezed between rail
equipment:
Coupling or uncoupling
Switching, spragging,
blocking or breaking
Pulling, pushing, or
dropping
Operating or riding
All other
Squeezed between rail equipment and construction:
Coupling or uncoupling
Operating or riding
All others
Derailments
Rerailing cars or motors
Collisions(cars or motors
under control)

0.5681

5.5675
0.0274
1.2342
3.385
5.7359
0.5642
24.5658
5.0542
2.5232
0.6582
1.6926
0.6034
0.2664
0.4467
27.9587

6.4764
0.7836
1.6456
3.2441
2.1549

0.5015
0.1881
0.3526
23.7508
0.7993
0.8463

(Continued)
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Location
Surface
(Cont'd)

Function
Material
Handling

(Continued)

Cause

Severity
Rate

Runaways(cars or motors
2.3508
not under control)
Falling, slipping, or
jumping in or from rail
equipment
3.8435
Coupling or uncoupling
(cars not moving)
0.0313
1.8806
Ropes or cables on haulage
Slips or strains from
pushing, pulling or dropping cars by hand
0.9677
Riding or getting on or off
0.2272
conveyor belts
0.0940
Flying particles on haulage
1.4105
All other
Shuttle cars or mobile electric
trucks:
0.0862
Struck or run over
Squeezed between shuttle car
or mobile electric trucks
0.2116
and roof, rib, machine, etc.
1.1284
All other
135.8286
Standard-gage haulage(railway)
Trucks, tractors, automobiles,
54.8753
etc.
0.5250
Water transportation
Machinery:
Belt conveyors
60.9168
Chain, bucket, or shaker
conveyors
27.3514
Power shovels, draglines,
3.4988
bulldozers, etc.
Stationary surface machinery
26.1643
While moving any machine
except mining and loading
71.8558
machines
Flying particles set in motion
by machinery
0.7405
Machines on surface for repair,
etc.
0.4114
9.2190
All other
(550.9)

(Continued)
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Location

Surface
(Cont'd)

Function

Environmental
Control

Support
Systems

(Continued)

Severity
Rate

Cause

Slips or falls of persons:
From an elevation:
While escaping another
hazard
Stepping or kneeling on sharp
or loose objects:
Stepping on nails or other
sharp objects
Stepping on loose objects
Knee or hand injuries while
working on all fours
Explosions of gas or coal dust:
Mine fires and suffocation
from fires:
Equipment or material
Burning or exploding oil,
gasoline, etc.
Miscellaneous causes:
Flying particles from draft
or wind
Acetylene or electric welding(burns,flashes, or
flying particles)
Irritations or burns from
battery fluid or corrosive
materials
Burns from controlled fires
All other

Slips or falls of persons:
From an elevation:
Due to failure of scaffolds,
ladders, etc.
Handtools:
Picks
Axes, hatchets, or adzes
Hammers or sledges
Crowbars or bars
Shovels
Saws
All tools in hands of fellow
workers
Flying particles from handtools or objects worked on

0.1567

0.0627
1.A810
0.1410
1.0970

0.1019
0.3056

0.0078

32.9111

0.6269
23.6842
8.5255
(69.2)

0.6582
0.0313
0.4153
0.6269
1.6456
0.3174
0.0078
0.2116
0.8463

(Continued)
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Location
Surface
(Cont'd)

SOURCE:

Function
Support
Systems

(Continued)

Cause
All other
Electricity (including sparks or
flashes)
Trolley wire or pole
Transformers, generators, etc.
Permanent or semipermanent
power or light circuits
Cutout switches or junction
boxes
Cable on mobile or portable
machinery and haulage
equipment
All other

Severity
Rate
1.3321

0.0274
0.5995
47.4389
0.4388

0.0823
0.1097
(54.8)

TRW Systems Group, Underground Coal Mining in the U.S.,
U. S. Bureau of Mines Open File Report 10-70 (Washington,
D. C., June 1970), pp. D-2 to D-8.

EARNINGS, HEALTH, SAFETY, AND WELFARE OF BITUMINOUS
COAL MINERS SINCE THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF MECHANIZATION BY
THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA

John Peter David

ABSTRACT
The United Mine Workers of America began encouraging mechanization and concentration in the coal mining industry immediately after
the end of World War II.

The coal industry was in danger of losing

primary markets, such as home heating and the railroads, and in order
to obtain new markets, a competitive relationship with other basic
fuels had to be assured.

The various actions that the union encourag-

ed were a restructuring of the industry so as to create more efficient
and concentrated production units;

higher wage rates and mine mecha-

nization so as to assist the industry in obtaining greater volume at
lower per unit costs;

and improvement of labor-management relations

so as to assure uninterrupted production to new markets, such as the
growing electric utility market.

The operators agreed to cooperate

with the union in implementing these goals when both parties signed
the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, the first
industry-wide agreement that is also frequently referred to as the
Mechanization Agreement.
The focus of this study is the impact of the United Mine Workers'
encouragement of mechanization on the union and on worker earnings,
health, safety, and welfare in the bituminous coal mining industry
from 1946 to 1971.

Data and information obtained from government
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documents, labor-management reports, congressional testimony, court
decisions, industry and union publications, unpublished and personal
materials, publications of dissident miner organizations, and personal
interviews are thoroughly analyzed.
study are:

The primary conclusions of the

1) since the advent of mechanization, average annual

earnings of coal miners have increased at a slower rate than the
average annual earnings of workers in the benchmark steel and motor
vehicle industries;

2) the advent of mechanization was not accompa-

nied by an improved worker safety record;

3) since the advent of

mechanization, conditions that adversely affect the health of working
coal miners have developed;

4) since the advent of mechanization,

benefits available from the United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement
Fund have increased at a slower rate than benefits available to union
employees in the benchmark steel and motor vehicle industries;

and

5) since the advent of mechanization, the economic interests of both
the United Mine Workers of America and the major coal operators have
become increasingly similar.
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